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Introduction 
In this chapter, I will argue that the study of cultural differences in the relative 
persuasiveness of evidence types is important to increase our understanding of 
argument quality in persuasive effects research. I will first introduce argument 
quality and the role of evidence (1.1). Subsequently, I will explain why culture may 
affect the relative persuasiveness of evidence types, which results in the 
formulation of the research questions (1.2). This chapter ends with an overview of 
the present study (1.3). 
1.1  Argument quality 
There is a long tradition in the study of persuasion. The ancient Greek 
philosophers were probably the first to intensively reflect on the persuasion 
process. Aristotle’s work in particular has had a major influence on our thinking 
about how messages should be designed in order to successfully persuade people. 
The Greek approach to studying persuasion was theoretical, and rather intuitive. 
However sound most of the Greeks’ reflections may appear, they were not 
submitted to empirical tests until the 20th century. From then on, however, scholars 
have conducted persuasion studies in a systematic and empirical way. The 
approach to studying persuasion has therefore changed dramatically (see 
McGuire, 2000; Perloff, 2003), but the main objective of such studies has remained 
the same since the Greeks: gaining insight into the persuasion process. 
Aristotle distinguished between three instruments of persuasion: ethos, 
pathos, and logos (Aristotle, trans. 1932). Persuaders using ethos try to create a 
positive, competent image of themselves through their words and gestures. The 
strategy of pathos relies on the arousal of emotions of the persuadees. Finally, the 
instrument of logos implies setting up a line of reasoning with constellations of 
claims and supporting arguments. Current persuasion studies are still interested in 
the ways the use of ethos, pathos, and logos affects persuasive outcomes (see 
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Hoeken, 2001c). Fishbein and Ajzen (1981, p. 359) underscored the importance of 
studying logos, and especially the persuasive effectiveness of arguments. They 
stressed that the lack of research attention to the persuasiveness of arguments is 
“probably the most serious problem in communication and persuasion research”. 
Recently, the social psychologist McGuire (2000) compared current persuasive 
effects research with the ancient Greek study of persuasion. He remarked that 
current researchers have neglected a few important topics in persuasion that were 
already studied by the Greeks. One of these topics is the relative persuasiveness of 
different types of argument.  
Most of the research that has been done on the effectiveness of arguments was 
carried out within the framework of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), one 
of the most influential persuasion models of the last decades (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986)1. People in principle want to hold correct beliefs and attitudes. If they are 
confronted with a persuasive message, they will therefore want to assess the 
correctness of the claim in such a message. The ELM’s central assumption is that 
the extent to which people are willing to base their beliefs and attitudes on a 
critical assessment of the arguments in the message is variable. The likelihood that 
people will elaborate a message depends on individual and situational factors. 
People who are highly motivated and able to scrutinize a persuasive message are 
predicted to follow the central route to persuasion. They will examine the 
arguments in the message. Strong arguments will persuade them, and weak 
arguments will not. If people lack motivation and/or the ability to scrutinize a 
message, they are predicted to take the peripheral route, that is, they will rely on a 
more superficial way of processing the information. They will use heuristics, or 
rules of thumb, such as ‘there are a lot of arguments, so it must be true’. Heuristics 
can only be used, if cues are present in the persuasive message, such as a number 
of arguments. Strong cues (a large number of arguments) will lead to more 
persuasion than weak cues (a small number of arguments). The quality of the 
arguments is not important in the peripheral route: strong arguments are as 
persuasive as weak arguments. 
Although the ELM has stimulated studying the conditions under which 
argument quality comes into play, it has failed to answer the question as to what 
really constitutes a strong argument. What did the strong and weak arguments 
look like that were used in ELM experiments? Consider examples (1), a strong 
argument, and (2), a weak argument, used in the typical persuasive message in 
ELM studies about the implementation of a senior comprehensive exam: 
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(1) “Data from the University of Virginia, where comprehensive exams were 
recently instituted, indicate that the average starting salary of graduates 
increased over $4000 over the two-year period in which the exams were 
begun. At comparable universities without comprehensive exams, salaries 
increased only $850 over the same period [...].” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, pp. 
56-57) 
 
(2) “A member of the Board of Curators has stated publicly that his brother had to 
take a comprehensive exam while in college and now he is manager of a large 
restaurant. [...] He also indicated that the university has received several letters 
from parents in support of the exam. In fact, 4 of the 6 parents who wrote in 
thought that the exams were an excellent idea [...].” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 
58) 
 
What distinguishes the quality of these two arguments? Is it the difference between 
the University of Virginia and the member of the Board of Curators? Is it the 
discrepancy between a dataset versus one restaurant manager? Or is an average 
starting salary more relevant than the approval of parents? As these arguments 
differ in various ways, it is difficult to determine what characterizes a strong or a 
weak argument. Recently, the problematic status of argument quality in the ELM 
has repeatedly been emphasized (e.g., Areni, 2002; O’Keefe, 2002; Van Enschot-
Van Dijk, Hustinx, & Hoeken, 2003). O’Keefe (1995, 2002) has regularly discussed 
the shortcomings of Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) approach to argument quality in 
the ELM. His starting point is the empirical definition of argument quality. In the 
ELM approach, participants were given a series of arguments that they had to rate 
for persuasiveness. Other participants were then asked to think about such 
arguments, and to record their thoughts during the processing of the arguments. 
These arguments were then labeled as strong or weak: 
 
“We define a ‘strong message’ as one containing arguments such that when subjects are 
instructed to think about the message, the thoughts that they generate are 
predominantly favorable. [...] the arguments in a weak message are such that when 
subjects are instructed to think about them, the thoughts that they generate are 
predominantly unfavorable” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 32) 
 
In a subsequent experiment, other participants were given a persuasive message 
that included these strong or weak arguments. They were asked to evaluate the 
message and to record their thoughts. Typically, strong arguments were found to 
be more persuasive, and to elicit more favorable thoughts than the weak 
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arguments. However, strong arguments had already been manipulated as being 
more persuasive than weak arguments. Therefore, O’Keefe (2002, p. 155) argued 
that a circular reasoning is in play in this approach to argument quality: 
 
“Thus to say, ‘Under conditions of high elaboration, strong arguments have been found 
to be more effective than weak arguments’ is rather like saying, ‘Bachelors have been 
found to be unmarried’. Researchers did not need empirical research to find these 
things out” 
 
Unfortunately, the empirical approach to a definition of strong and weak 
arguments gives no answer to the question of what specific qualities an argument 
must have to be persuasive. 
There is a need for deeper insight into argument quality. With the current ELM 
understanding of argument quality, “it is not yet possible to provide much 
direction to persuaders about just how to compose effective messages under 
conditions of high elaboration likelihood” (O’Keefe, 2002, p. 147). In order to be 
able to distinguish strong and weak arguments, it is important to have a clearer 
notion of argument itself. In the ELM, arguments were defined as “bits of 
information [...] that are relevant to a person’s subjective determination of the true 
merits of an advocated position” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 16). This means that 
‘argument’ was defined very vaguely. Booth-Butterfield and Welbourne (2002, p. 
167) correctly remark that the ELM fails to “provide significant conceptual 
understanding of a most basic construct – argument”2. 
A solution to the problem of an empirical approach to argument quality is 
suggested in argumentation theory (O’Keefe, 1995, 2002; cf. Allen, et al., 2000). 
Argumentation theorists have a normative approach towards the quality of 
arguments. They address the question as to what characteristics should make an 
argument strong. Also, they make a distinction between different types of 
argumentation, of which each has its own normative criteria for good 
argumentation. These criteria are formulated as evaluation questions that can be 
asked to assess the quality of the arguments. An argument is strong, if it meets 
normative criteria. Under the condition in which people carefully scrutinize the 
arguments in a persuasive message – ELM’s central route – norms for acceptability 
should matter: normatively strong arguments should be persuasive, and 
normatively weak arguments should not be persuasive. A normative approach to 
argument quality hence provides a framework for studying the persuasive 
effectiveness of arguments that are normatively strong or weak. 
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The most common type of argumentation that is employed in persuasive 
communication, such as advertising (Schellens & Verhoeven, 1994), and public 
information campaigns (Schellens & De Jong, 2004), is pragmatic argumentation, 
or argumentation from consequences. It was also used in the persuasive messages 
of ELM studies (see, e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The prototypical example of 
pragmatic argumentation is the recommendation of an action on the basis of its 
positive consequences. In an advertisement, for example, the use of specific fitness 
equipment may simply be recommended by referring to the consequence of better 
stamina. Two important evaluation questions for good pragmatic argumentation 
are (Feteris, 2002; Schellens, 1985): (a) how probable is it that the action will lead to 
the consequence, in this case, that using this equipment will certainly lead to better 
stamina, and (b) how desirable is the consequence, in this case, the desirability of 
better stamina? The text in the ad about this fitness equipment is unclear about the 
probability and the desirability of better stamina. Ads like these may not be 
persuasive, because “consumers may neither automatically believe specific 
product claims to be true nor perceive them as desirable” (Munch, Boller, & Swasy, 
1993, p. 294).  
In order to make the ad more persuasive, the probability and desirability have 
to be made evident. This can be done by providing evidence, “data (facts or 
opinions) presented as proof for an assertion” (Reynolds & Reynolds, 2002, p. 429). 
Text writers may use different types of evidence. Hoeken and Hustinx (2003b) 
distinguish anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert evidence. Anecdotal evidence 
consists of one case, such as ‘Since Andrew Clark regularly uses this fitness 
equipment, his stamina has improved’. Statistical evidence consists of numerical 
information about a large number of cases, such as ‘A study among 426 people 
shows that their stamina has improved after having regularly used this 
equipment’. Causal evidence consists of an explanation, for instance that ‘The 
wireless heart rate monitor in the equipment enables the users to organize their 
workout, so that their stamina will improve effectively’. Finally, expert evidence 
consists of a confirmation by an expert, such as ‘Professor Delacroix, a specialist in 
sports medicine, underscores that the regular use of this fitness equipment will 
improve the users’ stamina’.  
From a normative point of view, an argument is strong if the evaluation 
questions related to it can be answered positively. A strong pragmatic argument, 
therefore, is an argument that makes it highly probable that the consequences will 
occur, and that makes the consequences highly (un)desirable (cf. Hoeken, 1997). 
The stronger the evidence in support of the probability and the desirability is, the 
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stronger the pragmatic argument will be. Different types of evidence are not 
equally persuasive (see, e.g., reviews of Baesler & Burgoon, 1994; Reinard, 1988). In 
order to increase our understanding of argument quality, the study of the relative 
persuasiveness of evidence types is therefore important. A number of studies have 
investigated the relative persuasiveness of evidence types, but there is still much to 
be learned about which type of evidence is the most persuasive (O’Keefe, 2002; 
Reynolds & Reynolds, 2002). O’Keefe suggests that the mechanisms that explain or 
affect research findings on the effects of evidence should be identified. Some 
evidence studies have already started to investigate different aspects, such as 
involvement (Slater & Rouner, 1996), and the vividness of the evidence (Baesler & 
Burgoon, 1994). However, another aspect has remained untouched: the cultural 
background of the receiver of evidence.  
The question about the possible effect of culture on the relative persuasiveness 
of evidence types was asked in the first review of studies on evidence effects: 
“Does evidence function the same way in various cultures?” (McCroskey, 1969, p. 
176). Research on this aspect has been called for in studies on evidence (Allen & 
Preiss, 1997; Bradac, Sandell, & Wenner, 1979; Greene & Brinn, 2003; Reynolds & 
Reynolds, 2002), and argumentation (Hollihan & Baaske, 1998; Sanders, Gass & 
Wiseman, 1991), but no article has ever been published about the role of culture on 
the relative persuasiveness of evidence types. In Reinard’s (1988) review of studies 
on the relative persuasiveness of evidence types, there is only one unpublished 
study that investigated reactions of people from different cultures to types of 
source evidence in propaganda messages. Recently, Parrott, Silk, Dorgan, Condit, 
and Harris (2005) examined the effect of culture on the perceived persuasiveness of 
evidence, but they compared two forms of one type of evidence (statistical 
evidence with a visual or a verbal representation). These types of evidence were 
perceived as equally persuasive by African Americans and European Americans. 
1.2  The role of culture 
From a normative point of view, the persuasiveness of evidence should depend on 
the degree to which evidence respects the normative criteria for the support of a 
claim. If people carefully evaluate the persuasiveness of statistical evidence, for 
instance, argument theory supposes that the norm of a large sample size comes 
into play. The sample size in the statistical evidence, such as 426 people who used 
the fitness equipment, has to be sufficiently large in order to generalize to the claim 
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about the whole population. Processes, such as causal attribution, induction, and 
prediction, describe the ways in which people deal with these norms. These 
psychological processes have been investigated from a cultural perspective (e.g., 
Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998). Such cultural studies show that 
processes may differ between people from various cultures. A recent framework 
for cultural differences and similarities in reasoning is that of analytic versus 
holistic thought (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). 
Nisbett et al. (2001) focus on cultures influenced by ancient Greece, and 
cultures influenced by the ancient Chinese culture, as these are known to differ in 
their ways of reasoning. Cultures influenced by ancient Greece (e.g., Europe, 
United States) are characterized by analytic thought, whereas cultures affected by 
the ancient Chinese culture (e.g., China, Japan) are characterized by holistic 
thought. Analytic thought is a rule-based system that has “a tendency to focus on 
attributes of the object to assign it to categories, and a preference for using rules 
about the categories to explain and predict the object’s behavior” (p. 293). Holistic 
thought is a system “involving an orientation to the context or field as a whole, 
including attention to relationships between a focal object and the field, and a 
preference for explaining and predicting events on the basis of such relationships” 
(p. 293). Nisbett et al. discuss studies that show that this ancient distinction in 
reasoning between the West and the East still exists. One of these studies is 
Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, and Nisbett (2002, study III), in which the evaluation of 
deductive arguments was investigated in two cultures. Deductive arguments 
reason from general to particular. Two types of deductive arguments were 
distinguished: atypical and typical arguments. In the typical arguments, such as 
(3), the category in the conclusion is typical for the overall category in the premise. 
In the atypical arguments, such as (4), the category in the conclusion is not typical 
for the overall category in the premise. 
 
(3)   All Europeans are nice people    [premise] 
Therefore, Germans are nice people   [conclusion] 
 
(4)  All Europeans are nice people    [premise] 
Therefore, Polish are nice people   [conclusion] 
 
From the perspective of analytic thought, the two types of arguments should be 
equally persuasive. Once the unexpressed premise is detected – namely that 
Germans or Polish are Europeans – the reader will consider the argument a valid 
deductive argument. From a holistic point of view, attention is paid to the 
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similarity relations between the category, here the overall category in the premise, 
and the exemplar, here the category in the conclusion. The exemplar can be either 
typical or atypical for the category. With holistic reasoning, the typical exemplars 
should be more convincing than the atypical exemplars. Norenzayan et al. (2002, 
study III) gave these two types of arguments to European Americans and Koreans. 
A manipulation check showed that both cultural groups rated the typical 
exemplars as more typical than the atypical exemplars. With respect to the 
hypotheses, Koreans proved to be more persuaded by the typical exemplars than 
the atypical counterparts, whereas the two types of exemplars were equally 
persuasive to the Americans. In conclusion, for Eastern participants the typicality 
of the category in the conclusion is important for the assessment of the 
persuasiveness of a deductive argument. Studies such as these demonstrate that 
cultures may differ in basic cognitive processes. If processes related to the 
evaluation of arguments may be culture-dependent, it is also possible that there 
are cultural differences in the relative persuasiveness of evidence types.  
General research questions 
Kline (1971a) argued that a distinction should be made between actual 
persuasiveness (How persuasive are the types of evidence in reality?), and 
expected persuasiveness (How persuasive do people expect the types of evidence 
to be?). A comparison of both types of persuasiveness is important for the 
understanding of the persuasion process:  
 
“Such studies of the [actual persuasive] effects of evidence on audiences are useful, but 
they are not sufficient for an adequate understanding of communication, since an 
audience responding to a message is only one of the important parts of the process. 
Among other things, we must also study the encoding part, e.g., the way in which 
sources select materials for their messages” (Kline, 1971a, p. 190) 
 
Studying expected persuasiveness should not replace that of actual persuasiveness, 
but it is an useful complement (O’Keefe, 2002). The two general research questions 
of this dissertation were therefore the following: 
 
General RQ1 Are there cultural differences in the relative expected persuasiveness 
of anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert evidence? 
 
General RQ2 Are there cultural differences in the relative actual persuasiveness of 
anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert evidence? 
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Specific research questions 
On the basis of available cultural research on analytic versus holistic thought, there 
are no straightforward indications whether one type of evidence is more 
persuasive in one culture than in another. This kind of prediction may be possible, 
nevertheless, when values are taken as a possible source of cultural differences in 
the relative persuasiveness of evidence types.  
There is growing interest in the impact of culture, and cultural values in the 
field of persuasion (see, e.g., Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997; Fitch, 2003; Le Pair, 
Crijns, & Hoeken, 2000), and argumentation (e.g., Aldrich, 2003; Warnick & 
Manusov, 2000). Fitch remarks that it is “commonly recognized that persuasion is 
fundamentally shaped by culture” (p. 100). The interest in the effect of culture goes 
back, argues Fitch, to the foundation of rhetoric with Aristotle. Simply stated, 
persuasive attempts should be consistent with the values and beliefs that are 
shared by the audience. If an audience with another cultural background has other 
values, the persuasive message may have to be adapted to these values. Research 
has indeed shown that cultures may differ in their value hierarchies, that is, in the 
relative importance that they attach to basic values such as freedom, pleasure, and 
creativity. The best-known evidence comes from Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) extensive 
survey among people from 50 countries and three regions. Analyses of the large 
dataset revealed a pattern of four value dimensions: individualism – collectivism, 
uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and masculinity – femininity. Each of the 
countries (cultures) investigated was assigned a score on these dimensions. 
Cultures were shown to have specific value hierarchies ranging from values that 
are relatively important to values that are relatively unimportant. In the United 
States, for instance, individualist values (e.g., independence) are important, 
whereas in Chinese culture collectivist values (e.g., loyalty) are prioritized.  
As different cultures may have different values priorities and beliefs, messages 
should be adapted to be consistent with the values and beliefs of a specific culture. 
This ancient Greek suggestion has received some research attention in advertising 
research. Advertisements often refer to values, such as loyalty or safety. A number 
of experimental studies have been set up to investigate whether advertisements are 
more effective if the values that they appeal to are adapted from culture to culture. 
Le Pair et al. (2000) provide a review of such empirical studies. In one of these 
studies, Han and Shavitt (1994), an ad with an individualist value appeal (referring 
to the importance of self) was more persuasive than an ad with a collectivist value 
appeal (referring to the importance of groups and society) in the United States, 
whereas the reverse was true for Korea. In five of the six published experiments 
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that Le Pair et al. reviewed, advertisements were more effective when the values 
they appealed to were important for a specific culture than when they were not. In 
the other experiment, the unadapted value appeal was more persuasive than the 
adapted appeal. 
The value dimensions approach appears to be the most popular strategy that is 
used to characterize and study culture (Fiske, et al., 1998). In fact, values are a 
useful tool for understanding cultures, because value priorities of individuals can 
be related to attitudes and behavior (Smith & Schwartz, 1997). This means that, 
apart from the studies on cultural value adaptation in persuasive messages, culture 
can be studied by relating cultural values to attitudes and behavior. The 
importance that cultures attach to certain values may be an indication of the kinds 
of information that they find important or persuasive. If one is to search for 
possible links between cultural values, and the four types of evidence, the 
relationship between power distance and expert evidence is the most obvious (see 
Jansen, 1999).  
The concept of power distance originates from social psychology. According to 
the power distance theory of Mulder (1977), power is the potential to determine 
the behavior of other people. Power distance is the degree to which power is 
distributed equally. A large power distance between two persons means that one 
person has more potential to determine the behavior of the other person than the 
other way around. In contrast, a small power distance between two persons 
implies that both persons have an equal potential to influence the behavior of the 
other. In his study on cultural values, Hofstede (1980, 2001) showed that cultures 
may differ in values that refer to power distance. He defines power distance as 
“the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations 
within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally” (2001, p. 
98). Power is not strictly defined, and may vary from social status to prestige and 
wealth (Hofstede, 2001). Walton (1997) distinguished between two types of 
authorities that argumentation may appeal to: an administrative authority, whose 
power is related to rules, and a cognitive authority, whose power comes from a 
high level of knowledge. A cognitive authority, or an epistemic authority 
(Kruglanski, 1989) is a source people may rely on when they acquire knowledge or 
make decisions. For expert evidence to be persuasive, the receiver will have to 
accept that the cognitive authority (the expert) possesses more knowledge about 
the topic in question. Kruglanski et al. (2005) suggested that the influence of 
experts on people depends on the perceived gap between their own knowledge 
and that of the expert. As a gap in knowledge may be accepted more easily in large 
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versus small power distance cultures, it could be argued that expert evidence may 
be more persuasive in these large power distance cultures. 
Indirect evidence for a relationship between power distance and the reliance 
on experts was given by Pornpitakpan and Francis (2001). They investigated 
whether participants from a collectivist, large power distance, and strong 
uncertainty avoidance culture (Thailand) were more influenced by source expertise 
than participants from an individualist, small power distance, and weak 
uncertainty avoidance culture (Canada). Participants were given arguments 
(strong or weak in ELM terms) and an expert cue (high, moderate, or low 
expertise) in a shampoo ad. Source expertise tended to have more impact on the 
persuasiveness of the ad for the Thai than for the Canadian participants. The 
unique contribution of the dimension of power distance to this effect, however, 
could not be determined. 
In order to effectively investigate the effect of culture on the persuasiveness of 
expert evidence, at least two cultures have to be compared that are as similar as 
possible on all aspects except the one under investigation (Van de Vijver & Leung, 
1997), in this case power distance. This reduces the number of alternative 
explanations, and enhances the validity of the effect of culture on the 
persuasiveness of expert evidence. Two cultures that meet this criterion are the 
Dutch and the French culture. These European cultures differ considerably on the 
dimension of power distance (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Koopman, et al., 1999). In 
general, French people are said to accept and expect large power distances 
between people with a relatively low power (e.g., lay people), and people with a 
relatively high power (e.g., experts). France scored 68 on a scale of 0 (smallest 
power distance) to 100 (largest power distance). In contrast, people in the 
Netherlands generally have a relatively small power distance: they scored 38 on 
the same power distance scale. This leads to two specific research questions: 
 
Specific RQ1 Is the expected persuasiveness of expert evidence higher for the 
French than for the Dutch? 
 
Specific RQ2 Is the actual persuasiveness of expert evidence higher for the French 
than for the Dutch? 
 
The main objective of this dissertation was to investigate whether the cultural 
background of receivers affects the relative persuasiveness of anecdotal, statistical, 
causal, and expert evidence. This investigation concerned two cultures (the Dutch 
and the French), and four types of evidence, but focused in particular on one type 
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of evidence: expert evidence. In this dissertation, I will present five empirical 
studies. Studies 1 and 2 investigated the role of culture on expected persuasiveness, 
whereas Studies 3 and 4 examined the actual persuasiveness of the evidence types 
in France and the Netherlands. Study 5, finally, was set up for further clarification 
of the results of Study 4. 
1.3  Overview of the study 
The studies that will be presented in this dissertation were set up to investigate the 
role of culture on the relative persuasiveness of evidence types3. The starting point 
of these studies is the normative approach to argument and evidence quality. In 
Chapter 2, I will further explain the role of evidence within the framework of 
pragmatic argumentation. I will present the normative criteria for the 
persuasiveness of the four types of evidence. Chapter 3 is the empirical 
counterpart of Chapter 2. I will discuss whether what should be persuasive 
according to the normative criteria is also persuasive in practice by discussing the 
relevant empirical research on this matter. Such a comparison will also be carried 
out from a cultural perspective. I will also provide a review of studies that 
investigated the actual relative persuasiveness of evidence types.  
The empirical studies that were conducted to answer the research questions 
presented above will be presented in Chapters 4 – 6. In Chapter 4, I will review the 
few empirical studies that have been conducted on the expected persuasiveness of 
evidence types. The first of the two empirical studies that I conducted on the 
expected persuasiveness of evidence types will be presented in this chapter. This 
study concerned a corpus analysis of professional text writers’ use of the four types 
of evidence in Dutch and French persuasive information brochures. 
Chapter 5 will discuss the second study in this domain, an experiment on the 
expected persuasiveness of evidence types. The presentation of this study will be 
preceded by a discussion of the experimental approach to Studies 2 – 4, and of the 
instruments that were used to measure the effect of culture on the relative 
persuasiveness of evidence types. In Chapter 6, I will present two studies on the 
relative actual persuasiveness of evidence types. Study 3 compared the 
persuasiveness of anecdotal, statistical, causal and expert evidence evidence in the 
two cultures. Where possible, these evidence types were normatively strong. Study 
4 compared the persuasiveness of normatively strong and normatively weak 
statistical and expert evidence. The chapter will end with a supplementary study 
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conducted to throw light on a finding from Study 4. Finally, in Chapter 7, I will 
present my conclusion on cultural differences in the relative expected and actual 
persuasiveness of evidence types in the Dutch and the French culture. 
Notes 
1. Another dual-process model, Chaiken’s (1987) Heuristic-Systematic Model, resembles 
the ELM a lot (see for an overview of differences and similarities, Kruglanski & 
Thompson, 1999a). I will concentrate on the ELM in this dissertation, because it is the 
most widely used model of the two. 
2.  A solution to the problem of what is an argument may also come from the Unimodel, a 
new view on the modeling of the persuasion process introduced in reaction to the 
vagueness of the concept of argument in the ELM (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a, 
1999b). The underlying starting point of the Unimodel is a reflection on the question of 
which information serves as an argument. Persuasion is related to the process of 
judgment formation during which beliefs are formed on the basis of evidence. 
According to the Unimodel, “cues and message arguments all constitute forms [...] of 
persuasive evidence” (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a, p. 92). The Unimodel does not 
distinguish arguments and cues, but regards both types of information as an argument, 
or more precisely, as evidence for the message conclusion or claim. Although the 
Unimodel does not offer a framework to study evidence, it “reintroduces the concept of 
evidence as a central feature of persuasion” (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999b, p. 192). 
The model is a further encouragement to study the persuasive effects of evidence, 
because “contemporary persuasion models neglected the role of evidence” (Kruglanski 
& Thompson, 1999b, p. 192).  
3.  Some of these studies and parts of this dissertation have been published elsewhere: 
parts of Chapter 3 in Hornikx (in press-a), parts of Chapter 4 in Hornikx, Starren, and 
Hoeken (2003), parts of Chapter 5 in Hornikx (in press-b), Study 1 in Hornikx (2003, 
2004), Study 2 in Hornikx (2005), and Study 3 in Hornikx and Hoeken (2005). 
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A normative approach to the 
persuasiveness of evidence 
Evidence has been investigated in different fields of study in the humanities and 
the social sciences, such as argumentation and debate (Klopf & McCroskey, 1969), 
decision making (Bradac, Sandell, & Wenner, 1979), cognitive psychology 
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), mass communication (Brosius & Bathelt, 
1994), advertising (Dickson, 1982), educational communication (Koballa, 1986), 
health communication (Slater & Rouner, 1996), and policy communication 
(Hoeken, 2001b). Given this widespread and varied interest in evidence, it is 
important to specify the approach to evidence in this dissertation. As I mentioned 
in Chapter 1, a study of the persuasive effects of evidence is highly relevant within 
the framework of argument quality in the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). In 
this ELM, argument quality has been approached empirically, which hampers our 
understanding of what characterizes strong and weak arguments. A normative 
approach is a solution to this problem. The argumentation used in persuasive 
messages is usually pragmatic argumentation. The normative criteria for strong 
pragmatic argumentation will be presented in Section 2.1. Evidence plays an 
important role here, because the normative criteria can be met by including strong 
evidence. I will introduce different types of evidence (2.2), and I will present 
normative criteria for strong evidence that constitute a normatively strong 
pragmatic argument (2.3). This chapter will end with a discussion of how the 
normative approach to argument and evidence quality relates to a cultural 
approach (2.4). 
2.1  Pragmatic argumentation 
Persuasive messages, which aim to influence people’s attitude towards an object or 
behavior, often use argumentation to persuade them. These messages usually 
contain pragmatic argumentation. This is the case for advertising (Schellens & 
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Verhoeven, 1994), public information (Schellens & De Jong, 2004), and policy 
communication (Schellens & Lagerwerf, 2003). The persuasive messages in ELM 
studies also employed pragmatic argumentation to convince the participants of the 
implementation of a comprehensive exam (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In 
pragmatic argumentation, an action is recommended on the basis of its favorable 
consequences (positive variant) or advised against on the basis of its unfavorable 
consequences (negative variant) (Feteris, 2002; Schellens, 1985). The simplest form 
of the positive variant of pragmatic argumentation looks like (1), and the negative 
variant like (2): 
 
(1)  action A leads to B 
B is desirable 
therefore: action A is desirable 
 
(2)  action A leads to B 
B is not desirable 
therefore: action A is not desirable 
 
The implementation of a comprehensive exam, for instance, may be recommended 
by referring to higher starting salaries for students. As higher salaries are desirable, 
so is the comprehensive exam. Schellens (1985) demonstrated that there are 
different kinds of pragmatic argumentation, but that these can all be reduced to the 
simple form of (1) or (2). Another commonality of pragmatic argumentation is the 
often implicit rule “From the given number of alternative actions, the action that 
leads to the highest benefits at the lowest cost should be preferred” (p. 154). There 
might, for instance, be alternative behavior that guarantees higher starting salaries, 
such as participations in courses that prepare students for the labor market. The 
more available alternative actions there are, and the more negative and positive 
consequences relate to these actions, the more complicated pragmatic 
argumentation will be. The implementation of the comprehensive exam might, for 
instance, also have a negative consequence, namely a considerable investment. 
Case (3) is an example of a more complex form of pragmatic argumentation, of 
which (4) is a concrete example.  
 
(3)  action A leads to B 
A costs X 
B is desirable 
B counterbalances X 
therefore: action A is desirable 
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(4)  the implementation of a comprehensive exam leads to higher starting salaries 
the implementation is an expensive operation 
higher starting salaries are desirable 
higher starting salaries counterbalance the high costs 
therefore: the implementation of a comprehensive exam is desirable 
 
When argumentation theorists evaluate forms of argumentation, they use a series 
of normative, critical questions. On the basis of these evaluation questions, the 
quality of an argument is assessed. If an argument meets the criteria, it is 
considered as a strong argument. Schellens (1985) lists six evaluation questions for 
pragmatic argumentation: 
 
1.  Is B desirable? 
2.  Does action A lead to B? 
3.  Is action A feasible? 
4.  Is action A acceptable? 
5.  Do B and the possible other positive consequences of A counterbalance the  
disadvantages of A? 
6.  Is A the action that leads to B at the lowest cost. 
 
Of these questions, the first two appear essential (Feteris, 2002; Van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1992). The first one is about the desirability of the consequence: are 
higher starting salaries desirable? The second one is about the probability of the 
consequence: does the implementation of a comprehensive exam really lead to 
higher starting salaries? A pragmatic argument is normatively strong if these 
critical questions can be answered affirmatively. A strong argument in pragmatic 
argumentation, therefore, is an argument that makes it highly probable that the 
consequence will occur, and that indicates that the consequence is highly 
(un)desirable (Hoeken, 1997). In everyday argumentative discourse, pragmatic 
argumentation is usually employed in its simplest form, such as (1) or (2). Such 
simplified forms of argumentation may not supply sufficient information to 
answer the questions about the desirability and the probability of the consequence 
(cf. Munch, Boller, & Swasy, 1993). In order to make pragmatic argumentation 
normatively stronger, evidence can be employed as support for the probability and 
the desirability. Evidence is defined as “data (facts or opinions) presented as proof 
for an assertion” (Reynolds & Reynolds, 2002, p. 429). Evidence has been 
distinguished from other types of data that can be used to support claims. 
According to Klopf and McCroskey (1969), there are three distinct types of data: 
first-order data (audience opinion or audience knowledge), second-order data 
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(opinions or information asserted by the person that puts forward the claim), and 
third-order data. Third-order data are the most frequently used data and are called 
evidence. 
From a normative point of view, the probability and the desirability of the 
consequence are equally important to a strong argument. In practice, the use of 
evidence appears to be less necessary for the desirability than for the probability of 
the consequence. Schellens and De Jong (2004) suggested that evidence for the 
desirability of consequences, such as a higher salary or good health, may be 
redundant if these consequences are in the people’s own interest. People are often 
capable themselves of judging the desirability of consequences. This suggestion 
was supported in a corpus study of persuasive information brochures (Hornikx, 
Starren, & Hoeken, 2003). Evidence was given over three times as often in support 
for the probability than for the desirability of consequences. This does not mean, 
however, that providing support for the desirability is always redundant. Support 
appears necessary when the desirability of the consequences is not self-evident, for 
instance with consequences that are related to others. For example, people may not 
immediately grasp the desirability of better public transport in the Western region 
of Nigeria. In a fundraising brochure about better public transport in this region, 
evidence in support for this desirability could be necessary to convince the reader 
to donate to a specific fund. In the corpus study of Hornikx et al., evidence in 
support for the desirability of the consequences was indeed more frequent in 
brochures with an interest for other people than in brochures with a direct 
personal interest.  
With this normative framework of pragmatic argumentation, it is possible to 
gain a better understanding of argument quality. In the ELM studies, the 
implementation of a senior comprehensive exam was recommended on the basis of 
several arguments. From the perspective of pragmatic argumentation, each 
argument consisted of a consequence of the exam’s implementation, such as a 
higher starting salary. If the message had consisted of just this single consequence, 
the whole line of argumentation would have come down to (5) or, in a shorter 
formulation, (6): 
 
(5)  the implementation of a comprehensive exam leads to higher starting salaries 
higher starting salaries are desirable 
therefore: the implementation of a comprehensive exam is desirable 
 
(6) The implementation of a comprehensive exam is a good thing, because it will 
allow students to have a higher starting salary. 
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The strong and weak arguments in the ELM, however, were more elaborate than 
(5) and (6). Example (7), mentioned in Chapter 1, was a strong argument: 
 
(7) “Data from the University of Virginia, where comprehensive exams were 
recently instituted, indicate that the average starting salary of graduates 
increased over $4000 over the two-year period in which the exams were 
begun. At comparable universities without comprehensive exams, salaries 
increased only $850 over the same period [...].” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, pp. 
56-57) 
 
In my own reformulations, this argument consists of a desirable consequence of 
the exam (7a), and evidence that the implementation of the exam will indeed lead 
to this consequence (7b)1. 
 
(7a) Students who have passed a comprehensive exam will have a high average 
starting salary. 
 
(7b) A study has shown that the starting salaries of graduates at a university with 
comprehensive exams are much higher than these of graduates of comparable 
universities without comprehensive exams. 
 
An argument in ELM studies can therefore be defined as a desirable or undesirable 
consequence of a proposed action (7a), supported by evidence about the 
probability that the action will lead to the consequence (7b). Note that the 
desirability of the consequence was not supported by evidence in the typical ELM 
argument. If evidence is used in pragmatic argumentation, evidence for the 
probability of the consequences appears to be the most important.  
After having described the function of evidence in pragmatic argumentation, it 
is important to take a look at the characteristics of the claims that evidence 
supports. In fact, there are different kinds of claims: evaluative claims, normative 
claims, and descriptive or factual claims (Rieke & Sillars, 1984; Schellens & 
Verhoeven, 1994). An example of an evaluative claim is ‘The implementation of a 
comprehensive exam is bad’. An illustration of a normative claim is ‘The 
implementation of a comprehensive exam should be forbidden’. Descriptive claims 
are the kinds of claims that evidence supports in pragmatic argumentation, 
because these claims describe the occurrence of effects as a result of an action. 
However, since they describe a causal relation, these claims can also be regarded as 
causal claims. An example of a descriptive, causal claim is (8):  
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(8)  The implementation of a comprehensive exam leads to higher starting salaries. 
 
In addition, claims such as (8) are general: the phenomena are described 
independently of a context, or of a reference to time and space. In contrast, singular 
or specific claims deal with particular instances that occur at specific points in time 
and/or place, such as in example (9).  
 
(9) The implementation of a comprehensive exam at the University of Rotterdam 
will lead to higher starting salaries. 
 
The distinction between general and specific claims is often made in related fields 
of study, such as judgment and decision making (e.g., Anderson & Kellam, 1992), 
and causal cognition (e.g., Oestermeier & Hesse, 2001). This distinction is 
important, because it affects the set of normative criteria for strong evidence that 
supports these claims (see Section 2.3). In sum, the claims in the present study of 
the persuasive effects of evidence are descriptive, causal, and general. The 
evidence that can be employed in support of these claims has various forms. In the 
next section, I will present different types of evidence. 
2.2  Four types of evidence 
Different types of evidence can be used to support descriptive, causal, and general 
claims in pragmatic argumentation. In Section 2.2.1, I will give a historical 
overview of the distinction between anecdotal, statistical, and expert evidence. 
Anecdotal evidence consists of a specific instance (Rieke & Sillars, 1984, p. 92), 
statistical evidence is a numerical summary of a series of instances (p. 94), and 
expert evidence consists of the testimony of an expert (p. 94). In Section 2.2.2, I will 
discuss causal evidence, and its difference with the three other types of evidence. 
2.2.1 Historical overview 
There are a lot of different typologies of evidence types. Reynolds and Reynolds 
(2002, p. 437) are correct to posit that “Argumentation and persuasion scholars 
would be well-served by extended efforts at conceptualizing and testing different 
classifications of evidence types”. In order to give a rationale for the distinction 
between anecdotal, statistical, and expert evidence, I have traced the origins of the 
classifications of evidence types used in persuasion studies to debate textbooks. 
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Table 2.1 provides an overview of the three types of evidence in these two 
domains. I have used an old and a relatively new debate textbook (Klopf & 
McCroskey, 1969; Warnick & Inch, 1989), and reviews on the relative 
persuasiveness of evidence types that compared at least two of these evidence 
types (Allen & Preiss, 1997; Baesler & Burgoon, 1994; Reinard, 1988). 
 
Table 2.1  Anecdotal, statistical, and expert evidence in debate textbooks and persuasion 
studies 
 
 anecdotal statistical expert 
debate 1factual examples statistics  opinions, testimony 
 2reports, descriptions statistics  opinions 
    
persuasion 3reports of events, examples statistics  testimonial assertions 
 4report statistical - 
 5narrative  statistical expert testimonial assertions 
1Klopf & McCroskey (1969), 2Warnick & Inch (1989), 3Reinard (1988), 4Baesler & Burgoon (1994), 5Allen 
& Preiss (1997) 
 
Debate textbooks, which have become popular in the United States since the end of 
the 19th century, were aimed at educating students for a legal career or simply for 
participation in debates (see, e.g., Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck 
Henkemans, 1997). In these textbooks, evidence is regarded as “facts, opinions, and 
objects that are used to generate proof” (Freeley, 1976, p. 74)2. Klopf and 
McCroskey (1969) distinguished four types of evidence, of which the first one – 
tangible objects, such as murder weapons – is rarely used in argumentative texts. 
The other types of evidence are opinions or testimony, factual examples, and 
statistics. Two decades later, Warnick and Inch (1989) gave a similar division of 
evidence types. They distinguished opinion evidence, reports and descriptions, 
and statistics. Debate textbooks thus suggested that testimonial and factual 
(statistics or examples) evidence can be used in written communication. 
Experimental studies conducted to examine the relative persuasiveness of 
evidence types have generally concentrated on similar types of evidence. Initially 
expert evidence alone (McCroskey, 1969) was investigated. Later, the 
persuasiveness of expert, statistical and anecdotal evidence (Reinard, 1988) was 
studied. Most recently, the focus was on anecdotal and statistical evidence (Allen 
& Preiss, 1997; Baesler & Burgoon, 1994). Anecdotal and statistical evidence have 
been studied most extensively in persuasion studies. Concerning expert evidence, 
it should be noted that it was usually called source evidence. It appears legitimate 
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to label source evidence as expert evidence, because in the studies on source 
evidence reviewed by McCroskey sources in the experimental conditions differed 
in their perceived authoritativeness3.  
2.2.2  The case of causal evidence 
The study of the persuasiveness of causal evidence is relatively new. In 
argumentation and debate, there appears to be a distinction between causal 
evidence, and other types of evidence. For Klopf and McCroskey (1969), for 
instance, evidence is third-order data, whereas causal information is considered as 
second-order data that the debater gives himself. Also, Rieke and Sillars (1984) 
actually do not speak of ‘causal evidence’ in their book on argumentation, but 
present it as the argument by cause in another chapter than anecdotal, statistical, 
and expert evidence. The distinction between causal and the other types of 
evidence can also be expressed in terms of deductive and inductive reasoning (see, 
e.g., Van Eemeren, et al., 1997). Causal evidence in support of a causal claim is 
characterized by deduction: if the causal relationship in causal evidence is true, 
then the claim it supports is true. The three other types of evidence are 
characterized by induction: if the evidence is true, then the claim is probable. 
This distinction between deductive and inductive reasoning leads to the 
discussion of the fundamental difference between causal evidence and other 
evidence in the field of reasoning and thinking. Kuhn (1991) argues that there are 
two types of evidence that prove a claim such as ‘The implementation of a 
comprehensive exam leads to higher starting salaries’. The first type is genuine 
evidence, which establishes an empirical relationship between an antecedent and 
an outcome. Such evidence is “distinguishable from description of the causal 
sequence itself” (p. 45). Anecdotal and statistical evidence can be placed in this 
category. In contrast, causal evidence is called pseudoevidence, which “cannot be 
sharply distinguished from description of the causal sequence itself” (pp. 65-66). 
Pseudoevidence provides a causal theory, that is, the mechanism by which a cause 
produces an effect. Kuhn therefore concludes that “pseudoevidence must be 
regarded not as evidence at all, but as a part of the theory” (p. 95). Note that expert 
evidence seems to take a position between genuine and pseudoevidence. On the 
basis of Kuhn, it may be considered pseudoevidence, but on the basis of the 
distinction between deductive and inductive reasoning, it may be grouped with 
anecdotal and statistical evidence in the category of inductive reasoning. In this 
dissertation, expert evidence is considered genuine evidence, since experts are 
expected to provide genuine evidence when they are asked to. 
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If causal evidence differs fundamentally from anecdotal, statistical, and expert 
evidence, why should its persuasive effect be compared to that of genuine 
evidence? A straightforward argument is that pseudoevidence and genuine 
evidence can both be used as proof. Brem and Rips (2000, p. 574) argue that both 
“explanations and evidence can enhance an argument by encouraging arguers to 
accept or reject argument claims”. In fact, causal evidence appears to be an 
important source of information that people use to evaluate and support the 
probability of claims. First, concerning the evaluation of claims, a number of studies 
have shown that people make use of cause-effects relationships in order to 
coherently interpret and assess the likelihood of events (Ajzen, 1977; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1980). Ajzen specifically introduced the causality heuristic to stress this 
importance: “It is proposed that especially in the case of judgments concerning 
human behavior and its effects, people often rely on their intuitive understanding 
of the factors that cause the event in question” (pp. 303-304).  
Second, pseudoevidence is frequently employed to support claims. Kuhn (1991) 
had her participants generate causal theories for the occurrence of a phenomenon, 
such as unemployment. Subsequently, she asked these participants to provide 
evidence in support of their causal theory. All participants provided 
pseudoevidence for their own causes, but only 40% of them complemented it with 
genuine evidence. Brem and Rips (2000) demonstrated that this apparent 
preference for pseudoevidence as proof for causal claims is influenced by the 
availability of evidence. In a series of four studies, they showed that genuine 
evidence is used if it is available, and that people switch to explanations 
(pseudoevidence) if genuine evidence is unavailable. People also proved to be 
aware of their substitution of evidence for explanations when evidence is 
unavailable. Still, both Kuhn, and Brem and Rips demonstrated that 
pseudoevidence is an important source that people use to support causal claims. 
Pseudoevidence provides a mechanism for the cause-and-effect relation in the 
claim. Such mechanism information was found to be the most preferable causal 
information in paper-and-pencil experiments (Ahn, Kalish, Medin, & Gelman, 
1995), and to be the most frequently used causal information in causal arguments 
in journal articles (Oestermeier & Hesse, 2000).  
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2.3  Normative criteria 
From a normative point of view, a strong argument in pragmatic argumentation is 
an argument that makes it highly probable that a consequence will occur, and that 
indicates that this consequence is highly (un)desirable. When evidence is 
employed to support the probability, a line of argumentation is built, because 
evidence serves as an argument in support of a claim. Each line of argumentation 
can be characterized by the way in which the argument supports the claim. This 
characterization is called the argumentation scheme, “a more or less 
conventionalized way of representing the relation between what is stated in the 
argument and what is stated in the standpoint” (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 
1992, p. 96). One of these schemes was already presented in Section 2.1, namely the 
scheme of pragmatic argumentation. Each type of evidence that is used as an 
argument for a claim is related to an argumentation scheme. Surprisingly, evidence 
types and argumentation schemes have been treated separately in argumentation 
textbooks (e.g., Klopf & McCroskey, 1969; Warnick & Inch, 1989). The 
argumentation scheme, however, determines which critical questions have to be 
asked in order to determine the quality of evidence. Some textbooks did include 
criteria for evidence (e.g., Rieke & Sillars, 1984), but these criteria apparently were 
not based on any theoretical account. Such a basis is provided here. I will first 
present different argumentation schemes, before I will indicate what critical 
questions are relevant to the different types of evidence. 
Throughout the years, a lot of different classifications of argumentation 
schemes have been proposed. As a consequence, there are differences in the 
number of schemes, subschemes, and critical questions. It is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation to discuss these classifications. Instead, the starting point is the 
argumentation schemes and critical questions that are distinguished and 
formulated by Garssen (1997) and Schellens (1985), who both provided a review of 
classifications of argumentation schemes. When necessary, their schemes will be 
complemented with those of other argumentation theorists.  
Which argumentation schemes are related to the four types of evidence? The 
answer to this question depends on the type of claim. In fact, the argumentation 
scheme is an expression of the relationship between the argument (the type of 
evidence) and the claim. A change in the type of claim may alter the 
argumentation scheme in question. In Section 2.1, specific claims were 
distinguished from general claims. Evidence can be employed to support the 
general, descriptive claim ‘The implementation of a comprehensive exam leads to 
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higher starting salaries’, and the specific, descriptive claim ‘The implementation of 
a comprehensive exam at the University of Rotterdam will lead to higher starting 
salaries’. As Table 2.2 demonstrates, the argumentation scheme for statistical and 
anecdotal evidence is not the same when these evidence types support a general 
claim than when they support a specific claim4.  
 
Table 2.2 Argumentation schemes in relation to type of evidence and type of claim 
 
type of evidence general claim specific claim 
statistical argument by generalization argument by classification 
anecdotal argument by generalization argument by comparison 
causal argument by cause argument by cause 
expert argument by authority argument by authority 
 
In support of a general claim, statistical evidence is related to the argument by 
generalization. In an argument by generalization “you look at a series of instances 
and from them claim a general principle” (Rieke & Sillars, 1984, p. 72). A statement 
about the higher starting salaries that result from the implementation of 
comprehensive exams at a large number of universities may be used as evidence to 
generalize this result to universities in general. What critical questions can be 
asked to assess the quality of statistical evidence that is employed in support of a 
general claim? The critical questions for statistical evidence, as for the other types 
of evidence, will be presented in the form of normative criteria. I will present 
normative criteria that (a) are shared by most classifications (that is, they are listed 
in the overviews of Garssen, 1997 and/or Schellens, 1985), and/or that (b) are 
relevant in the framework of evidence supporting descriptive, causal claims in 
written persuasive communication. Appendix A provides a list of these normative 
criteria. Statistical evidence in support of general claims is normatively strong, if it 
meets the following two normative criteria: (a) the cases in the evidence should be 
representative of the class of cases in the claim, (b) the number of cases in the 
evidence should be sufficiently large in order to allow valid generalizations about 
the class of cases in the claim. Note that these normative criteria correspond to the 
rules of sampling theory about representativeness and sample size.  
In support of a specific claim, statistical evidence is related to the argument by 
classification. The scheme of classification is as follows: “what is true of the items 
reported in the evidence is also true of a hitherto unexamined item under 
consideration that is known (or believed) to fall within that class” (Ehninger & 
Brockriede, 1963, p. 145). The same evidence about the higher starting salaries at a 
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large number of universities is not generalized to universities in general, but to the 
University of Rotterdam in particular. This scheme of classification implies two 
subsequent steps: generalization from a sample of cases to a class of cases, and a 
comparison between the sample and the single case in the claim. The normative 
criteria that apply here are similar to those that were just discussed (step 1), 
complemented with a criterion about similarity between sample and case (step 2). 
In fact, the sample in the evidence may be large and representative of the 
population; this does not necessarily imply that the sample and the case are similar. 
The University of Rotterdam, for instance, may have a specific characteristic that is 
not shared by a sample of Dutch universities that – as a whole – is representative of 
all the Dutch universities. Therefore, the similarity criterion has to be included. The 
normative criteria therefore are: (a) the cases in the evidence should be 
representative of the class of cases to which the case that is presented in the claim 
belongs, (b) the number of cases in the evidence should be sufficiently large in 
order to allow valid generalizations about the class of cases to which the case in the 
claim belongs, (c) the cases in the evidence should be highly similar to the case 
presented in the claim.  
Next, anecdotal evidence is related to the argument by generalization when a 
general claim is concerned. The evidence that the implementation of a 
comprehensive exam at the University of Amsterdam has resulted in higher 
starting salaries may be used to support the general claim about higher salaries as 
a consequence of this comprehensive exam. The two normative criteria for the 
argument by generalization – sample size and representativeness – were presented 
for statistical evidence, and also apply to anecdotal evidence. By definition 
anecdotal evidence does not meet the criterion of large sample size. The 
representativeness criterion, however, can be met: a single case is representative of 
a group of cases, if they are highly similar. Similarity plays a more important role 
when anecdotal evidence is used to support a specific claim. Anecdotal evidence is 
then related to the argument by comparison. The same statement about the 
University of Amsterdam may be used to support the probability of the benefits of 
the comprehensive exam at the University of Rotterdam. In an argument by 
comparison, the argument is “presented as if there were a resemblance, an 
agreement, a likeness, a parallel, a correspondence or some kind of similarity 
between that which is stated in the argument and that which is stated in the 
standpoint” (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 97). Anecdotal evidence in 
support of specific claims is normatively strong, if it meets the following two 
normative criteria: (a) there should be a large number of relevant similarities 
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between the case in the evidence and the case in the claim, and (b) there should be 
no relevant dissimilarities between the case in the evidence and the case in the 
claim. 
When causal evidence supports a general or specific causal claim, the 
argument by cause is in play. In this argumentation scheme, the argument is 
“presented as if what is stated in the argumentation is a means to, a way to, an 
instrument to or some other kind of causative factor for the standpoint, or vice 
versa” (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 97). In pragmatic argumentation, 
causal evidence supports a claim that is causal itself. Causal evidence, therefore, 
provides a mechanism that explains the underlying causal relation in the claim (see 
Figure 2.1). With causal evidence, a causal relation is created from the cause in the 
claim (C1) to the effect in the claim (E1). An example is the explanation that, if 
comprehensive exams are introduced (C1), students will have more proof for their 
expertise (E2); this proof (C2) enables them to get higher salaries more quickly 
(E1). 
 
Figure 2.1  Causal evidence as a causal mechanism in support of the claim C1 > E1 
 
The causal mechanism in Figure 2.1 consists of two relations, but the number of 
relations may be higher. Causal evidence is normatively strong, if it meets three 
normative criteria for each relationship, such as from C1 to E2, or from C2 to E1. 
These normative criteria are (see, e.g., the rules for causality in social sciences in 
Elifson, Runyon, & Haber, 1998): (a) the cause and the effect should covary, (b) the 
cause should come into play before the effect occurs, and (c) there should not be 
other variables that trouble the causal relationship in a positive way (the 
relationship only holds if another variable is present), or in a negative way (the 
relationship does not hold if another variable is present). 
Finally, in an argument by authority “a statement is defended by pointing out 
the fact that an authoritative person or institution suscribes to it” (Schellens, 1985, 
p. 179). The simple fact that, for instance, Professor Jackson underscores that the 
implementation of a comprehensive exam leads to higher starting salaries, may 
C1 E1 
E2 / C2 
claim 
evidence 
cause effect 
mechanism 
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serve as support for the probability of this claim. Expert evidence can be 
considered as a form of genuine evidence, because experts are expected to be able 
to provide empirical facts (cf. Section 2.2.2). Facione and Scherer (1978, p. 315) 
clearly formulate this point: “Instead of the whole proof the reliable authorities 
give their word. They vouch for the conclusion’s being true, but they could have 
given the proof. They should be able to supply an acceptable proof upon demand”. 
Walton (1997) provided a detailed discussion of the argument by authority. He 
showed that there are two different types of authority: the administrative authority 
and the cognitive authority. An administrative authority has “the right to exercise 
command over others or to make rulings binding on others through an invested 
office or recognized position of power” (p. 76). Examples are a minister and a 
mayor. When a cognitive authority is concerned, there is “a relationship between 
two individuals where one is an expert in a field of knowledge in such a manner 
that his pronouncements in the field carry a special weight of presumption for the 
other individual” (p. 77). Expert evidence is most related to the cognitive authority. 
Expert evidence as support for general or specific claims is normatively strong, if it 
meets the following three normative criteria: (a) the expert should be credible, (b) 
the expert should be reliable, and (c) the expert should have a high expertise in the 
field that is relevant to the claim. 
2.4  Different cultures, different norms? 
In Section 2.3, I presented normative criteria that are expected to affect the 
persuasiveness of the four types of evidence. Normatively strong evidence should 
be more persuasive than normatively weak evidence if people carefully scrutinize 
the evidence in a persuasive message. These normative criteria were developed by 
American and European argumentation theorists, and scholars in the social 
sciences. There are no research findings to date that demonstrate that norms 
related to the persuasiveness of evidence types differ or not from culture to 
culture. Still, if norms should be culture-independent, cultures may react 
differently to these norms (see Section 3.1.2). Apart from this lack of empirical 
evidence, philosophers and argumentation theorists have stressed the importance 
of cultural differences in the evaluation of argument quality (see, e.g., MacIntyre, 
1988; McKerrow, 1990). According to the multiculturalism perspective, the 
evaluation of argument quality depends on culturally specific beliefs and values. 
This perspective contradicts the normative approach to argument quality, which 
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argues that an argument is strong if it justifies the claim that it supports. In this 
view, argument quality is not dependent on the evaluator, but is an intrinsic 
characteristic of the argument. Siegel (1999) critically analyzed both perspectives, 
and concluded that the multiculturalist perspective fails against the normative 
approach. The multiculturalists claim that there are no transcultural, objective 
principles. Without these principles, however, argues Siegel, they can not criticize 
other perspectives, including their own normative perspective.  
Apparently, there are different opinions as to whether argument quality is an 
intrinsic characteristic of an argument or whether it depends on receivers’ cultural 
characteristics. In addition, if argument quality is culture-dependent, it is still an 
open question as to whether the norms are universal and people’s reactions to 
them are culture-dependent, or as to whether norms themselves may be culture-
dependent. Empirical research is needed to gain insight into this question. A 
number of studies have investigated whether norms do matter in practice, but not 
from a cultural perspective. In the next chapter, I will review such studies on the 
norms related to the four types of evidence. 
Notes 
1. Other researchers have also observed the distinction between desirability and 
probability in the arguments used in the ELM (e.g., Areni & Lutz, 1988; Van Enschot-
Van Dijk, Hustinx, & Hoeken, 2003). Hoeken (1997) observed that this distinction is also 
made in rational decision making. When people adopt the central route to persuasion, 
their behavior should resemble that of a rational decision maker. In that case, models of 
rational decision making can be consulted. These models claim that people should base 
their decisions upon the consequences that result from these decisions (Abelson & Levi, 
1985). Such decisions are based on two assessments: the desirability and the probability 
of the consequences of the decision.  
2.  It should be noted that ‘opinion’ has to be regarded as the fact that a person other than 
the debater or text writer has an opinion (e.g., in expert evidence). Such a fact can be 
observed and verified. 
3.  After McCroskey’s (1969) review of studies on expert evidence, the interest in expert 
evidence has diminished considerably. The set of studies that Reinard (1998) selected 
for his review on expert evidence (‘testimonial assertion evidence’), for instance, dated 
from 1955 to 1984. This current lack of interest in expert evidence might be explained by 
the popularity of the dual-process models as the ELM, in which expert assertions are 
considered as a cue, and not as an argument. As a consequence, evidence studies might 
have left expert evidence aside.  
4.  As each type of evidence is related to an argumentation scheme, one could argue that 
the study of the persuasiveness of evidence types could also be labeled the study of the 
persuasiveness of different argumentation schemes. In the framework in which 
evidence supports the probability of causal claims in pragmatic argumentation, 
however, type of evidence does not correspond to argumentation scheme for two 
38 chapter 2 
 
 
reasons. The first reason is that the argument by generalization is related to both 
statistical and anecdotal evidence (see Table 2.2). There is, therefore, no exact one-to-
one relationship between evidence types and argumentation schemes. The second 
reason is that anecdotal and statistical evidence can each be linked to two distinct 
argument types depending on the type of claim. More generally, there is a difference in 
perspective of argumentation theorists, interested in schemes and criteria for strong 
argumentation, and persuasion scholars, interested in the persuasive effect of different 
types of evidence. More important than a detailed comparison of the two perspectives, 
however, is that the study of the relative persuasiveness of evidence types can benefit 
from insights of argumentation theory.  
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A review of studies on the actual 
persuasiveness of evidence types 
Whereas Chapter 2 addressed the question what characteristics should make 
arguments persuasive, this chapter will answer the question which characteristics 
do make them persuasive. In Section 3.1, I will discuss empirical studies that 
investigated whether meeting normative criteria actually leads to a more 
persuasive outcome. I will show that only little attention has been paid in research 
to the role of culture in this area. Subsequently, I will discuss explanations other 
than the normative criteria that have been given for the persuasiveness of evidence 
types (3.2). A number of experiments have been conducted to test whether some 
types of evidence are more persuasive than others. In the last section of this 
chapter (3.3), I will present a review of such studies on the relative actual 
persuasiveness of evidence types.  
3.1  Normative criteria and persuasiveness 
In the condition of high elaboration, under which people are expected to carefully 
scrutinize the arguments in a persuasive message, normative criteria for strong 
evidence should matter. In this section, I will answer the questions as to whether 
what should be persuasive is also persuasive in practice (3.1.1), and whether 
cultures differ in this respect (3.1.2). 
3.1.1  Do normative criteria for strong evidence matter? 
Below, I will review studies that have tested whether meeting the normative 
criteria affects the persuasiveness of evidence in practice. It should be noted at the 
outset that only a minority of these studies were studies on evidence. This can be 
explained by the lack of interest in normative criteria for evidence. Most of the 
studies were (cognitive) psychological studies that examined whether people’s 
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judgments were affected by information that did or did not meet the normative 
criteria relevant to the types of evidence. The criteria for strong causal evidence will 
not be discussed, because they have not been investigated.  
Sample size 
One of the normative criteria for strong statistical evidence in support of a general 
claim is the presence of a sufficiently large sample size of cases that allow valid 
generalizations about the population in the claim. There are hardly any empirical 
studies that have examined this sample size criterion. Doosje, Spears, and Koomen 
(1995, p. 643) correctly posit that ”surprisingly little is known about the processes 
of generalizing sample information to a target population”. I found only two 
studies that investigated the persuasive impact of different sample sizes. In Darke 
et al. (1998), participants were given the Petty and Cacioppo (1986) text about the 
implementation of a comprehensive exam. The text included the general opinion of 
either 10 or 1 000 students, of which 80% were in favor of the implementation or of 
which 80% were against. Participants were highly or moderately involved in the 
topic through a manipulation of the introduction date of the exam (in 1 year or in 
10 years). Low-involved participants proved to be influenced by the majority 
opinion regardless of the sample size. However, sample size mattered for the high-
involvement participants: they were only influenced by the majority opinion when 
the poll size was large.  
In Doosje et al. (1995, study II), participants had to generalize behavior of a 
small or a large sample to their own ingroup or to an outgroup. Sample 
information was either positive (e.g., ‘I gave a tourist directions’), or negative (‘I 
jumped the queue at the baker’s’). When the sample information was positive for 
the participants’ ingroup, samples were generalized irrespective of their size. 
When the sample information was negative for the participants’ ingroup, the 
sample size mattered. In fact, there was a less strong generalization with a small 
sample than with a large sample. Finally, these two studies suggest that large 
sample sizes may have more impact than small sample sizes under certain 
motivational conditions. In Darke et al. (1998), larger sample size only had an effect 
when the participants were highly involved, and in Doosje et al. the effect of a 
larger sample size was higher when the likelihood estimation of the negative 
behavior concerned the participants’ ingroup. 
It should be noted that a large number of studies have been conducted in 
cognitive psychology on the way people use sample size information to make 
decisions. Classic experiments showed that people are insensitive to sample size. 
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In Kahneman and Tversky (1973), for instance, participants were given the 
following base-rate information (comparable to statistical evidence): psychologists 
have interviewed 30 engineers and 70 lawyers. The participants were then given 
five descriptions of persons (comparable to anecdotal evidence), which were said 
to be randomly chosen from the 100 interviews. The participants were asked to 
judge for each description whether the person was an engineer or a lawyer. The 
results showed that the participants underused statistical information and its 
sample size information, but that they based their judgment on the individual’s 
characteristics. People apparently did not use the so-called law of large numbers, 
which reads “the larger a sample is the more likely it is to be representative of the 
population from which it is drawn” (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986, p. 351).  
In studies such as the one by Kahneman and Tversky (1973), statistical and 
anecdotal evidence were simultaneously presented to participants. In order to test 
the understanding of the law of large numbers, participants’ reactions to sample 
sizes without competing individuating information should be investigated. A 
considerable number of studies did this, and demonstrated that people do 
understand the law of large numbers (e.g., Kunda & Nisbett, 1986; Nisbett, Krantz, 
Jepson, & Kunda, 1983; Well, Pollatsek, & Boyce, 1990). In Nisbett et al. (study I), 
for instance, participants had to make a judgment about a population on the basis 
of samples of 1 person, 3 persons, and 20 persons. Their estimations were 
consistent with the law of large numbers: “they were more willing to assume that 
the population resembles the sample when N is larger” (p. 349). On the basis of 
such studies, Well et al. concluded that people’s understanding of the law of large 
numbers is not likely to result from a thorough knowledge of sample sizes, but 
from a more simple heuristic ‘bigger is better’. Regardless of how the effect of 
different sample sizes may be explained, the studies discussed in this section 
provide reasons to believe that evidence with a larger sample size may be more 
persuasive than evidence with a smaller sample size1. 
Representativeness 
The other normative criterion for strong statistical and anecdotal evidence in 
support of a general claim, is that the case(s) in the evidence should be 
representative of the population in the claim. Representativeness has to do with 
homogeneity of the characteristics of cases, and with random selection of a sample. 
Concerning homogeneity, the more homogeneous a population is with respect to 
its relevant characteristics, the higher the chances that even a small sample will be 
representative. A few studies have investigated the way people generalize as a 
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function of the homogeneity of samples and populations. Nisbett et al. (1983), for 
instance, demonstrated that people generalized more when the population was 
homogeneous with respect to relevant characteristics than when it was more 
heterogeneous. Doosje et al. (1995, study I) examined the effect of the degree of 
homogeneity of samples on the ease of generalization to a population. When the 
sample information was negative for the participants’ ingroup, there was a less 
strong generalization with a heterogeneous sample than with a homogeneous 
sample. When the sample information was positive for the participants’ ingroup, 
however, samples were generalized irrespective of their degree of homogeneity. 
Thus, under certain conditions, people understand that the more homogeneous a 
sample is, the more it can be generalized to a population. This understanding not 
only holds for reasoning from sample to population, but also from individual to 
sample. Park and Hastie (1987, study I) showed that participants generalized more 
easily from an individual to a homogeneous sample than to a heterogeneous 
sample. Representativeness can not only be assessed through the sample’s or 
population’s homogeneity, but also through information that the sample has been 
randomly selected or not (Kassin, 1979). Random selection implies that the sample 
should be representative. People have been shown to understand the relevance of 
random selection. In Wells and Harvey (1977, study I), participants who were told 
that the sample had been randomly selected made a more correct generalization 
than participants who were not.  
A few studies in cognitive psychology have also investigated the effect of the 
representativeness of cases on people’s generalization of these cases to the 
population (e.g., Hamill, Wilson, & Nisbett, 1980; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975). 
Representativeness was operationalized by indicating that cases were typical or 
atypical of the population. Typicality was found not to affect the generalization. 
Again, case information was given together with statistical population data in 
these studies. This design favored the impact of the anecdotal information, and 
therefore is not an unbiased test of the effect of representativeness. A more detailed 
discussion of these studies is given in Appendix B. In conclusion, a limited body of 
empirical research suggests that – under certain conditions – people may respect 
the normative criterion of representativeness when generalizing from case or 
sample to population. 
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Similarity 
The criterion of high similarity between the case(s) in the evidence, and the case in 
the claim is relevant for anecdotal and statistical evidence in support of a specific 
claim. There should be a large number of relevant similarities, and there should be 
no relevant dissimilarities. Only two studies have investigated the effect of the 
degree of similarity on the persuasiveness of anecdotal evidence. Hoeken (2001b) 
gave his participants an anecdote about a town that was similar or dissimilar to the 
town in the claim. The dissimilar anecdotal evidence proved to be as persuasive as 
the similar anecdotal evidence. Hoeken (2005) reports on a more recent experiment 
by Hoeken and Hustinx that investigated the same similarity criterion, not with 
one claim with evidence, but with several claims with evidence. Similar anecdotal 
evidence proved to be more persuasive than dissimilar anecdotal evidence. In 
another study, people’s likelihood estimation in function of similarity of cases was 
investigated. Read (1983) had his participants predict a specific performance of a 
target individual who was either similar or dissimilar to another individual who 
had performed the action. The participants were more likely to predict the 
performance when the target was similar to the other individual than when it was 
dissimilar.  
A larger number of studies in cognitive psychology have examined similarity, 
which is essential in judgment and decision making (e.g., Smith & Zárate, 1992; 
Tversky, 1977). There are a number of different models of similarity, but they agree 
on the central characteristic of similarity: a shared set of properties. The more 
properties two cases share, the more similar they are. In a series of experiments, 
Tversky demonstrated that people perceive a higher similarity between two cases 
when common features are added or when distinctive features are deleted. In 
conclusion, a few empirical findings suggest that the normative criterion of 
similarity is relevant in practice: judgments based on dissimilar cases differ from 
those based on similar cases. 
Credibility and reliability 
Two of the three normative criteria for expert evidence are high credibility and 
high reliability. Source credibility is one the most frequently studied source factors 
in persuasive effects research, and has been divided into source expertise and 
source trustworthiness (see, for an overview, O’Keefe, 2002). As source credibility 
has been operationalized through the source’s field of expertise (the third 
normative criterion), a discussion of studies on credibility would also imply a 
discussion of field of expertise. It is possible, however, to discuss studies on the 
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effect of credibility and reliability of sources that have the same field of expertise. 
The difference between high credibility / reliability and low credibility / reliability 
can be expressed through a difference in the title of the source: a professor or a 
doctor versus a researcher or a student. A number of studies have investigated the 
effect of the source’s title on the persuasiveness of these sources. In general, 
credible and reliable sources (e.g., professors) have been found to be more 
persuasive than less credible and reliable sources (e.g., students) (see Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). This effect, however, needs to be qualified: it only occurs if 
participants have a low ability and/or a low motivation to scrutinize a persuasive 
message (but see Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a). If participants are able and 
motivated to scrutinize a persuasive message, there is no effect for credibility and 
reliability. In conclusion, under conditions of low elaboration, sources who are 
highly credible and reliable are more persuasive than sources who are credible and 
reliable to a lesser degree. 
Field of expertise 
The other criterion for strong expert evidence is that the expert’s field of expertise 
should be relevant to the field of the claim. A number of experimental studies have 
examined the effect of field of expertise on the source’s persuasiveness, and have 
shown that sources with a relevant field of expertise are more persuasive than 
sources with an irrelevant field of expertise (e.g., Luchok & McCroskey, 1978; 
Maddux & Rogers, 1980; Pornpitakpan & Francis, 2001). In Maddux and Rogers, 
for instance, participants read a text about a source who stated that people should 
sleep only four hours a night. The source was Dr. James Campbell, an authority on 
sleep and sleep research, or on music during the Baroque period. The first 
Campbell was perceived as significantly more expert on the topic of sleep, and as 
more persuasive than the second Campbell. These kinds of studies suggest that 
expert evidence is more persuasive to the extent that the field of expertise of the 
expert corresponds to the domain of the claim. 
 
In sum, the studies discussed above demonstrate that people react differently 
depending on the degree to which the normative criteria are met. People’s 
judgments are different when the sample size is larger, when the 
representativeness of the sample or case is higher, when the similarity increases, 
when sources are more credible and reliable, and when their field of expertise is 
more relevant. It is important to be cautious about these conclusions, however, 
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because they are based on a limited body of research, and because the effects 
sometimes only occurred under certain conditions. 
3.1.2  Cultural differences 
In Section 2.4, I argued that cultures may differ in the normative criteria they have 
for the persuasiveness of evidence types. No studies were available to confirm or 
disconfirm such differences, but – even if the norms are the same – cultures may 
also vary in the way they deal with these norms. Nisbett et al. (1983) already 
suggested that culture may affect people’s tendency to apply statistical rules to 
judgments that require these rules. I found only one study that tested a normative 
criterion from a cultural perspective. Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, and Nisbett (2002, 
study II) examined the use of rules for similarity judgments in American and East-
Asian cultures. American participants were expected to make rule-based similarity 
judgments, applying the so-called unidimensional rule. According to this rule, an 
object is considered as similar to a category of objects if they all share a single 
feature (cf. Section 3.1.1). In a bouquet of seven flowers, all flowers may have the 
same kinds of leaves, but different colors. Asian participants were expected to 
make these judgments more intuitively on the basis of family resemblance. In this 
case, an object is similar to a category if a large number of features are shared by 
some of the objects, although no single feature characterizes all the objects. In a 
bouquet of seven flowers, each flower may share a characteristic with four other 
flowers, but there is no characteristic that all flowers share (except for the fact that 
they are all flowers). The hypotheses were confirmed: the Americans’ reasoning 
followed the unidimensional rule, and Easterners’ reasoning the family 
resemblance. For anecdotal evidence, this may imply that an anecdote that is 
dissimilar to a given case for an American participant might be similar to this case 
for an Asian participant.  
 In conclusion, relatively little attention has been paid in research to the role of 
culture on how people deal with norms such as large representativeness, high 
similarity, or high source credibility. Whether culture affects the way people deal 
with these norms is an issue that should be addressed in future research.  
46 chapter 3 
 
 
3.2  Other explanations for the persuasiveness of evidence  
   types 
If people carefully scrutinize a persuasive message, normative criteria for strong 
evidence, such as the criterion of a large sample size, should matter. Under this 
condition, statistical evidence could be expected to be more persuasive than 
anecdotal evidence, because the sample size in statistical evidence is larger. In 
some studies, however, anecdotal evidence was found to be more persuasive than 
statistical evidence (see reviews of Baesler & Burgoon, 1994; Reinard, 1988). The 
persuasiveness of evidence therefore can not be explained by normative criteria 
only. A few studies have provided other explanations why anecdotal, causal, and 
expert evidence can be persuasive. An overview of such studies is given below. For 
statistical evidence, I have not found other explanations than the normative 
criteria. 
Anecdotal evidence 
Several researchers have tried to explain the persuasive power of anecdotal 
evidence (see, e.g., Baesler & Burgoon, 1994; Sherman, Beike, & Ryalls, 1999). 
Anecdotal evidence may be persuasive, (a) because it evokes similar cases or (b) 
because it stimulates causal thinking about the causal claim that anecdotal 
evidence supports. Both processes contribute to the ease with which people 
generalize information about anecdotes to a population.  
The first reason concerns the availability heuristic. In numerous experiments, 
an anecdote was operationalized as a vivid story with a beginning, a course of 
action, and an end (e.g., in Slater & Rouner, 1996). If people process such an 
anecdote, it will remind them of similar events (Strange & Leung, 1999). As a 
result, the probability of the event in general will be perceived as higher. This 
process is explained through the availability heuristic, which holds that people 
judge the probability of an event on the ease with which instances of similar events 
come to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The more easily past occurrences of 
events can be retrieved from memory, the more probable the events are judged. 
The presentation of an anecdote facilitates retrieval of other events, and enhances 
the generalizability of the events. Anecdotal evidence does not necessarily possess 
a narrative structure. O’Shaughnessy and O’Shaughnessy (2004) distinguish the 
narrative from the anecdote. Whereas a narrative is “a story that accounts for the 
sequence of events” (p. 31), an anecdote is short and illustrative. Example (1), for 
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instance, is relatively pallid anecdotal evidence as support for the claim about the 
implementation of comprehensive exams. 
 
(1)  The implementation of a comprehensive exam at the University of Rotterdam 
has led to higher starting salaries. 
 
The exemplar-based model of social judgment (Smith & Zárate, 1992) suggests that 
even relatively pallid anecdotal evidence such as (1) facilitates the process of 
evoking similar events. This model assumes that people retrieve information about 
similar instances whenever they encounter a new target instance, such as in 
anecdotal evidence. These similar instances in memory are cognitive 
representations, and are called exemplars. Exemplars may be very detailed or very 
minimalistic. This implies that even for examples such as (1) similar events can be 
evoked, and that, if this retrieval is easy, the generalizability of the event is 
facilitated.  
The second reason why anecdotal evidence can be persuasive is that it may 
lead to spontaneous causal processing. Anderson (1983) gave his participants 
information that was similar to either anecdotal or statistical evidence that 
suggested a positive or a negative relationship between fire fighters’ preference for 
risk and their success. After being debriefed about the fictitious nature of the 
anecdotal or statistical evidence, participants were asked to write down their 
beliefs about this relationship. Anecdotal evidence had more impact: participants 
who had been given anecdotal evidence believed more in the causal relationship 
than participants who had read the statistical evidence. A vividness explanation 
(anecdotal evidence was more vivid, so it was better recalled) was ruled out. In 
contrast, anecdotal evidence proved to stimulate causal thinking. Participants with 
anecdotal evidence wrote down more causal explanations for the relationship than 
participants with statistical evidence, and this made them believe more in this 
relationship. The impact of causal thinking will be elaborated on in the next section 
about causal evidence. 
Causal evidence 
A large number of studies have explained the impact of causal reasoning and 
thinking in judgments and decision making. What makes causal evidence 
persuasive? Some studies show that causal thinking about the occurrence of an 
event enhances the perseverance of the belief in this occurrence, even after 
discrediting the data that created this belief. Causal evidence appears to borrow its 
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persuasive power from the fact that it is difficult to refute it (e.g., Anderson, 1983; 
Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Ross, Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz, 1977). In a 
series of experiments, Ross et al., for instance, showed that people’s subjective 
likelihood of the occurrence of an event increases when they are asked to give an 
explanation for this event. In study I, participants were given a clinical case history 
about a patient, and the information of an event in the patient’s life. Half of the 
participants were then asked to provide an explanation why the event had 
occurred on the basis of the available case history. Subsequently, all participants 
were told that the event had not occurred. Next, they were asked to judge the 
likelihood of five events of which one event was the event they had read before. 
Participants who had been asked to provide explanations for the first event 
considered this event as more likely than the participants who had given no 
explanations, even though this first event was said not to have occurred. The 
results were corroborated in study II, in which participants were told at the outset 
that the first event had not occurred, and that it was hypothetical. Even under this 
circumstance, hypothetical events that had been explained were considered as 
more likely than events that had not been explained. Studies such as Ross et al. 
indicate (a) that beliefs for which an explanation is generated are perceived as 
more probable, and (b) that causal information is difficult to refute when people 
generate it themselves. This last effect is so strong that Brem and Rips (2000) call 
this the explanation effect.  
Expert evidence 
Expert evidence usually consists of an expert’s repetition of the claim. An 
explanation for the persuasiveness of expert evidence may be related to people’s 
expectation that experts are capable of giving supplementary support when they 
are asked to (cf. Facione & Scherer, 1978). Similarly, people may expect experts to 
provide strong (as opposed to weak) arguments. This suggestion was supported in 
Wiener, LaForge, and Goolsby (1990), and in Bohner, Ruder, and Erb (2002). In the 
study of Bohner et al., for instance, participants were given a short text about a 
professor (expert) or a student, and were asked to write down their expectations 
about that source (e.g., How convincing will the source’s arguments be?). The 
subsequent message of the source contained weak or strong arguments, as defined 
in the ELM tradition (see Section 1.1). Participants who had received the message 
with weak arguments were far less persuaded when the source was a professor 
than when it was a student. This means that when people are asked to explicitly 
think about experts, they expect them to be capable of providing strong arguments. 
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In conclusion, these studies lend support to the suggestion that expert evidence 
may be persuasive because experts are expected to be in a position to provide 
strong supplementary support.  
 
Until now, I have shown that the normative criteria presented in Chapter 2 may 
affect the persuasiveness of evidence types under certain conditions (3.1), and that 
there are other explanations for the persuasiveness of the types of evidence (3.2). In 
the next section, I will not treat the types of evidence separately, but I will review 
studies that have investigated how they relate to each other in their persuasive 
effectiveness. 
3.3  A review of studies on the relative persuasiveness of  
       evidence types 
The persuasiveness of evidence has been empirically investigated for more than 60 
years. In the first review of experimental research on the effects of evidence, 
McCroskey (1969, p. 170) concluded that “no firm generalization can be drawn 
concerning the effect of evidence on attitude change”. He had found nine 
experiments, of which only two showed that the use of evidence was more 
effective than no use of evidence. Not surprisingly, some researchers were quite 
cynical towards the use of evidence, such as Gregg (1964):  
 
“the audience reaction to an argument may have little or nothing to do with whether 
the argument includes fully documented or completely undocumented evidence, 
relevant or irrelevant evidence, weak or strong evidence or any evidence at all” (cited in 
McCroskey, p. 169) 
 
It was not until the 1980s that the persuasive impact of evidence was assessed in a 
review by Reinard (1988). On the basis of available experimental studies, he 
convincingly showed that inclusion of evidence enhances the persuasiveness of a 
message. If providing evidence is persuasively effective, the question that logically 
follows is whether some types of evidence are more persuasive than others. As a 
matter of fact, recent studies on the persuasiveness of evidence did not investigate 
whether evidence is persuasive or not, but compared the relative persuasiveness of 
different types of evidence. Before I provide a review of such studies (3.3.3), I will 
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first argue why a new review is desirable (3.3.1), and present the criteria used to 
select studies for this review (3.3.2). 
3.3.1  Inconsistencies in existing studies 
The first published article on the persuasiveness of evidence types was Cathcart 
(1955). Participants listened to a speech in favor of the abolition of capital 
punishment that contained one of four – as he called it – methods of presenting 
evidence. Current studies still resemble this Cathcart study, both with respect to 
their central research question (which type of evidence is the most persuasive?) 
and with respect to their research design (a speech or text containing a claim that is 
supported by different types of evidence presented to participants in a between-
subject design). Despite these similarities, evidence studies have had quite 
inconsistent definitions and operationalizations of evidence and the evidence 
types. Kellermann (1980) wrote a critical review about the concept of evidence. She 
argued that the inconsistent results of empirical studies conducted before the 80s 
can be attributed to methodological weaknesses, and to the “inability to 
adequately isolate, limit and define ‘evidence’ as a construct” (p. 159). Her 
methodological remarks are not specific for evidence studies (e.g., about the lack of 
control for variations in participant’s characteristics, and in message topics). Her 
commentary about the inconsistency in definitions of evidence is interesting. 
Although evidence is considered as a form of proof in all studies, the “definitions 
of ‘evidence’ are almost as numerous as the individuals who work in the area” (p. 
162). The same goes for the operationalizations of evidence types. Kellermann 
gives the example of source evidence, which has been operationalized through a 
presence or absence of an authority attribution, a general or vague attribution, the 
amount of attribution (date, place, name, qualifications), or the source reliability.  
Kellermann’s (1980) analysis makes it clear that the inconsistencies in 
definitions and operationalizations of evidence fog our understanding of which 
type of evidence is the most persuasive. Reviews of evidence studies may provide 
more insight into the relative persuasiveness of evidence types. Three reviews 
have been presented over the years2: Reinard (1988), Baesler and Burgoon (1994), 
and Allen and Preiss (1997). The descriptive reviews of Reinard, and Baesler and 
Burgoon concluded that anecdotal evidence was more persuasive than statistical 
evidence. Allen and Preiss, however, answered the same question through a meta-
analysis, and found that it was statistical evidence that was more persuasive. How 
can this difference be explained? A straightforward explanation is the research 
method: a meta-analytic review may lead to other conclusions than a descriptive 
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review. Another explanation is that the selection of studies in the reviews differs 
considerably. Only two experimental studies were included in all of the three 
reviews. As existing reviews have not taken into account differences in definitions 
and operationalizations of evidence types, and because a number of experiments 
have been published since 1997, a new review is desirable. For this review, more 
rigid criteria have been used to ensure a more homogeneous selection of studies, 
on the basis of which more reliable conclusions can be drawn. In the following 
section, I will present these criteria. 
3.3.2  Selection of studies 
In the ideal situation, only studies in which the evidence operationalizations meet 
the normative criteria of Chapter 2 should be included in the review. A first 
advantage of these operationalizations is that they allow a comparison between 
different studies. It is inconvenient to interpret the results of two studies if 
evidence was normatively stronger in the first than in the second study. A second 
advantage lies in the comparison of the types of evidence within each study. If the 
operationalization of one type of evidence is normatively stronger than a second 
type, a comparison of the persuasiveness of the two types is not appropriate. 
Unfortunately, as evidence studies have not taken into account these normative 
criteria, these criteria could not be a means to select studies to be reviewed. The 
criteria that I present, however, did result in a smaller selection of studies that are 
more similar with respect to a number of characteristics than in previous reviews. 
Published experiments about the relative persuasiveness of evidence types were 
selected employing the following five criteria: 
 
1.  Evidence (called information, data, or evidence) is used as proof to enhance the 
probability of a claim. The claim can be explicitly stated, but may also be inferred 
from the text message. 
 
2.  Type of evidence is an independent variable (statistical, anecdotal, causal, expert 
evidence, or combinations), and at least two types of evidence are compared. 
 
3.  The definitions of the types of evidence (explicitedly stated or inferred from the 
operationalizations) correspond to those of Rieke and Sillars (1984, pp. 74-94). 
Anecdotal evidence consists of a specific case, and statistical evidence is a 
numerical summary of a number of cases. Causal evidence consists of an 
explanation for the occurrence of the effect, and expert evidence consists of the 
testimony of an expert. With these definitions, the problem of different 
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operationalizations is partly covered. Different forms of statistical evidence were 
accepted. Statistical evidence can be divided into four types (e.g., Ehninger & 
Brockriede, 1963)3: a number (e.g., a study among 14 universities), a percentage 
(e.g., 90% of the universities), a comparison (e.g., students at such universities have 
four times more chance to get a high starting salary than students at universities 
without such an exam), or a mean (e.g., students at such universities have, on 
average, $150 more starting salary per month). A few studies were not selected, 
because their operationalizations were not mentioned (Harte, 1976), or because the 
operationalizations were different from the ones given above (Greene & Brinn, 
2003; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Knouse, 1983; Rook, 1986; Spooren, Smith, & 
Renkema, 2000). In Greene and Brinn, for instance, statistical evidence apparently 
did not contain any numerical information. Iyengar and Kinder (study VI) 
investigated the impact of vivid (anecdotal) and pallid (statistical) information. 
Statistical evidence was not always statistical, for instance when a reporter 
discussed the link between a chemical dump and catastrophic illness as support for 
the message about an increase of childhood leukaemia4. Finally, differences in 
length and vividness of especially anecdotal and statistical evidence were accepted, 
as anecdotal evidence has traditionally been operationalized as a long, vivid story. 
 
4.  Participants are exposed to only one type of evidence for each claim. This research 
design was chosen in the majority of the persuasion studies on evidence. In a large 
number of studies in cognitive psychology and mass communication, however, the 
impact of information that corresponds to either statistical or anecdotal evidence 
was examined by providing participants both types of evidence at the same time 
(see Appendix B). Because of this criterion, a lot of studies were not used for the 
review (cf. Allen & Preiss, 1997). I did include studies in which participants were 
given two different claims with another type of evidence each time (e.g., Koballa, 
1986). In such studies, the judgment of the first claim with evidence is expected not 
to have affected the judgment of the second claim with evidence, as the claims 
were different. 
 
5.  The acceptance of the claim supported by evidence is the dependent variable. 
Acceptance may be measured in terms of probability (e.g., Hoeken, 2001a) or 
prediction (e.g., Dickson, 1982), as an attitude toward an object or behavior (e.g., 
Koballa, 1986), or as an intention (e.g., Sherer & Rogers, 1984). 
 
I looked for publications in various ways. First, I consulted previous reviews on 
the effectiveness of the use of evidence (McCroskey, 1969; O’Keefe, 1998; Reinard, 
1998; Stiff, 1986), reviews on the persuasiveness of different types of evidence 
(Allen & Preiss, 1997; Baesler & Burgoon, 1994; Reinard, 1988), and non-empirical 
articles on evidence (e.g., Reynolds & Reynolds, 2002). Second, I searched through 
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databases and document-retrieval services (PsychINFO, Sociological Abstracts, 
Econlit, Current Contents Weekly, Current Contents Archives, and Social 
Sciences5). Finally, I used the snowball method on the basis of the publications that 
had been found to increase the number of publications.  
This resulted in 14 studies on the relative persuasiveness of evidence types. To 
illustrate of what the five criteria do with the selection of studies, I will show 
which studies in the three previous reviews on statistical and anecdotal evidence 
meet these criteria. The review of Reinard (1988) consisted of 15 studies on 
statistical and anecdotal evidence. Of these 15 studies, 6 studies were not 
published, 6 studies presented anecdotal and statistical evidence together (criterion 
4), and 3 studies did not meet my criteria for definitions and operationalizations 
(criterion 3). In the Baesler and Burgoon (1994) review, 19 evidence studies on the 
relative persuasiveness of statistical and anecdotal evidence were selected. Of these 
studies, 7 studies remained unpublished, 8 studies presented anecdotal and 
statistical evidence together (criterion 4), 1 study was Iyengar and Kinder (1987) 
(criterion 3), and the 3 remaining studies were included in my review (Dickson, 
1982; Kazoleas, 1993; Koballa, 1986). The review of Allen and Preiss (1997) dealt 
with 16 studies, of which 5 studies were not published, 3 studies presented 
anecdotal and statistical evidence together (criterion 4), 1 study compared two 
forms of statistical evidence (criterion 2), and 1 study was Harte (1976) (criterion 3). 
In the end, 6 studies were included in my review (Baesler & Burgoon, 1994; 
Dickson, 1982; Kazoleas, 1993; Koballa, 1986; Sherer & Rogers, 1984; Slater & 
Rouner, 1996). 
3.3.3  Results 
The studies that met the five criteria are discussed on the basis of a comparison 
between two types of evidence at a time: statistical versus anecdotal, statistical 
versus causal, anecdotal versus causal, and expert evidence versus the three other 
types of evidence. Each paragraph contains a short presentation of the studies, an 
overview of the results, and a discussion. Table 3.1 lists the studies with their 
results. 
Statistical – anecdotal 
In Allen et al. (2000), participants received 1 of 15 texts (e.g., women’s use of 
cosmetics) that contained either statistical or anecdotal evidence. The definitions of 
both types of evidence correspond to criterion 3, but no information about the 
operationalizations was provided. Statistical evidence proved to be more 
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persuasive than anecdotal evidence. Baesler and Burgoon (1994) investigated the 
relative persuasiveness of statistical and anecdotal evidence in support of the claim 
that most juvenile delinquents do not become adult criminals. Statistical evidence 
was more convincing than anecdotal evidence. The finding of Dickson (1982) can 
be interpreted as a persuasive advantage for statistical evidence. Participants were 
given a report about a breakdown rate of a refrigerator brand with either anecdotal 
or statistical evidence. Anecdotal evidence consisted of four housewives who had 
not had any problem with their refrigerator, and one housewife who had indeed 
encountered a problem. 
 
Table 3.1 Results of the selected studies on the relative persuasiveness of evidence types 
  (nc = not communicated) 
 
study type of claim result 
statistical – anecdotal evidence   
     Allen et al. (2000) nc st > an 
     Baesler (1997)  general st = an 
     Baesler & Burgoon (1994) general st > an 
     Cox & Cox (2001) general st = an 
     Dickson (1982) general, specific st > an 
     Hoeken (2001a) specific st > an 
     Hoeken (2001b) specific st = an 
     Hoeken & Hustinx (2003b) general st > an 
     Kazoleas (1993) general st = an 
     Koballa (1986) general an > st 
     Sherer & Rogers (1984) general st = an 
     Slater & Rouner (1996) general st > an 
   
statistical – causal evidence   
     Hoeken (2001a) specific st > ca 
     Hoeken & Hustinx (2003b) general st = ca 
     Slusher & Anderson (1996, study I) general ca > st 
     Slusher & Anderson (1996, study II) general ca > st 
   
anecdotal – causal evidence   
     Hoeken (2001a) specific an = ca 
     Hoeken & Hustinx (2003b) general ca > an 
   
expert evidence – other types of evidence   
     Hoeken & Hustinx (2003b) general ex > an, ex = st, ex = ca 
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In the statistical evidence, 395 housewives were reported to have had no problem, 
whereas 105 housewives said their refrigerator had broken down. Note that in 
both versions, around 80% of the sample did not have any problem with their 
refrigerator. Participants had to predict the breakdown rate in the hypothetical 
situation in which they owned this refrigerator themselves (specific claim), and 
had to predict the breakdown rate of 20 refrigerators (general claim). With both 
claims, the prediction of a breakdown was higher with anecdotal evidence. 
Although the judgments on the basis of statistical evidence were closer to the 20% 
breakdown rate, Dickson interpreted the higher prediction of anecdotal evidence 
as more influential than statistical evidence. However, I believe, and so do Allen 
and Preiss (1997), and Baesler and Burgoon (1994), that statistical evidence was 
more persuasive. If the message had had a persuasive character, its objective 
would have been to convince the readers that only 20% of the refrigerators of this 
brand break down. Participants with statistical evidence were more persuaded 
than those with anecdotal evidence, as their judgments were closer to the 20%.  
 In Hoeken (2001a), participants were given statistical, anecdotal, or causal 
evidence in support of the specific claim that a new cultural center would be 
successful. The anecdotal evidence stated that a similar center in another city had 
been successful. In the statistical evidence, the success of 27 such cultural centers 
was reported. Statistical evidence proved to be more convincing. In Hoeken and 
Hustinx (2003b), participants were given 20 general claims, which were 
accompanied by statistical, anecdotal, causal, expert, or no evidence. An example 
of a claim was ‘Relaxation rooms in offices lead to a sharp decline of absence 
through illness’. Statistical evidence was found to be more persuasive than 
anecdotal evidence. In Slater and Rouner (1996), the claim was that alcohol is a 
harmful presence in society, because it leads to health risks, economic and career 
harm, and drunk driving6. Anecdotal evidence consisted of a person who had 
experienced these problems because of alcohol. An example of statistical evidence 
was that 25% of men who occasionally drink have these problems. Statistical 
evidence was found to be more convincing. 
A few studies have reported no difference in the persuasiveness of statistical 
and anecdotal evidence. In Baesler (1997), these two types of evidence were used to 
support three messages about crime, internships, and birth control. Evidence 
definitions and operationalizations were similar to those of Baesler and Burgoon 
(1994). In Cox and Cox (2001), female participants were given information about 
the benefits of regular screening mammographs. In the statistical evidence, an 
early treatment was said to reduce the risk of dying of breast cancer by 30%. The 
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anecdotal evidence consisted of a report of a successful story of a woman. 
Statistical and anecdotal evidence were found to be equally persuasive. In Hoeken 
(2001b), the specific claim was that local taxes in a certain town should be raised in 
order to install extra streetlights on the sidewalks, because that would reduce the 
number of burglaries. The statistical evidence consisted of a study among 48 towns 
showing that installing extra streetlights decreased the number of burglaries with 
42%. In the anecdotal evidence, the effect was shown to have occurred in another 
town. The two types of evidence were equally persuasive. The participants in 
Kazoleas (1993) received a message that advocated the use of safety belts. The 
message was supported by statistical evidence (people have a 50% smaller risk of 
getting injured when wearing a safety belt) or anecdotal evidence (an example of a 
person who used the safety belt). The attitude toward the use of safety belts was 
the same after statistical or anecdotal evidence. Sherer and Rogers (1984) 
constructed an essay in which the main claim was that less drinking avoids certain 
dramatic consequences. Anecdotal (2 drinkers) and statistical evidence (statistics 
about a group of 2 000 drinkers) were used to support this claim. The two types of 
evidence were equally effective in influencing the intention to limit alcohol use, 
and to abstain from it. 
Koballa (1986) found that anecdotal evidence was more persuasive than 
statistical evidence in support of two general claims that the introduction of new 
science programs would be useful because it would lead to better results. 
Participants were given two messages, each time for a different science program 
with another type of evidence. The types of evidence did not compete with each 
other, as they each supported another message. Anecdotal evidence consisted of a 
report of a person who had experienced the program. In the statistical evidence, 
the usefulness of the programs was demonstrated in numerous studies. 
In sum, 12 studies have compared the relative persuasiveness of anecdotal and 
statistical evidence. Statistical evidence proved to be more persuasive in 6 studies, 
anecdotal evidence in 1 study, and in the 5 remaining studies, no differences were 
found (see Table 3.1). The results of this review correspond with those of the meta-
analysis of Allen and Preiss (1997), but not with Baesler and Burgoon (1994), or 
Reinard (1988). As I argued in 3.3.1, this discrepancy of conclusions can be 
explained by the selection of studies. Still, the present review shows conflicting 
results. This may partly be explained by the types of claims that were used: general 
or specific. With a general claim, statistical evidence is normatively stronger than 
anecdotal evidence because it has a large sample size. This does not hold under the 
condition of a specific claim, because there the criterion of a large sample size is no 
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longer relevant for anecdotal evidence. Three of the studies in the review used 
specific claims (see Table 3.1). For only one of these studies, anecdotal evidence 
was as persuasive as statistical evidence (Hoeken, 2001b). Although these 
opposing results can not be fully explained through the types of claims that were 
used, type of claim appears to be a factor to take into account7. 
Statistical – causal 
In Hoeken (2001a), participants were given statistical, anecdotal, or causal evidence 
in support of the specific claim that a new cultural center would be successful. In 
the causal evidence, three reasons were provided why this center would be 
profitable. For instance, one of them was that a movie theatre in a nearby town had 
burnt down. Statistical evidence was found to be more convincing. In a follow-up 
study that used more claims (Hoeken & Hustinx, 2003b), there was no difference in 
the persuasiveness of statistical and causal evidence. Finally, Slusher and 
Anderson (1996) supported the general claim that Aids is not transmitted by 
personal contact or mosquitoes with causal and/or statistical evidence8. An 
example of the statistical evidence was that in rural villages, where mosquitoes are 
likely to spread the disease, only 0.8% of the people have the Aids virus. Causal 
evidence consisted of reasons why mosquitoes do not spread the disease, for 
instance, because they are too small to carry enough viruses to infect a person. 
Causal evidence was found to be more persuasive.  
In sum, the results are mixed: sometimes statistical evidence was more 
persuasive (Hoeken, 2001a), sometimes causal evidence was more convincing 
(Slusher & Anderson, 1996; studies I and II), and sometimes there was no 
difference (Hoeken & Hustinx, 2003b). This means that there is no clear indication 
whether causal and statistical evidence are equally persuasive or whether one of 
them is more persuasive than the other. 
Anecdotal – causal 
The two studies that compared these types of evidence show different results: in 
Hoeken (2001a) the two types are equally persuasive, whereas in Hoeken and 
Hustinx (2003b) causal evidence is more convincing. As there are only two studies 
that directly compared the persuasiveness of anecdotal with causal evidence, it is 
impossible to draw reliable conclusions about which type of evidence is more 
persuasive. Also, the type of claim was different in the two studies. The claim was 
specific in Hoeken, and general in Hoeken and Hustinx. Anecdotal evidence 
appears to be less persuasive in support of a general claim (because of the criterion 
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of a large sample size), than in support of a specific claim. However, there are two 
reasons to suggest that causal evidence is more convincing than anecdotal 
evidence. First, this result was obtained in Hoeken and Hustinx who investigated 
the effect of evidence for 20 claims, which enhances the generality of its result. 
Second, although there was no difference in the actual persuasiveness of anecdotal 
and causal evidence in Hoeken, participants did perceive the persuasive power of 
causal evidence as higher than that of anecdotal evidence. 
Expert – other types of evidence 
In the only study that investigated expert evidence with other types of evidence 
(Hoeken & Hustinx, 2003b), this type of evidence was found to be as persuasive as 
statistical and causal evidence, and more persuasive than anecdotal evidence. 
3.3.4  Conclusion 
When the results of this review are taken together, it appears that statistical and 
causal evidence are more persuasive than anecdotal evidence. As one study shows 
that expert evidence too is more persuasive than anecdotal evidence, the overall, 
tentative conclusion would be that anecdotal evidence is the least persuasive type 
of evidence. The conflicting results that were sometimes found could be attributed 
to different factors, of which (a) the participants’ elaboration, (b) the experimental 
design, and (c) the lack of control for evidence quality appear to be the most 
relevant. First, under the condition of high elaboration, normatively strong 
arguments are expected to be more persuasive than normatively weak arguments. 
Therefore, one could expect statistical evidence to be more persuasive than 
anecdotal evidence in this central route to persuasion. In cases where statistical 
evidence was not more persuasive than anecdotal evidence, it could be suggested 
that participants might not have scrutinized the persuasive message. As it is 
difficult to determine whether the participants in the 14 studies in the review were 
in the central (high elaboration) or peripheral route (low elaboration), this 
explanation can not be tested. 
Second, most of the 14 studies used single-message designs, in which 
participants were given only one text with a type of evidence. Differences in the 
results between these studies are likely to be affected by the topic of the different 
messages that were used (e.g., refrigerators, alcohol, science programs). In order to 
be able to make more reliable generalizations about the effects of evidence, a 
multiple message design is more appropriate. This was used by Allen et al. (2000), 
Baesler (1997), and Hoeken and Hustinx (2003b). Finally, a factor that may explain 
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the opposing findings is that it is difficult to compare the persuasiveness of 
evidence types without controling for the quality of evidence. Some types of 
evidence were normatively stronger than others, and this also varied across the 
studies. In my empirical studies, I took into account the normative criteria 
presented in Chapter 2 in order to allow a fair comparison of the relative 
persuasiveness of evidence types. I did not only focus on actual persuasiveness – as 
was done in this chapter – but also considered expected persuasiveness. The next 
two chapters are concerned with this expected persuasiveness. 
Notes 
1.  It should be noted that a few studies have shown that people also generalize on the 
basis of one single case when it is the only information that is given (e.g., Strange & 
Leung, 1999). This, however, does not disconfirm the conclusion of this section that 
evidence with larger sample sizes may be more persuasive than evidence with smaller 
sample sizes. 
2.  Four reviews have investigated the effectiveness of (one type of) evidence. McCroskey 
(1969) wrote a descriptive review that was aimed at indicating whether source evidence 
was effective or not. Reinard (1998) investigated the effect size of the inclusion of source 
evidence. In the two other reviews, the definition of evidence was generally too broad. 
Stiff (1986) selected quite heterogeneous studies that consisted of supporting 
information, such as evidence studies, but also studies on argument quality, and the 
number of arguments. Finally, the meta-analysis of O’Keefe (1998) focused on the 
effects of justification explicitness: source citation, completeness of arguments 
(premises, supporting information), and quantitative specificity.  
3.  Whereas it is easy to relate a number or a percentage to the argument by generalization, 
it requires more effort to interpret statistical evidence that consists of a comparison or a 
mean. For comparisons and means, however, one can suppose this numerical 
information to be based on numerous cases, even if this is not mentioned. 
4.  Knouse (1983) studied the effect of anecdotal and statistical evidence in a letter of 
recommendation. Statistical evidence consisted of a grade point average (a correct 
operationalization), but also of other numerical data, such as the number of years that 
the writer had known the student, and the number of surveys that the student had 
administered in a research project. In Rook (1986), the operationalization of statistical 
evidence was not clear. The claim about health risks for women was supported by 
“information with reference to women in general” (p. 528). Finally, in Spooren et al. 
(2000) statistical and anecdotal evidence supported the claim that a save-as-you-earn 
account is flexible. Statistical evidence was operationalized as a quantification of 
interest rates and amounts of money. This may be a correct operationalization, if one 
can assume that it is based on large number of cases (i.e., customers). However, this is 
not the case: the interest rate can be determined when the bank has no customers. 
5.  The following keywords were used: anecdotal evidence + empirical, base-rate + 
anecdote, base-rate + attitude, base-rate + case, base-rate + persuasion, causal evidence, 
evidence + documentation, evidence + persuasion, evidence + persuasive, evidence 
quality, evidence types, expert evidence, narrative evidence, statistical + anecdotal, 
statistical + anecdotical, statistical evidence + persuasion, and support + persuasi*. 
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6.  This study partly does not meet criterion 4, because two different types of evidence 
were given together for one message. This study has been taken into account 
nevertheless, because in two of the four conditions, participants were only exposed to 
one of the two types of evidence. 
7.  Hoeken and Hustinx (2003a) report on an unpublished experiment that investigated 
whether anecdotal evidence was more persuasive with a specific than with a general 
claim. For the general claims, statistical evidence was more persuasive than anecdotal 
and causal evidence. However, with the specific claims, there was no significant 
difference in the persuasiveness of the three types. This study suggests that the 
difference in persuasiveness of statistical and anecdotal evidence decreases with a 
specific claim. 
8.  See footnote 6. 
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Expected persuasiveness: 
a corpus-analytic approach 
Cultural differences in the expected persuasiveness of evidence types were 
investigated in two studies that aimed to answer the first general and specific 
research questions: 
 
General RQ1 Are there cultural differences in the relative expected persuasiveness 
of anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert evidence? 
 
Specific RQ1 Is the expected persuasiveness of expert evidence higher for the 
French than for the Dutch? 
 
Expected persuasiveness can be measured directly (“How persuasive do you 
expect this piece of statistical evidence to be?”), and indirectly by investigating the 
use of evidence types in a persuasive setting. Study 1 used an indirect 
measurement of expected persuasiveness, and Study 2 a direct measurement. 
These ways of measurement will be discussed in 4.1, where I will present a review 
of the few empirical studies on the relative expected persuasiveness of evidence 
types. Study 1 is presented in this chapter, Study 2 in Chapter 5. 
4.1  Expected persuasiveness of evidence types 
In contrast to the considerable number of studies on the actual persuasiveness of 
evidence types (see Chapter 3), there are only a few studies that have examined 
their expected persuasiveness. In some of these studies, expected persuasiveness 
was measured directly by asking participants to rank evidence types in terms of 
expected persuasiveness (Kline, 1971a). Other studies investigated expected 
persuasiveness indirectly on the basis of the actual use of evidence types (e.g., 
Kline, 1971b; Levasseur & Dean, 1996). 
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Kline (1971a) was probably the first to study the expected persuasiveness of 
evidence types. Participants, including college students and PhD candidates, were 
given a claim, either (a) ‘Requirements for admission to college should be raised’, 
or (b) ‘The Federal government should exercise more control over primary and 
secondary education’. The claim was followed by 25 instantiations of evidence that 
differed on the dimensions of specificity and relevance, and on the attribution to 
different sources (differing in expertise and trustworthiness). For the college 
admission claim, three examples of evidence without an attribution to a source 
read as follows (p. 190): 
 
(1) Although 65% of the students in the upper half of entering freshman classes 
will graduate, only 23% of those in the lower half will graduate (specific and 
relevant). 
 
(2) Although a large percentage of the students who rank high in entering 
freshman classes will graduate, only a small percentage of those who rank low 
will graduate (non-specific and relevant). 
 
(3) Nearly 40% of the college students come from high schools with an enrolment 
of less than 300 students (specific and irrelevant). 
 
Participants ranked these instantiations according to the likelihood that they 
would use them to persuade either college students of the college admission claim, 
or the local Parents-Teachers Association of the government control claim. The 
main goal of Kline (1971a) was to investigate whether people differed in their 
ranking. Response patterns were analyzed in such a way that participants were 
clustered in different groups of encoders. Four groups were identified, some for 
both claims, others for only one of the claims. For the first group, the source 
credibility was essential (evidence with trustworthy and expert sources was 
preferred), and for the second group evidence attributed to a source – regardless of 
its trustworthiness or expertise – was preferred over evidence without a source. 
For the third group, the complexity of the evidence affected the ranking (evidence 
where two or fewer dimensions were manipulated had the highest expected 
persuasiveness), and the fourth group preferred specific and relevant evidence. 
Kline showed that people may differ in their expected persuasiveness of the 
evidence types, but – as the groups did not differ in initial attitude or on 
demographic characteristics (e.g., political preferences) – he was unable to explain 
why people differ. 
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Other studies have indirectly investigated the expected persuasiveness of evidence 
types. Instead of explicitly asking for an expectation of the persuasiveness of 
evidence, the use of different evidence types was analyzed. Kline (1971b) 
investigated the use of evidence types in students’ speeches. He hypothesized that 
highly dogmatic participants (who are said to be closed-minded, intolerant, and 
deferential to authority; Rokeach, 1960) would use documented evidence in favor 
of undocumented evidence. Although Kline does not explain the difference 
between documented and undocumented evidence, I assume on the basis of 
Cathcart (1955) and Kline (1971a) that documented evidence is specific evidence 
that is attributed to sources. Participants were told that there are different types of 
evidence. The types of evidence were presented in such a way that nothing was 
said about possible differences in their persuasiveness. About two weeks later, 
each participant was asked to give a short speech, of which the use of documented 
and undocumented evidence was noted down. Highly dogmatic participants used 
more documented evidence than participants who scored low on the dogmatism 
scale, but these participants used more undocumented evidence than the highly 
dogmatic participants. 
Levasseur and Dean (1996) analyzed the actual use of evidence types in 
debates between presidential candidates in the United States. They distinguished 
statistical, anecdotal, and source evidence. Anecdotal evidence consisted of specific 
historical instances, and statistical evidence of numerical instances (simple: 500 
people; complex: 45%). Source evidence relied on experts or lay people. Based on 
the data they provide, I calculated that the presidential candidates more frequently 
used statistical (45%) and anecdotal evidence (44%) than source evidence (11%)1. 
Some argumentation scholars have been interested in the occurrence of 
different argumentation schemes in written discourse (e.g., Schellens, 1985; 
Schellens & De Jong, 2004). Schellens and De Jong investigated the use of 
argumentation schemes in persuasive texts. They analyzed 20 Dutch persuasive 
information brochures to determine how many used the different argumentation 
schemes. Pragmatic argumentation was employed in all the brochures. The two 
other most frequently used argumentation schemes were causal argumentation (in 
75% of the brochures) and argumentation on the basis of examples (in 70% of the 
brochures). The argument by authority, which is related to expert evidence, 
occurred in 30% of the brochures. Schellens and De Jong considered authoritative 
institutions, (unnamed) scientists, celebrities, and the collective’s opinion (e.g., 
‘more and more people’) as authorities. The argument by authority only occurred 
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in relation to the probability and the desirability of consequences in pragmatic 
argumentation. It was not employed as support in another argumentation scheme.  
This kind of corpus analysis can be used to investigate the expected 
persuasiveness of evidence types. Writers of persuasive texts are professionals 
whose job is to design texts that are highly convincing. These writers can be 
expected to specifically use the evidence types that they expect to be most effective 
for the target audience. Expected persuasiveness can therefore be measured on the 
basis of the use of evidence. If the audience has a large power distance, expert 
evidence could be more persuasive than when the audience has a small power 
distance (see Chapter 1). Therefore, text writers from large power distance cultures 
might use expert evidence more frequently than their colleagues from small power 
distance cultures. Study 1 was set up to investigate the use of evidence types of 
text writers of persuasive information brochures in France and the Netherlands. 
Study 1 
This first study was set up to answer the general and specific research questions 
about cultural differences in the relative expected persuasiveness of anecdotal, 
statistical, causal, and – in particular – expert evidence. As expected 
persuasiveness was measured on the basis of the actual use of evidence by 
professional text writers, the concrete research questions of Study 1 were the 
following: 
 
RQ1 Are there cultural differences in the relative use of anecdotal, statistical,  
   causal, and expert evidence in persuasive communication in France and the  
   Netherlands? 
 
RQ2 Is expert evidence more frequently used in persuasive communication in 
France than in the Netherlands? 
 
An additional aim of this study was to assess the cross-cultural equivalence of the 
construct of evidence (Is evidence employed to support the probability within the 
scheme of pragmatic argumentation in both cultures?), and of the distinction 
between the four types of evidence (Do the four types of evidence occur in both 
cultures?). After a discussion of the material (4.2.1) and the procedure (4.2.2), I will 
comment on the statistical analysis (4.2.3). 
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4.2  Method 
4.2.1  Material 
As in Schellens and De Jong (2004), persuasive information brochures produced by 
government agencies (e.g., the city of Amsterdam) and non-profit organisators 
(e.g., the Animal Protection Society) were used as material2. These brochures were 
all written to convince readers to behave in a certain way. The effects of the 
different forms of behavior are not always directed to the readers of the brochures. 
Schellens and De Jong make a distinction between an interest for the readers 
themselves (e.g., avoiding excessive alcohol consumption), for society (e.g., the 
environment), or for others (e.g., fundraising). The brochures were gathered 
between October 2001 and August 2002. In the Netherlands, about 140 brochures 
were gathered in the public libraries and town halls of Amsterdam, Den Bosch, 
Nijmegen, and Veldhoven. A considerable number came from Postbus 51, the 
Dutch Government Information Service. A large part of the 100 French brochures 
in France were gathered through the French Committee for Health Education 
(CFES, ‘le Comité français d’éducation pour la santé’), the French equivalent of 
Postbus 51. The remainder were received from the Local Hygiene and Health 
Service in Rennes (‘Le service communal hygiène et santé’) or were collected 
personally in a number of fundraising institutions in Paris (these institutions were 
found via www.yeba.org/annuaire and www.aidez.org). 
 Only a minority of these brochures was finally selected for analysis. A 
brochure was included in the final selection if it met two criteria: (a) it should have 
a persuasive character, and (b) it should have a counterpart brochure with the 
same topic but in the other culture. These criteria will now be discussed. First, the 
distinction between informative and persuasive texts is not a clear-cut case. From a 
theoretical point of view, the goals of both types of texts are different. The aim of 
informative brochures is to provide information to readers in order to help them 
form an opinion or make a decision. The goal of persuasive public information in 
the Netherlands is to change the readers’ attitude or behavior in a direction 
proposed by the text writer (Koelen & Martijn, 1994). In France, similarly, the goal 
of persuasive public information is to propose a change of mentality or behavior 
that the citizen should adopt (Berthelot-Guiet & Ollivier-Yaniv, 2001). The 
distinction between information and persuasion is usually hard to make in reality, 
because persuasive brochures are often presented in an informative way (Schellens 
& De Jong, 2004), and because brochures may have multiple objectives, such as 
informing and persuading (De Jong & Schellens, 2000). Neither the apparent goal 
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of the brochure, nor the style in which it was written were considered as 
indications of the genre of a brochure, but the use of pragmatic argumentation 
was. Pragmatic argumentation is considered as the most popular argumentation 
scheme in persuasive communication (cf. Schellens & Verhoeven, 1994; Schellens & 
De Jong, 2004). 
Brochures that contained pragmatic argumentation were only included if there 
was another brochure with the same topic in the other culture. In fact, the use of 
certain types of evidence may be related to the topic of a brochure. A text writer of 
a brochure about traffic accidents, for instance, might have much statistical 
information about accidents, whereas a fundraising organization may lack such 
information. Each brochure was attributed to a thematic category, such as alcohol, 
smoking, or support for Developing Countries. These categories were created on 
the basis of the available brochures. This matching procedure (cf. Neuendorf, 2002, 
p. 85) resulted in a corpus of 22 Dutch and 22 French brochures. In each corpus, 
there were 8 brochures with a receiver interest (e.g, alcohol, smoking), 1 brochure 
with a societal interest (environment), and 13 brochures with an interest for other 
people (Developing Countries, and fundraising).  
The 44 brochures differed in format, text length, and number of pages. In the 
Dutch corpus, the number of pages ranged from 2 pages to 12 pages with a mean 
of 6.45 pages (SD = 2.89). The mean number of pages of the French brochures, 7.55 
(SD = 2.69), did not differ significantly from the Dutch average (t(42) = 1.30, p = 
.20). The smallest French brochure had 4 pages, and the largest 16. There was no 
criterion for text length in the selection of brochures. It seems logical to suggest 
that larger brochures have more instantiations of evidence than smaller brochures, 
but this appeared not to be true. Although there was a positive correlation between 
the number of pages and the number of evidence instantiations in the Dutch 
corpus (r (22) = .67, p < .01), there was no significant correlation in the French 
corpus (r (22) = .22, p = .33). Regardless of the number of pages, brochures may 
differ in the number of actions (e.g., quit smoking, and reduce the number of 
cigarettes per day), and in the number of related positive and negative 
consequences (e.g., feeling better, getting positive reactions from friends). As a 
result, the number of evidence instantiations in support of the occurrence of 
consequences may also differ. These differences in the number of actions and 
consequences will be discussed below. Appendix C lists the 44 brochures with 
their title, sender, and number of pages. Note that the terms ‘sender’ and ‘text 
writer’ are used alternately in this chapter, although the sender of brochures 
usually is not the writer. 
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4.2.2  Procedure 
The persuasive information brochures were analyzed with the grid of pragmatic 
argumentation. Evidence was counted if it was employed to support the 
probability of the occurrence of effects as a result of behavior. In each brochure, 
behavior was recommended or advised against by pointing out its (un)favorable 
consequences. The procedure consisted of three stages: (a) determining the 
intended behavior, (b) searching for the (un)favorable consequences, and (c) 
seeking evidence in support for the probability that the behavior will lead to the 
consequences. Below, I will discuss in detail the elements behavior, consequences, 
and evidence. Excerpts of the brochures used to exemplify the procedure are 
presented in translation, just as the titles of the brochures. 
Behavior 
A brochure may recommend one action or a series of actions. In the majority of the 
brochures in the corpus, there was just one action. In the Dutch brochure ‘What 
does alcohol do with you?’, for instance, the behavior advised against was drinking 
alcohol. An example of a more complex brochure is ‘If everybody helps a bit, we will 
save our lives’, a French brochure about the consequences of risky behavior on the 
road. In this brochure, four kinds of behavior were discussed: drinking and 
driving, driving too fast, wearing no seat belt, and driving when tired. 
Consequences 
Regardless of the number of actions in a brochure, each action can be 
recommended or advised against by presenting one consequence or multiple 
consequences. In its most simple form, one consequence was given for one action. 
In ‘If everybody helps a bit, we will save our lives’, the consequence of not wearing a 
seat belt was death. In most of the brochures, however, multiple consequences 
were given (cf. Schellens & De Jong, 2004). There were two forms here. First, an 
action was related to multiple positive or multiple negative consequences. In the 
French brochure ‘If everybody helps a bit, we will save our lives’ the negative 
consequences of driving too fast were a reduced field of vision, a larger braking 
distance, and death. Second, for one single action, both positive and negative 
consequences were presented. This was the case in the Dutch brochure about 
alcohol (‘What does alcohol do with you?’). Drinking alcohol was said to have the 
positive consequence of a reduced risk of cardiovascular disease, but also, and 
above all, a number of negative consequences, such as a higher risk of breast 
cancer, and reduced fertility3. 
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Evidence 
After determining the action(s) and the consequence(s) in a brochure, evidence as 
support for the probability of the occurrence of this/these consequence(s) was 
analyzed. Evidence often referred to the past when it concerned anecdotes, expert 
opinions, and numerical data. Readers are expected to infer that if evidence shows 
that behavior has led to consequences in the past, this causal relation will also 
apply to the future. Only verbal evidence was taken into account. Purely visual 
evidence, such as an image of a person, was not analyzed, as the interpretation of 
such images is often unclear (see Oestermeier & Hesse, 2000). Nevertheless, just as 
in Oestermeier and Hesse’s study of verbal and visual arguments, most images – 
such as graphs, diagrams, or photographs – were directly related to a text 
fragment. In an indirect way, therefore, these images were taken into account. An 
example of an image that was related to an instantiation of evidence was a series of 
pictures of Abdoulaye in the French brochure ‘Daily hunger’. The claim that a 
donation would combat hunger was supported by a series of pictures with 
anecdotal evidence. Text fragments of the anecdotal evidence are given in (4): 
 
(4) “On the first day, Abdoulaye (3 years old) weighs 5.5 kilos, the weight of an 
average French baby of 4 months old. Two nutritionists of ‘Action contre la 
faim’ take charge of him and his mother in Chad. [...] Around 20 days later, 
Abdoulaye smiles. He has gained 3.5 kilos. He now manages to stand up, but 
his legs are still too thin to allow him to walk. For the first time since his 
arrival, one can hear him sing” (Daily hunger) 
 
The way the occurrence of evidence in the brochures was counted was not the 
same for each type of evidence. In the case of expert evidence, each instantiation 
was counted as one instantiation of expert evidence. An expert has a high level of 
knowledge about the claim he underscores. There appeared to be two types of 
experts: persons or institutions designated by name, or anonymous experts such as 
‘Studies show that’. This last category was not taken into account, as no difference 
in power distance can occur: there is a reader on the one hand, but no other person 
or institute on the other hand. Moreover, explicit identification can be considered 
as an indicator for reliable and credible experts (see Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik, 1984). 
An example of an expert is the General Inspection of Social Affairs (IGAS), which 
was used as support in a French brochure about host families for children (‘A real 
family life’). Senders of the brochures that refer to their own expertise were not 
considered as expert evidence (cf. Schellens & De Jong, 2004), although this 
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strategy was sometimes used. An example of an appeal to own expertise, is quote 
(5) from the French brochure ‘Thanks to you’: 
 
(5) “Its ideas about development, its experience, and the number of years on the 
spot have made [the organization] an important, respected association that is 
listened to” 
 
When the person was not an expert, I labeled expert evidence source evidence. 
Source evidence sometimes occurred in combination with another type of 
evidence, such as anecdotal evidence. In this case, a person who talks about 
experiencing the consequences of behavior was quoted. Example (6) shows a quote 
of Rik Felderhof, a Dutch television host. Felderhof is a Dutch celebrity, but not an 
expert in foster parents programs. Contrary to Schellens and De Jong’s (2004) 
analysis, in which celebrities were considered as authorities, celebrities were not 
regarded as experts in this study, unless they were used as experts in their own 
field.  
 
(6) “With financial support for a child like Joli we do not only help Joli, but also 
her little brothers and sisters, and the other children from her village. Being a 
foster parent helps them to go to school and to benefit from medical assistance 
[...] [was signed] Rik Felderhof” 
 
When expert evidence was used in combination with another type of evidence, or 
when the source was no expert, it was not considered as expert evidence. These 
separate categories were not taken into account in the analysis, as they were rare 
(combinations of expert evidence with the three other types of evidence per 
brochure: M = 0.20, SD = 1.07; source evidence alone or in combination: M = 0.14, 
SD = 0.51). An example of expert evidence and statistical evidence, taken from ‘If 
everybody helps a bit, we will save our lives’ is (7), which was used as support for the 
claim that drinking leads to death: 
 
(7) “Twenty-eight percent of drivers that are involved in fatal accidents have too 
high an alcohol level. [...] (Source: National Institute for Transport and Safety 
Research [...])” 
 
Concerning causal evidence, there appeared to be three varieties. First, causal 
evidence could consist of two causal relations. The claim that drinking alcohol 
makes you gain weight in ‘What does alcohol do with you?, for instance, was 
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supported by information about two causal relations: if you drink alcohol 
(behavior), the breakdown of fat will be reduced; as a consequence, you will gain 
weight (consequence). Second, an explanation could consist of a causal chain. In 
the Dutch brochure ‘Tobacco’, for example, there was this causal chain from 
smoking to negative effects for the vocal cords: if you smoke (behavior), there will 
be more mucus in your throat; in your attempt to reduce the mucus, you will have 
to clear your throat; regularly clearing your throat will damage your vocal cords 
(consequence). Third, causal evidence could consist of several independent causal 
relations. In the Dutch brochure ‘Amsterdam has good relations with Managua’, 
different causes were given for the claim that by helping the organization SAM the 
social circumstances of the people in Managua would improve. Two examples of 
causes were (a) SAM invests in projects that were set up by the local inhabitants, 
and (b) SAM collaborates with the city of Amsterdam that supports Managua with 
knowledge about public transport, drinking water, and waste processing. When 
causal evidence consisted of several causal relations, these were together 
considered as one instantiation of causal evidence. The reason for this is that these 
relations often constituted an explanation in combination. 
Concerning anecdotal evidence, each instantiation of anecdotal evidence was 
considered as an independent unit. As each single anecdote may be sufficient, the 
choice for more anecdotes was considered deliberate. In the French brochure 
‘Together, we combat indifference’ seven anecdotes were given to support the claim 
that supporting the ACAT organization would help to combat torture in the world. 
Two examples of these seven anecdotes are (8) and (9): 
 
(8) “Peru: In January 2001, three police officers who were suspected of having 
committed torture on three occasions were found guilty after the intervention 
of ACAT [...]” 
 
(9) “France: In 2001, the legal support of ACAT helped about 20 people who had 
requested asylum to finally get the status of refugee. If they had been sent back 
to their country, their life would have been in danger” 
 
Finally, statistical evidence consisted of numbers, percentages, or other numerical 
information that is supposed to be based on a large dataset (cf. footnote 3 in 
Chapter 3). A simple example of statistical evidence is (10), which was used in the 
French brochure ‘If everybody helps a bit, we will save our lives’ to support the claim 
that wearing a seat belt reduces the risk of dying: 
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(10) “By correctly wearing a seat belt, the risk of dying when you are involved in a 
car accident is halved” 
 
Sometimes, there was more than one numerical piece of information, like in (11), 
which consists of two numerical elements. As statistical evidence is often the result 
of research in which several elements are investigated, examples such as (11) were 
regarded as one instantiation of statistical evidence. 
 
(11) “250 dead and over 2 000 injured per year because of drink driving” (‘What 
does alcohol do with you?’) 
 
When two or more instantiations of statistical evidence were not presented 
together as support for the same claim, and when it was not likely that this 
information came from the same research, these instantiations were considered as 
independent instantiations of statistical evidence. This was the case in the French 
brochure ‘What is your position concerning alcohol?’, where three instantiations of 
statistical evidence were employed to support claims that drinking leads to 
dangerous risks on the road. Two examples are given, (12) and (13): 
 
(12)  “One out of three mortal car accidents is directly caused by alcohol” 
 
(13) “The risk on an accident doubles with 0.5 grams of alcohol in your blood, 
which is equal to a maximum of two consumptions” 
 
Intercoder reliability 
The brochures were analyzed by four independent coders (see Appendix C). I 
analyzed all the brochures, and three other coders each analyzed a third of the 
brochures. In total there were three groups of coders. First, we agreed upon the 
analytic procedure, as described above. Next, each coder independently analyzed 5 
brochures. As the intercoder reliability within each pair of coders was good for 
these brochures, the brochures were taken into account in the analysis that 
followed. After the independent analyses of the remaining 34 brochures, the 
reliability was assessed for each pair of coders on the basis of two decisions made 
in each brochure: (a) Is a text fragment indeed evidence as support for the 
probability of the occurrence of an effect?, and (b) If the fragment is evidence, 
which type of evidence is it? The measurement of the reliability of the analyses is 
not the same for both questions. Potter and Levine-Donnerstein (1999) claim that 
the determination of reliability in corpus research depends on the type of content 
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that is in play. In this study, the two decisions are related to another type of 
content. The type of content concerned with the question whether a text fragment 
is evidence or not, is called pattern by Potter and Levine-Donnerstein. The role of 
the coders of a pattern is as follows:  
 
“Every time the coders see an element on the surface of the content that may indicate 
the presence of a particular pattern [here: evidence], they search for other indicators. 
When there are enough indicators [here: behavior and its consequences] or when the 
right combination of indicators is present, coders conclude that the pattern exists, and 
they record its presence on their coding forms” (p. 265) 
 
Both coders in each pair checked whether they had coded the same text fragment 
as evidence. If this was the case, it was an agreement. If one of the two had not 
coded that fragment as evidence, it was a disagreement. In case of a disagreement, 
the coders together decided as to whether the fragment had to be coded as 
evidence or not. For each brochure one extra agreement was added, because both 
coders implicitly agreed that no evidence occurred in the rest of the brochure. The 
reliability of the analysis of the occurrence of evidence was calculated with percent 
agreement4. The second question – which type of evidence is it? – concerns a 
manifest content (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). Once a text fragment was 
identified as evidence, the determination of the type of evidence was a relatively 
easy step. This content is manifest, because it is “on the surface and easily 
observable” (p. 259). The intercoder reliability for the type of evidence was 
calculated with Cohen’s κ, but only when both coders had independently coded 
the same text fragment as evidence in the first decision. Table 4.1 shows the 
intercoder reliability for both decisions. The reliability proved to be very adequate 
or good, as the percent agreements and κ’s are near or above .80 (see Neuendorf, 
2002). 
 
Table 4.1  Intercoder reliability for decision (a) (in percent agreement) and decision (b)  
    (in κ) for each pair of coders (with number of brochures) 
 
pair of coders (brochures) (a) evidence or not?  (b) type of evidence 
1 (16 Dutch)  .76  .73 
2 (11 French)  .77  .85 
3 (6 Dutch, 11 French)  .84  .83 
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4.2.3  Analysis 
In order to test cultural differences in the use of evidence types, the χ2 test would 
be a straightforward test, as the the presence (or absence) of evidence is measured 
at the nominal level. The percentage of expert or causal evidence on the total of 
evidence instantiations in the Dutch and French corpora could thus be compared. 
The significance of that comparison could then be tested with χ2. The assumption 
of this method is that the observations (of evidence) are independent. In this study, 
however, as in some other corpus studies in the field of linguistics (Rietveld, Van 
Hout, & Ernestus, 2004), the observations may be dependent. The occurrence of 
one type of evidence may affect the probability that the next occurrence of 
evidence is of the same type. Many brochures contained several actions and 
multiple consequences. As a result, more than one piece of evidence was used in 
most of the brochures. In the Dutch brochure ‘What does alcohol do with you?’, for 
instance, 3 positive and 11 negative consequences of drinking alcohol were 
presented. This gives the text writer 14 opportunities to provide evidence. If he or 
she expects one type of evidence to be most persuasive, he or she may use it more 
regularly than the other types, and not just for one consequence, but for a whole 
series of consequences. As a matter of fact, in this particular brochure, statistical 
and causal evidence were each used five times. 
A suitable test is a 2 (culture) x 4 (statistical, anecdotal, causal, expert evidence) 
analysis of variance, taking brochures as the unit over which to generalize. Culture 
was a between-subjects factor, and type of evidence a within-subjects factor. With 
this analysis, relations within the brochures were taken into account. Each 
brochure was considered as a subject that had a score for each type of evidence 
(e.g., no anecdotal evidence, one statistical evidence instantiation, two 
instantiations of causal evidence, and no expert evidence). The results of this 
analysis will be presented in the next section. 
4.3  Results 
The corpus study was set up to test whether there are cultural differences in the 
relative use of the four types of evidence, and of expert evidence in particular. On 
average, a French brochure contained 3.45 (SD = 2.32) instantiations of evidence, 
with a minimum of no evidence and a maximum of 8 instantiations. The Dutch 
brochures contained only 2.41 (SD = 2.74) evidence instantiations on average, 
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ranging from 0 to 10. This difference was not significant, as there was no main 
effect of culture on the occurrence of evidence (F (1, 42) = 1.87, p = .18). Table 4.2 
shows the mean occurrence of the types of evidence per brochure in the Dutch and 
the French corpus. 
 
Table 4.2  The mean occurrence of evidence types per Dutch and French brochure (a 
     higher score means a higher occurrence; SD between parentheses; means with  
     different superscripts significantly differ from each other within the French or  
    Dutch corpus, alpha level of .05) 
 
type of evidence Dutch brochure French brochure total 
causal 1.55a (1.97) 0.86a,b (1.13)  1.20a (1.62) 
statistical 0.64b (1.26) 1.18a (1.37) 0.91a (1.33) 
anecdotal 0.18b,c (0.50) 1.14a,b (2.21) 0.66a,b (1.66) 
expert 0.05c (0.21)  0.27b (0.55) 0.16b (0.43) 
total 2.41 (2.74) 3.45 (2.32) 2.93 (2.56) 
 
There appeared to be a main effect of type of evidence (F (3, 40) = 7.74, p < .001, η2 
= .37): the four types of evidence were not employed to the same degree. Causal 
and statistical evidence were more frequently used than expert evidence, and 
anecdotal evidence held an intermediate position (see Table 4.2). This main effect 
was qualified by an interaction effect between culture and evidence type (F (3, 40) 
= 2.85, p < .05, η2 = .18). This means that there are indeed cultural differences in the 
relative use of the four types of evidence in France and the Netherlands (RQ1). 
Figure 4.1 visualises the absolute number of occurrences of the types of evidence in 
the Dutch and the French corpus.  
Figure 4.1 The frequency of use of the evidence types in function of culture 
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The second research question concerned expert evidence (RQ2): is it more 
frequently used in France than in the Netherlands? This was indeed the case 
(t(27.16) = 1.81, p < .05; one-tailed)5. Concerning the three other types of evidence, 
the Dutch and French brochures did not differ significantly in the occurrence of 
statistical (t(42) = 1.38, p = .18) or causal evidence (t(42) = 1.41, p = .17). There was a 
tendency for a higher occurrence of anecdotal evidence in the French corpus 
(t(23.15) = 1.98, p = .06). Within each culture, however, there were clear differences 
(see Table 4.2). The most frequently used type of evidence in the Dutch corpus was 
causal evidence. It occurred more often than statistical (t(21) = 2.31, p < .05), 
anecdotal (t(21) = 3.04, p < .01), and expert evidence (t(21) = 3.49, p < .01). 
Furthermore, statistical evidence was more frequently used than expert evidence 
(t(21) = 2.27, p < .05). In the French corpus, statistical evidence was more frequently 
used than expert evidence (t(21) = 2.71, p < .05), and there was a tendency for a 
higher occurrence of causal than expert evidence (t(21) = 2.08, p = .05). 
As can be seen in Table 4.2, the standard deviations are mostly larger than the 
mean number of evidence instantiations per brochure. This means that there were 
large differences between the brochures. An analysis that circumvents this 
problem is the one Schellens and De Jong (2004) used. I calculated the percentage 
of brochures in which each type of evidence was used, regardless of the number of 
times they were used. Expert evidence was shown to occur in more French than 
Dutch brochures (χ2 (1) = 12.18, p < .001). As shown in Table 4.3, expert evidence 
was used in 22.7% of the French brochures, and in only 4.5% of the Dutch 
brochures. 
 
Table 4.3  The percentage of brochures in which the types of evidence occurred  
 
type of evidence Dutch brochure French brochure total 
causal 72.7% 59.1% 65.9% 
statistical 27.3% 59.1%***  43.2% 
anecdotal 13.6% 27.3%* 20.5% 
expert 4.5% 22.7%***  13.6% 
* p < . 05, *** p < .001 
 
What did the expert evidence that was used look like? With one exception, it was 
always used in brochures in which the consequences were in the interest of other 
people, such as brochures about fundraising. Concerning its form, expert evidence 
was often implicit. The experts did not literally underscore that it was highly 
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probable that the consequences would occur, but they supported this causal 
relationship in a more indirect way, as the examples (14), (15), and (16) show. 
 
(14) “Because of their effective method of working [...], the Liliane Fund received 
an award in 1990 from the United Nations” (‘Care about this child’) 
 
(15) “Receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977, Amnesty International maintains 
close contacts with the UN Economic and Social Council [...]” (‘Amnesty 
International’) 
 
(16) “In a recent report the General Inspection of Social Affairs (IGAS) observes 
that the association [SOS Children’s Villages] works coherently, rigorously, 
and with transparency” (‘SOS Villages d’Enfants’) 
 
The only expert evidence in the Dutch brochures was (14). This piece of evidence 
was given in support of the claim that a donation to the Liliane Fund would help 
poor, handicapped children. The fact that the United Nations honoured this fund 
underscores that it is a credible organisation, and that it is highly probable that the 
fund will succeed in helping these children with new donations. A similar use of 
expert evidence was (15) in a French brochure for Amnesty International. The fact 
that the Nobel Peace Prize committee awarded Amnesty International suggests 
that donations have led to positive effects, and that they will lead to these effects in 
the future. In the last example, (16), expert evidence was used to support the claim 
that a donation to SOS Children’s Villages would result in host families for 
children.  
4.4  Conclusion 
In this study, the relative use of evidence types in Dutch and French public 
information brochures was analyzed. There was a cultural difference in the relative 
use of the four evidence types (RQ1), and expert evidence was more frequently 
used in the French brochures than in the Dutch brochures (RQ2). It should be 
noted, however, that expert evidence was the least used evidence type in both 
corpora. Therefore, a better way to formulate this result would be to say that 
expert evidence was hardly used in the Dutch corpus, and only moderately in the 
French corpus. Study 1 also showed cross-cultural equivalence in the way evidence 
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was used to support claims in pragmatic argumentation. The equivalence of the 
distinction between four types of evidence in both cultures was also assessed. 
The relative use of the four types of evidence was analyzed in this study to 
investigate the relative expected persuasiveness of these evidence types. An 
important issue to address is the extent to which the use of evidence types is a 
good indicator of the persuasiveness the text writers assign these evidence types. 
The use of evidence may be the result of (implicit) genre conventions in each 
culture. But even if this were the case, conventions are likely to be related to text 
writers’ preferences about what should be persuasive. Text writers in France and 
the Netherlands work on the same kinds of persuasive information brochures, and 
the same types of evidence are available to support their claims. It is highly 
plausible even that the same arguments are available: the consequences of drinking 
alcohol, for instance, are the same in France as in the Netherlands. If one assumes 
that text writers do their best to design the most persuasive brochures, this means 
that the choice for certain types of evidence is strategic. As a result, Dutch and 
French text writers can be said to have different expectations about which types of 
evidence are more persuasive than others. However, the four types of evidence 
may not be available in the same degree for each occasion where evidence can be 
used. In reaction to this limitation, an experiment was set up in which participants 
chose freely between the four types of evidence. Chapter 5 will report on this 
experiment. At the end of that chapter, Study 1 will be further discussed, and its 
results will be compared to those of Study 2. 
Notes 
1.  Statistical evidence was more frequently used than expert evidence (χ2 (1) = 21.49, p < 
.001), and anecdotal evidence was also more frequently used than expert evidence (χ2 
(1) = 19.80, p < .001). 
2.  These brochures are preferable to advertisements, which often lack explicit verbal 
argumentation. On the basis of a corpus of Dutch magazine advertisements, Van 
Gisbergen, Ketelaar, and Beentjes (2004), for example, showed that in 75% of the ads the 
size of verbal copy is less than a quarter of the total surface of the ad. Although a 
restricted space may still contain a large number of words printed in a small font, it is 
reasonable to assume that brochures contain more text than advertisements. 
3.  In a few cases, consequences were presented in the form of characteristics. In the Dutch 
brochure ‘I’m looking for a home where I need to be before dark’, readers were asked to 
become foster parents. Besides the positive consequences of this action, the negative 
consequence of sometimes being troubled by these children who are regularly in a bad 
mood was mentioned. This consequence was formulated as a characteristic of the 
children: these children have their moods, just like any other child. This characteristic 
can easily be reformulated as a disadvantage: having foster children leads to the 
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consequence of being sometimes troubled by their bad moods. The distinction between 
consequences and characteristics therefore did not affect the analysis. 
4.  An appropriate statistical test to calculate intercoder reliability is Cohen’s κ. For this 
first decision, the proportion of agreement that is expected by chance (PAE in the κ 
formula) can not be calculated, as the chance that a coder categorizes a text fragment as 
evidence can not be predicted. Agreement was therefore computed by means of percent 
agreement (see Neuendorf, 2002): the number of agreements was divided by the total 
number of agreements and disagreements.  
5.  The results for the two research questions were corroborated with a χ2 test. There was a 
cultural difference in the relative occurrence of evidence types (χ2 (3) = 37.00, p < .001), 
and expert evidence was more frequently used in the French than in the Dutch 
brochures (χ2 (1) = 3.42, p < .05; one-tailed). Next to the interaction effect between 
culture and the four types of evidence, there was also an interaction effect between 
culture and the kinds of evidence that Kuhn (1991) distinguishes (F (1, 42) = 14.18, p < 
.01, η2 = .25). Anecdotal, statistical, and expert evidence are genuine evidence, and 
causal evidence is pseudoevidence (see Section 2.2.2). Genuine evidence was more 
frequently used in the French brochures (M = 2.59, SD = 1.94) than in the Dutch 
brochures (M = 0.86, SD = 1.42) (t(42) = 3.36, p < .01).  
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Expected persuasiveness: 
an experimental approach 
In Study 1, the expected persuasiveness of evidences types in France and the 
Netherlands was investigated on the basis of professional text writers’ use of 
evidence types in persuasive information brochures. Study 2 aimed to answer the 
same general and specific research question on the basis of an experiment. Before 
presenting this study (5.3 – 5.5), I will first discuss how the expected and actual 
persuasiveness of evidence types (5.1), and the effect of culture (5.2) was measured 
in the experiments that were conducted for this dissertation, including Study 2. 
5.1  Outline of the experimental approach 
In Chapter 3, I presented a review of experimental studies on the relative actual 
persuasiveness of evidence types. In most of these studies, participants read a long 
message in which evidence supported an often implicit claim. The persuasiveness 
of evidence was usually measured on the basis of the perceived probability of the 
claim supported by evidence. As long messages with evidence may differ in more 
aspects than only in the type of evidence, it is difficult to attribute the perceived 
probability to the evidence included. Therefore, I chose to reduce messages to 
simple claims, such as (1). 
 
(1)  Smoking cigarettes leads to a high risk of lung cancer. 
 
Measuring the expected or actual persuasiveness of evidence types then consists of 
comparing the perceived probabilities of claims that are the same except for the 
type of evidence that supports them. If group A receives this claim with anecdotal 
evidence (2), and group B with statistical evidence (3), measuring the relative 
persuasiveness of anecdotal and statistical evidence consists of comparing the 
mean perceived probabilities of claim (1) in both groups.  
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(2) Smoking cigarettes leads to a high risk of lung cancer. John Smith from 
Rotterdam has smoked for more than 30 years and now suffers from lung 
cancer. 
 
(3) Smoking cigarettes leads to a high risk of lung cancer. A British study has 
recently shown that 49% of the 254 smokers they investigated suffer from lung 
cancer. 
 
Most of the evidence studies discussed in Chapter 3 used a single-message design: 
one message with one type of evidence. As the message topic may affect the 
persuasiveness of evidence, it is important to measure the effect of evidence across 
various topics. When participants are given short texts like (2) and (3), it is possible 
to provide them with more than one text. As such a multiple message design 
allows for more reliable generalizations than a single-message design (Jackson & 
Jacobs, 1983; O’Keefe, 2002), it was also used in the experimental studies in this 
dissertation. In the following sections, I will discuss the claims that were used 
(5.1.1) and the operationalizations of the evidence types (5.1.2), and I will explain 
the way in which the equivalence of the Dutch and French material was 
ascertained (5.1.3). 
5.1.1  Selection of claims 
A number of claims were needed for the multiple message design. Not every 
descriptive, causal claim could be used, since I only accepted claims that were 
perceived as moderately probable. Highly probable claims, such as (1), do not need 
evidence, because they are accepted without supporting evidence (thereby 
obscuring any differences in persuasive effects of evidence). Likewise, improbable 
claims are not accepted regardless of whether evidence supports these claims or 
not. In fact, studies on the so-called prior belief effect have demonstrated that the 
perceived probability of a claim may be influenced more by the prior acceptation 
of that claim than by the evidence that is provided (see, e.g., Edwards & Smith, 
1996; Kunda, 1987; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). When people are faced with 
evidence for claims contrary to their initial beliefs, they try to undermine the 
evidence. In Lord et al., for instance, participants who either supported or were 
opposed to capital punishment were given the reports of two studies. One study 
was in favor of capital punishment, the other was against. The results confirmed 
the prior belief effect: participants rated the evidence that confirmed their own 
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initial beliefs as more convincing than evidence that disconfirmed their beliefs. 
This leads Edwards and Smith to conclude that “people are unable to judge the 
strength of an argument independently of their prior belief in the conclusion [the 
claim]” (p. 18). Therefore, moderately probable claims are best suited to detect 
evidence effects.  
A pre-test was conducted to select 20 claims that were perceived as moderately 
probable, and that were rated equally probable in France and the Netherlands. I 
first created a pool of 40 moderately probable claims and 10 extremely probable or 
improbable claims with different topics (transportation, work, health, and 
education)1. The extreme claims were included because with 40 moderately 
probable claims it was thought likely that participants would try to differentiate 
between the claims, and judge some claims as relatively probable and others as 
relatively improbable. The 10 extreme claims served as anchor points, and allowed 
participants to give extreme opinions from time to time. The 50 claims, listed in 
Appendix D, all consisted of one phrase, indicating an action and a consequence, 
like example (1). The set of 50 claims was put in a random order, but the different 
topics were presented alternately, with an extreme claim in each group of 5 claims. 
Four versions that differed in terms of the order in which the claims were 
presented were created to neutralize possible order effects2. I translated the 50 
Dutch claims into French and had this translation checked by the UTN Language 
Center at the Radboud University Nijmegen. As suggested by Brislin (1980), this 
French version was back translated into Dutch by another person. We compared 
the original Dutch version with the back-translated Dutch version, and agreed on 
four minor lexical changes (one in the Dutch version, three in the French version). 
Participants received one of the versions, and were asked to rate the 
probability of each claim on a 5-point semantic differential (very improbable – very 
probable). In the Netherlands, the pre-test was held at the beginning of a course at 
the Faculty of Arts at the Radboud University Nijmegen in September 2003. Thirty 
Dutch students participated, of which 93.3% were female. The mean age was 22.37 
(SD = 1.22) and ranged from 21 to 25. In France, 28 French students participated at 
the end of a course at the Faculty of Arts at the University of Montpellier in 
October 2003. The mean age was 21.71 (SD = 1.36), ranging from 20 to 25; 64.3% of 
them were female. Appendix D lists the 20 claims for which the mean 
French/Dutch probability rating ranged from 2.15 to 3.50 on a 5-point scale3, and 
for which the French and Dutch probability ratings did not significantly differ 
(alpha level of .05). 
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5.1.2  Operationalization of evidence types 
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, studies on the relative actual persuasiveness of 
evidence types did not take into account the quality of their evidence 
instantiations, although the importance of evidence quality has regularly been 
emphasized (see, e.g., Luchok & McCroskey, 1978; Reinard, 1988; Reynolds & 
Reynolds, 2002). In my experiments, I used the normative criteria presented in 
Chapter 2 to create normatively strong instantiations of statistical and expert 
evidence. As we will see below, it was difficult to create normatively strong 
anecdotal and causal evidence. For each of the 20 claims, a set of anecdotal, 
statistical, causal, and expert evidence was created. 
Normatively strong statistical evidence should consist of a large sample of 
cases that is representative for the population in the claim that it supports. The 
statistical evidence instantiations had a large sample size. Ideally, I should have 
searched for the Dutch and French population sizes relevant to the 20 claims before 
determining each normatively correct sample size. Because of the unavailability of 
this information, however, I made up different sample sizes such as 246, 315, and 
429. The statistical evidence instantiations also contained a high percentage of 
cases in the sample for which the claim holds (e.g, 71%, 77%, and 82%). The 
representativeness of the sample (the second criterion) could have been 
manipulated by indicating that the sample was randomly selected (cf. Kassin, 
1979). However, as participants received a number of statistical evidence 
instantiations, the indication of random selection in each instantiation could have 
made the material unrealistic. Therefore, representativeness was not manipulated. 
The operationalization of anecdotal evidence was normatively weak. As it 
consists of only one case to support the general claim about a whole population, a 
normatively strong operationalization was impossible. Anecdotal evidence 
consisted of a short sentence about a person who had experienced the consequence 
(e.g., better sporting performances) as a result of behavior (e.g., eating basil). 
From a normative point of view, causal evidence should provide a mechanism 
that explains the causal relation between the cause and the effect in the claim. For 
causal evidence, a strict template was impossible. It consisted either of two causal 
relations (which is typical of everyday explanations; Hesslow, 1988), or of a causal 
chain (see Section 4.2.2). 
Finally, expert evidence is normatively strong if the expert is credible and 
reliable, and when the expert’s field of expertise corresponds to the field of the 
claim. Credibility and reliability were operationalized together through the titles of 
the expert. For the Dutch version, I used the expression ‘Prof. dr. [name]’. This 
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would not have evoked enough credibility and reliability in France, since teachers 
are also called ‘professeur’. I therefore employed the expression that Breton (2003) 
used when he gave a prototypical French example of a competent expert: ‘Prof. 
[name], director of a research institute affiliated to the CNRS [Centre National de 
la Recherche Scientifique / French National Center for Scientific Research]’. It is 
important to stress that the terms ‘expert’ and ‘claim’ were never mentioned 
literally in the Dutch or French material. Relevant fields of expertise for the experts 
in the 20 claims were chosen in mutual agreement in a session with 17 Dutch 
students (Radboud University Nijmegen). Dietetics, for instance, was considered 
as a relevant field of expertise for this claim: ‘The consumption of basil in tomato 
pasta sauce improves sporting performance’. 
The templates for the operationalizations of each type of evidence are given in 
Table 5.1. For purposes of variation, two formulations for statistical and expert 
evidence were used. The original Dutch and French templates are given in 
Appendix E. 
5.1.3  Cross-cultural equivalence 
One of the problems in cultural persuasive effects research is the equivalence of 
constructs, material, and measurement instruments (e.g., Harkness, Van de Vijver, 
& Mohler, 2003; Hoeken & Korzilius, 2003). Equivalence of the construct of 
evidence, and of the distinction into four types of evidence was assured in Study 1. 
A solution to the problem of the material’s equivalence was not only found by 
back translating the claims and the evidence, but also by searching for Dutch and 
French equivalents of first names, last names, places, and universities used in the 
material. In the discussion of the material in each experiment, I will refer to the 
concrete information that was used. Here, I will discuss how the equivalence was 
ascertained. I searched for last names that were neither very common, nor very 
rare, as they both may be considered unrealistic. For France, I randomly picked 
names from an online database (www.cartedefrance.tm.fr) containing the most 
frequent names between 1966 and 1990. As I did not find any such database for the 
Netherlands, I selected Dutch names from the material of Hoeken and Hustinx 
(2003b). These names were neither peculiar nor too ordinary.  
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Table 5.1  The templates of the four types of evidence, and an example 
 
evidence template example 
anecdotal Since [first name + last name] 
from [place] experienced the 
cause, the consequence has taken 
place 
Since Peter Johnson from Amsterdam 
regularly eats tomato pasta sauce with 
basil, his sporting performance has 
improved 
   
statistical A [Dutch/French] study among 
N [Dutch/French] participants 
showed that the consequence 
occurred with X % of them as a 
result of the cause 
A study among 315 Dutch people 
showed that the sporting performance 
of 74% of them has improved after 
having regularly eaten tomato pasta 
sauce with basil 
   
 The results of a [Dutch/French] 
study among N [Dutch/French] 
participants showed that the 
consequence occurred with X % 
of them as a result of the cause 
The results of a French study among 
315 participants showed that the 
sporting performance of 74% of them 
has improved after having regularly 
eaten tomato pasta sauce with basil 
   
causal - Basil improves the production of 
adrenaline, the substance that is 
necessary for better sporting 
performance 
   
expert According to Prof. dr. [name] 
from the university of [place], an 
expert / a specialist in the field 
of [research area], [the claim] 
According to Prof. dr. Timmermans 
from the University of Amsterdam, a 
specialist in dietetics, the consumption 
of basil in tomato pasta sauce improves 
sporting performance 
   
 Prof. dr. [name], an expert / a 
specialist in the field of [research 
area] at the university of [place], 
underscores [the claim] 
Professor dr. Timmermans, a specialist 
in the field of dietetics at the University 
of Amsterdam, underscores that the 
consumption of basil in tomato pasta 
sauce improves sporting performance 
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Concerning the first names, I used online databases containing the most popular 
names in the Netherlands (www.voornamelijk.nl), and in France (www.voila.fr). I 
selected names from the 1980 list, supposing that popular names from that year are 
still familiar, yet less frequently given. Julien and Peter, for instance, were the third 
most popular names in France and the Netherlands respectively (see Appendix F). 
The German online database www.gazetteer.de, which gives current population 
figures of cities was used to pick cities in France and the Netherlands in the top 20, 
but outside the top 10. Dutch and French universities comparable in size were 
selected for the expert evidence. For the Netherlands, size was defined through the 
number of students of each Dutch university in 2003 (www.vsnu.nl). As I could not 
find a similar French list, I used the number of faculties of the universities in one 
city as an indicator of size (www.excite.fr). The following university cities were not 
taken into account: cities mentioned in anecdotal evidence, cities where the 
questionnaires for the experiment were to be filled in, and three universities that 
have a strong connotation with a particular research area (Eindhoven, Delft, and 
Toulouse). The choice for large universities had a practical reason: the larger the 
university, the higher the chances that the 17 research areas of the experts in the 
experimental material would all be present. I checked the occurrence of these 
research areas in the universities selected, using the websites of these universities. 
There was a fit in 90% of the combinations of research area and university. The 
Dutch evidence operationalizations were translated into French by the UTN 
Language Center (Radboud University Nijmegen), and back translated by the 
same person who had done this for the claims. Three minor lexical changes were 
made in the Dutch version. 
5.2  Measuring culture 
The material that the Dutch and French participants received in the experiments 
has just been discussed. If these cultural groups differ on a given dependent 
variable, no indications are present why the factor culture should account for that 
result. As cultures differ in many ways (e.g., religion, economy, politics), there are 
a number of alternative explanations. Since cultural preferences for values were 
taken as a point of departure that culture may affect the relative persuasiveness of 
evidence types, a straightforward solution lies in attributing differences to these 
values. In Section 5.2.1, I will explain how this can be done. Subsequently, I will 
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present the instrument that was used to measure the effect of culture on the 
relative persuasiveness of evidence types (5.2.2). 
5.2.1  Values and context variables 
If expert evidence should appear to be more persuasive to the French than to the 
Dutch participants, there is no proof that this effect is caused by a difference in 
power distance. If people live in a culture where the value of a large power 
distance is important, it will also be important for individuals in this cultures on 
average, but this does not have to be the case for every individual (e.g., Hofstede, 
1980; Smith & Schwartz, 1997; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). This leads to the 
invalid inference problem (see Hoeken & Korzilius, 2003). It is invalid to explain 
cultural differences on a dependent variable by a supposed cultural difference in 
the importance that is attached to a value without any knowledge about the value 
preferences of the participants of the study. Hoeken and Korzilius argue that a 
straightforward solution consists in measuring cultural values at the level of the 
individual participants. There is a set of individual values that has been used in 
experiments on cultural persuasive effects research, namely the Schwartz (1994) 
value list. Schwartz classified and cross-culturally validated more than 50 values. 
People’s preference for these values is measured by asking to what extent the 
values are a guiding principle in their lives. A minor problem of measuring values 
at an individual level is that “there is no apparent direct relationship” between 
Hofstede’s cultural values, and Schwartz’ individual values (Hoeken, et al., 2003, 
p. 203). Researchers have to discover reasonable combinations of values at the two 
levels on their own. 
Peng, Nisbett, and Wong (1997) discuss three major problems of the 
measurement of values at an individual level. First, the problem of meaning 
equivalence holds that the meaning of a value, such as equality, may differ from 
culture to culture. Second, people often assess the importance of a value on the 
basis of the importance that people around them attach to this value. A Dutch 
participant may think he finds authorities important because his friends do not. A 
French participant may think that she does not attach great value to authorities 
compared to her family. In reality, however, the French participant may attach 
more importance to authorities than the Dutch participant. Finally, people often 
attach more importance to the values that are not important to them, and relatively 
less importance to their own values because these are self-evident. This 
phenomenon appeared to occur in a study by Hornikx and Starren (2004). Whereas 
the Dutch culture is characterized by a weak uncertainty avoidance, and France by 
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a strong uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 1980, 2001), the Dutch participants in 
Hornikx and Starren attached more importance to the Schwartz (1994) values 
related to strong uncertainty avoidance, and the French participants attached more 
importance to the Schwartz values related to weak uncertainty avoidance. Peng et 
al. further emphasized the difficulties of measuring values by demonstrating that 
different methods of assessing participants’ values correlated weakly or not at all. 
If values are problematic to measure at an individual level, what else can be 
measured at that level? A solution is provided by the concept of so-called context 
variables. 
The idea of context variables, which originates from cross-cultural psychology 
(Poortinga & Van de Vijver, 1987), is similar to that of measuring values at an 
individual level as a solution for the problem of how cultural differences can be 
explained. Appropriate context variables have to be chosen with respect to the 
context where an effect of culture is expected, for instance the persuasiveness of 
expert evidence. The researcher’s task therefore consists of carefully selecting or 
constructing a context variable that is expected to determine the persuasiveness of 
expert evidence. In contrast, in the value approach the choice of values at an 
individual level is determined by the expected difference in values at a cultural 
level, and not so much on the dependent variable under investigation. In 
conclusion, values are essential for inspiring research questions, and for providing 
a social-cultural framework of cultural differences and similarities. As the 
assessment of values at an individual level has methodological problems, context 
variables other than individual values constitute a better alternative. The next 
question is to ask what context variable may serve as a predictor for the 
persuasiveness of expert evidence. This question will be answered below. 
5.2.2  The Preference for Expert Information (PEI) 
A context variable that is related to the persuasiveness of expert evidence may be 
the degree to which people accept and appreciate information given by experts. 
The only scales close to this concept are the social power scales of Swasy (1979), 
which regroup six interpersonal power types based on French and Raven (1959). 
Two of these types are important here: informational power (the importance of the 
information given by a high power person), and expert power (attribution of 
superior knowledge of a high power person by a low power person). However, the 
formulations of these items were too abstract (e.g., ‘The information provided by A 
about this situation makes sense’). Inspired by Swasy, I therefore developed six 
new items for a Preference for Expert Information scale (PEI). These items are:  
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1.  If an expert says it is right, then it is right. 
2.  Judgments of experts are very important to me. 
3.  I prefer to base my decisions on the opinion of an expert. 
4.  The judgment of an expert needs to be believed. 
5.  I accept that there are people who know more about a topic than me. 
6.  Knowledge makes experts powerful. 
 
The Dutch Preference for Expert Information scale was translated into French, and 
back translated by a native French researcher. French participants are expected to 
have a higher preference for expert information than Dutch participants, and the 
score on this scale is expected to correlate positively with the persuasiveness of 
expert evidence. 
Study 2 
Study 1 demonstrated that Dutch and French text writers differ in their use of 
evidence types in persuasive information brochures. A limitation of this study was 
that these writers may not always have had the four types of evidence at their 
disposal when they wanted to use evidence. Therefore, a second study was 
conducted, in which participants chose explicitely between the four types of 
evidence. The research questions of Study 2 are those that Studies 1 and 2 both 
aimed at: 
 
General RQ1 Are there cultural differences in the relative expected persuasiveness 
of anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert evidence? 
 
Specific RQ1 Is the expected persuasiveness of expert evidence higher for the 
French than for the Dutch? 
 
In order to answer these questions, an experiment was conducted in which French 
and Dutch participants were given a series of claims, each supported by four types 
of evidence. Where possible, these evidence instantiations were normatively 
strong. The participants were asked to rank these evidence types according to their 
expected persuasiveness to convince another person. An advantage of this ranking 
method (cf. Kline, 1971a) is that participants are forced to judge the relative 
expected persuasiveness of the four types of evidence. 
 chapter 5 89 
 
 
5.3  Method 
5.3.1  Material 
Eight claims were randomly selected from the pool of 20 claims presented in 
Section 5.1.1 (see Appendix D). For each of the 8 claims, four types of evidence 
were constructed in accordance with the templates in Section 5.1.2. In order to 
avoid having four completely identical anecdotal evidence operationalizations, the 
order of the main and subordinate clause was sometimes reversed, and instead of 
since, the words after, and, and through were used from time to time. The two 
operationalizations of statistical and expert evidence were used alternately. The 
percentages in the statistical evidence ranged from 71% to 84%, and the sample 
sizes from 138 (for relatively small populations, such as young criminals in prison) 
to 429 (for relatively large populations, such as boys at secondary school). The 
names, cities, and universities mentioned in the material are listed in Appendix F. 
5.3.2  Participants 
In line with the pre-test and the majority of the experimental studies on the 
persuasiveness of evidence types, students were chosen as participants for this and 
the following experiments. No student participated in more than one experiment 
presented in this dissertation. The Dutch participants (n = 88) studied Business 
Communication Studies at the Radboud University Nijmegen. The French 
participants studied Applied Foreign Languages (University of Montpellier-II, n = 
56) or Linguistics (University of Paris-VIII, n = 30). The programs are very similar. 
Questionnaires filled in by non-natives were not used for further analyses. The 
percentage of male participants was higher in France (45.3%) than in the 
Netherlands (14.8%) (χ2 (1) = 19.41, p < .001). On average, the Dutch participants 
were 19.48 (SD = 1.95) years old (range: 18 – 26 years old), and the French 
participants 22.05 (SD = 2.22) (range: 18 – 30 years old). This difference was 
significant: t(172) = 8.12, p < .001. Participants’ sex and age did not affect the 
expected persuasiveness of expert evidence, and hardly affected the other types of 
evidence4. 
5.3.3  Design 
Four versions of the material were created, in which the order of the eight claims 
was identical, but in which the order of the types of evidence was different. A 
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balanced Latin square design was employed to assign the different orders of the 
types of evidence to the eight claims, and to the four versions. The scores were 
pooled across the four versions, as there were no effects of version on the mean 
ranking of anecdotal evidence (Kruskal-Wallis χ2 (3) = 6.12, p = .11), statistical 
evidence (Kruskal-Wallis χ2 (3) = 3.81, p = .28), causal evidence (Kruskal-Wallis χ2 
(3) = 1.05, p = .79), or expert evidence (Kruskal-Wallis χ2 (3) = 5.15, p = .16). 
5.3.4  Instrumentation 
The booklet that participants received was titled ‘Convincing another person with 
arguments’. Participants were asked to rate the four types of evidence in terms of 
their persuasive power to convince another person of the believability of each of 
the eight claims. After the eight rankings of the evidence types, participants were 
asked to fill in on a 5-point Likert scale the degree to which they agreed with six 
items of the Preference for Expert Information (PEI) scale, and with seven items of 
the Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Concerning the PEI 
scale, it was hypothesized that (a) French participants would score higher than the 
Dutch participants, and that (b) the higher participants scored on PEI, the higher 
their expected persuasiveness of expert evidence would be. The first four items of 
the PEI scale proved to be reliable, both for the French participants (α = .73), and 
for the Dutch participants (α = .75). Van de Vijver and Leung (1997, p. 60) 
suggested a formula to test the equality of reliability coefficients in two groups. 
There proved not to be a cultural difference in the coefficients in the present study 
(p > .05), suggesting that the scale is not culturally unreliable.  
The second scale, the Need for Cognition (NFC), measures the degree to which 
people spontaneously engage in thinking and enjoy it (Cacioppo, et al., 1984). In 
the ELM, people who score high on NFC are said to be more inclined to take the 
central route to persuasion, and to differentiate between strong and weak 
arguments (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The NFC scale was included in the 
questionnaire as a check on the route that Dutch and French participants took (cf. 
Section 3.3.4). I used the seven items of the French version from Falcy (1997), and 
the corresponding items of the Dutch version as used by Pieters, Verplanken, and 
Modde (1987). The scale was reliable for the French participants (α = .74), but not 
for the Dutch (α = .58). Therefore, I will not refer to this scale in the presentation of 
the results. After these items, there were eight control questions about the expertise 
of the eight experts that each participant read about in the claims. For each of the 
eight experts, participants had to indicate the degree to which they agreed with a 
standpoint on a 5-point Likert scale, such as: “Professor Timmermans is a 
 chapter 5 91 
 
 
researcher in the field of retail marketing at the University of Rotterdam. In that 
capacity, he has enough expertise to make a judgment about the relation between 
slow music in supermarkets and their turnover”. The questionnaire ended with 
questions about participants’ age, sex, nationality, and current education. 
5.3.5  Procedure 
The questionnaires were filled in at one Dutch university and two French 
universities in January – March 2004. As for the other experiments in this 
dissertation, questionnaires were not filled in at the universities mentioned in the 
material. The questionnaires were distributed at the beginning of a lecture. The 
students received no reward for their participation. After the questionnaires had 
been collected, the real research purpose was revealed, and participants were 
thanked for their cooperation. The whole procedure took about 15 minutes. There 
were no disturbances during the experiment. 
5.3.6  Statistical tests 
A Friedman test was used to investigate whether the mean ranking of the four 
types of evidence differed. Next, a Wilcoxon signed rank test was employed to test 
for each culture which types of evidences differed from each other in their mean 
ranking. Cultural differences in the mean rankings of the evidence types were 
measured with a nonparametric Mann-Whitney test, and cultural differences in the 
number of first rankings with an independent t-test. 
5.4  Results 
Cross-cultural methodology suggests checking whether participants with different 
cultural backgrounds have the same scale use (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). One 
of the types of scale bias where European differences have been reported is 
extreme response style, “the tendency to endorse extreme response categories on a 
rating scale (e.g., the 1 and/or the 5 on a 5-point scale), regardless of content” (Van 
Herk, Poortinga, & Verhallen, 2004, p. 347). The study of Johnson, Kulesa, Cho, 
and Shavitt (2005) suggests that extreme response bias is likely for the French 
culture, and not for the Dutch culture. In fact, they demonstrated for a large 
number of cultures that there are positive correlations between the level of power 
distance of a culture, and the number of extreme responses on 5-point Likert 
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scales. I therefore tested whether the Dutch and French differed in their use of the 
two endpoints 1 and 5 on the context variables (11 items), and on the perceived 
expertise of the experts (8 items), using the Bachman and O’Malley (1984) index 
(number of items with extreme responses divided by the total number of items). 
The French participants scored more extremely than the Dutch (see Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2  Extreme response indices for Dutch and French participants and t-test for 
cultural differences (SD between parentheses) 
 
variable  Dutch index French index t-test 
context variables .13 (0.16)  .24 (0.20)  t(172) = 4.04, p < .001 
expertise of experts .04 (0.15)  .10 (0.20)  t(154.89) = 2.37, p < .05 
 
I therefore standardized the scores on the context variables, and on the perceived 
expertise of the experts5. The analyses below of the PEI scale and the perceived 
expertise of the experts will concern only the standardized data. I checked whether 
there were cultural differences on the PEI scale, and on the expertise of the experts. 
First, it was found that, contrary to expectation, the Dutch (M = 2.51, SD = 0.69) 
and French participants (M = 2.52, SD = 0.77) scored equally on the PEI scale 
(t(172) = 0.95, p = .35). Next, I tested whether the experts were indeed considered 
as persons with high expertise. This was the case, as the mean perceived expertise 
for the French (M = 3.25, SD = 0.60) and the Dutch participants (M = 3.52, SD = 
0.54) scored above the midpoint (3.00) of the scale (French: t(85) = 3.82, p < .001; 
Dutch: t(87) = 9.17, p < .001). For each expert there was no cultural difference in his 
or her perceived expertise (p’s > .14). 
This experiment was conducted to investigate whether there are cultural 
differences in the expected persuasiveness of the four types of evidence, and of 
expert evidence in particular. The types of evidence were ranked from lowest to 
highest expected persuasiveness. There was a difference in the mean rankings of 
the four types of evidence (Friedman χ2 (3) = 284.63, p < .001). The mean rankings 
were then compared for each individual culture. The Dutch participants had the 
highest preference for statistical evidence, followed by expert, causal, and 
anecdotal evidence (see Table 5.3).  
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Table 5.3  Mean ranking in function of evidence type and culture (SD between 
parentheses; a smaller number indicates higher expected persuasiveness; 
different superscripts refer to significant differences within-cultures, alpha 
level of .001) 
 
evidence type Dutch participants (n = 88)  French participants (n = 86) 
statistical 1.25a (0.44) 1.55a (0.67) 
expert 2.33b (0.62)  2.33b (0.69) 
causal 2.68c (0.67) 2.71c (0.78) 
anecdotal 3.73d (0.49)  3.40d (0.70) 
 
The same pattern of rankings of the four types of evidence was found for the 
French participants. This means that there was no cultural difference in the relative 
expected persuasiveness of the four types of evidence (general RQ1). Still, there 
may be differences in the Dutch and French mean rankings of the individual types 
of evidence. Statistical evidence had a higher ranking for the Dutch participants (z 
= 3.26, p < .01), whereas the French ranking of anecdotal evidence was higher than 
the Dutch (z = 4.05, p < .001). Causal evidence (z = 0.48, p = .63) and expert 
evidence (z = 0.26, p = .79) were not significantly differently ranked by the two 
cultural groups. Concerning the specific RQ1 about expert evidence, this means 
that there was no cultural difference in the expected persuasiveness of expert 
evidence. 
In order to explore in more detail participants’ rankings of expert evidence for 
each of the eight claims, I tested whether there were cultural differences in the 
number of times that the participants put expert evidence in first position in the 
ranking (that is, expert evidence is expected to be most persuasive). As Table 5.4 
shows, statistical evidence was put in first position in the majority of the eight 
claims.  
 
Table 5.4  Mean number of times that a type of evidence was put in first position in the 
ranking (SD between parentheses) 
 
evidence type Dutch participants (n = 88)  French participants (n = 86) 
statistical 6.47** (2.52)  5.02 (3.01) 
causal 0.75 (1.81) 1.24 (2.06) 
expert 0.70 (1.73) 1.26* (2.14) 
anecdotal 0.04 (0.28) 0.47** (1.50) 
* p < .05, ** p < .01  
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French participants appeared to put expert evidence in first position more often 
than the Dutch participants (t(163.28) = 1.87, p < .05, one-tailed). Each French 
participant put it on average 1.26 times in first position, whereas the Dutch 
participants did this only 0.70 times. The number of top rankings for expert 
evidence was not affected by participants’ score on the PEI scale (for both cultures: 
F < 1).  
Finally, the effect of PEI on the expected persuasiveness of expert evidence was 
tested. A positive correlation was hypothesized between a person’s score on the 
PEI scale and the mean ranking of expert evidence. For the French participants, 
this was the case, but the correlation was not particularly strong (r (86) = .26, p < 
.05). For the Dutch participants, surprisingly, the correlation was not significant (r 
(88) = .16, p = .13). 
5.5  Conclusion 
Study 2 investigated cultural differences in the expected persuasiveness of the four 
types of evidence, and of expert evidence in particular, on the basis of the 
participants’ preference for evidence types to persuade other people. Concerning 
the general RQ1, there was no cultural difference in the relative rankings of the 
four types of evidence. Two more subtle results were indications for cultural 
differences: the cultural background of the participants affected the mean rankings 
of statistical and anecdotal evidence, and the number of times that three of the four 
types of evidence were put in first position in the ranking. Concerning the specific 
RQ1, expert evidence was not ranked higher in France than in the Netherlands. 
There was one indication, however, for a cultural difference in the expected 
persuasiveness of expert evidence: French participants put expert evidence in first 
position more frequently than the Dutch participants. 
The scores on the PEI scale were expected to differ between the two cultural 
groups, and were expected to correlate with the expected persuasiveness of expert 
evidence. Contrary to these expectations, the two cultural groups scored equally 
on this scale, and the scale scores correlated positively with the expected 
persuasiveness of expert evidence for the French participants only, but not for the 
Dutch participants. 
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5.6  Conclusion and discussion of Studies 1 and 2 
Studies 1 and 2 addressed the research questions whether there are cultural 
differences in the relative expected persuasiveness of anecdotal, statistical, causal, 
and expert evidence (general RQ1), and of expert evidence in particular (specific 
RQ1). In Study 1, expected persuasiveness was measured on the basis of the use of 
evidence in persuasive information brochures, because – as I argued in Section 4.4 
– this use is an indicator for expected persuasiveness. Studies 1 and 2 both 
demonstrated with different methodologies that there are cultural differences 
between France and the Netherlands in the relative expected persuasiveness of the 
evidence types, and of expert evidence in particular. However, the differences 
were rather small. Before I will discuss how Studies 1 and 2 relate to each other, I 
will first discuss them separately. 
In Study 1, there was only a moderate use of expert evidence in the French 
corpus. A first explanation for this is that expert evidence may be considered less 
relevant than the other types of evidence, as it usually does not provide new 
information. A second explanation may lie in the suggestion that the brochures’ 
senders do not like to use expert evidence, because they do not feel the need for 
support of other experts to defend their claims. French text writers in particular 
may feel that their own authority makes support from other experts redundant. 
Conversely, senders who are not sure whether the readers will accept their claims, 
such as fundraising companies, may be more inclined to use expert evidence. 
Study 1 supported this: all expert evidence instantiations except one came from 
fundraising brochures. The low use of expert evidence corresponds with the 
finding of Levasseur and Dean’s (1996) study on the use of evidence in presidential 
debates. In Schellens and De Jong (2004), argumentation from authority, which is 
related to expert evidence, occurred in 30% of the brochures. This percentage is 
much higher than the 4.5% of the brochures in which expert evidence was used in 
Study 1, but the 30% would have been lower with a more narrow definition of 
authority. In Schellens and De Jong, the argument from authority also included 
sources such as celebrities, and unnamed scientists. Causal argumentation was 
very frequently used in the corpus in Schellens and De Jong. It occurred in 75% of 
brochures, similar to the 72.7% in which causal evidence was used in the brochures 
in Study 1. These high percentages are quite remarkable, as causal evidence is not 
genuine, but pseudoevidence (Kuhn, 1991). 
In Study 2, students were asked to rank evidence types in terms of their 
expected persuasiveness. With this design, the limitation of the possible 
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unavailability of the four evidence types in Study 1 was combatted. A drawback of 
the ranking method is that differences in relative expected persuasiveness may 
sometimes be artificial, because participants are not able to rank two types of 
evidence as equally persuasive. Study 2 can not be related to similar studies, as it is 
the first to investigate the expected persuasiveness of four types of evidence on the 
basis of a ranking technique.  
Finally, the number of differences in the approaches used in Studies 1 and 2 
limit to a certain extent the comparability of the studies’ findings: the concrete 
brochures versus the more abstract claims with evidence, the text writers versus 
the students as participants, the use of evidence types versus a ranking of evidence 
types, and the target audiences of the brochures versus the other persons that the 
students had to imagine. Such a comparison nevertheless provides some 
interesting insight: the persuasiveness of expert evidence as expected by students 
appears relatively higher than the actual use of expert evidence in persuasive 
brochures, and the use of anecdotal evidence appears relatively higher than the 
degree to which students expect it to be persuasive. A problem that the two studies 
share is that it is difficult to empirically explain the (small) cultural differences that 
were found. In Study 1, the power distance of the text writers was not measured, 
and in Study 2, the context variable PEI could not account for the cultural 
differences. I will come back to the issue of the measurement of cultural effects in 
the final chapter of this dissertation. 
Notes 
1.  The 40 moderate claims consisted of 4 claims from Hornikx and Hoeken (2003) that 
were judged between 2.76 and 3.46 on a 5-point scale, 4 claims from Hoeken and 
Hustinx (2003b) that were judged between 2.90 and 3.40, 6 claims from Hoeken and 
Hustinx (2003a) that were judged between 2.81 and 3.40, and 26 newly developed 
claims. Next, I searched for claims that were rated as extremely (im)probable by both 
the Dutch and the French participants in Hornikx and Hoeken. Finally, I added claims 
from Hoeken and Hustinx (2003a, 2003b) that were judged as extreme by their Dutch 
participants, to come to a total of 10 claims. The 5 extremely improbable claims scored 
on average 1.94, and the 5 extremely probable claims 4.05. 
2.  Version 1: claims 1 to 50; version 2: claims 50 to 1; version 3: claims 1 to 25, and 50 to 26; 
version 4: claims 50 to 26, and 1 to 25. There was no effect of version on the 
acceptability of the claims for the Dutch participants, or for the French participants. For 
the comparison of the scores on the 50 claims in each version, the use of a multivariate F 
test was not appropriate, as the claims hardly correlated. Instead, univariate F tests 
were performed for each culture with a corrected alpha level (Bonferroni correction: p = 
0.05 / 50 comparisons = .001). With this alpha level, none of the 50 claims was rated 
differently in the four versions in both cultures.  
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3.  As the range 2.50 – 3.50 did not include 20 claims, the range was expanded at the lower 
bound, where effects of evidence are more likely to occur than for claims scoring over 
3.50. 
4.  Participants’ sex did not affect the mean ranking of statistical (z = 0.75, p = .45), causal (z 
= 1.67, p = .10), or expert evidence (z = 0.03, p = .98), but it did have an effect on 
anecdotal evidence (z = 3.78, p < .001). Men (M = 3.32, SD = 0.75) ranked anecdotal 
evidence higher than women (M = 3.67, SD = 0.53). The sex of the participants did not 
affect the number of times that anecdotal (t(62.12) = 1.70, p = .09), statistical (t(172) = 
0.30, p = .77), causal (t(172) = 0.74, p = .46), and expert evidence (t(172) = 0.02, p = .99) 
were ranked as best, nor the score on PEI (t(172) = 0.30, p = .76). Age did not 
significantly correlate with the mean ranking of anecdotal (r (174) = .15, p = .05), causal 
(r (174) = .03, p = .74), or expert evidence (r (174) = .01, p = .88), but it did with statistical 
evidence (r (174) = -.21, p < .01). Age (as covariate) did not affect the number of times 
that anecdotal (F (1, 172) = 2.13, p = .15) causal (F (1, 172) = 2.98, p = .09), or expert 
evidence (F (1, 172) = 3.09, p = .08) were put on the first place, but it did affect the 
number of first positions of statistical evidence (F (1, 172) = 9.26, p < .01). On the basis of 
the median-split technique, two groups were created. The participants aged 20 years 
and younger (M = 6.55, SD = 2.41) put statistical evidence in first position more 
frequently than the participants aged 21 years and older (M = 4.95, SD = 3.06). Finally, 
age had no effect on the score on PEI (F (1, 172) = 2.72, p = .10) 
5.  For each culture, the scores on the context variables were standardized by subtracting 
from each original score the mean score of the 11 items of the context variables, and by 
dividing the remaining number by the standard deviation of the mean of these 11 
items. The same procedure was followed for the expertise of the eight experts. 
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Actual persuasiveness: 
an experimental approach 
Studies 1 and 2 showed cultural differences in the relative expected persuasiveness 
of evidence types in general, and of expert evidence in particular. If culture plays a 
role in the relative expected persuasiveness of evidence types, it is possible that it 
also affects the relative actual persuasiveness of these evidence types. Therefore, 
the second general and specific research questions of this dissertation were: 
 
General RQ2 Are there cultural differences in the relative actual persuasiveness of 
anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert evidence? 
 
Specific RQ2 Is the actual persuasiveness of expert evidence higher for the French 
than for the Dutch? 
 
In this chapter, I will present three studies. Study 3 aimed to answer both research 
questions with (normatively strong instantiations of) the four types of evidence. 
Study 4 focused on the specific research question by examining normatively strong 
and normatively weak statistical and expert evidence. The chapter will end with 
Study 5, which was conducted to test an explanation given for a finding in Study 4. 
Study 3 
If French and Dutch people differ in how persuasive they expect evidence types to 
be (Studies 1 and 2), the actual persuasiveness of these evidence types may also 
differ culturally. Therefore, Study 3 was set up to answer the general and specific 
RQ2 mentioned above. An experiment was conducted in which Dutch and French 
participants received 20 claims supported by different types evidence. Where 
possible, these evidence instantiations were normatively strong. Actual 
persuasiveness of evidence was measured on the basis of the perceived probability 
of the claims supported by evidence. 
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6.1  Method 
6.1.1  Material 
The 20 claims selected in the pre-test (Section 5.1.1) were all used in this 
experiment. Their order in the questionnaire was random, but also respected a 
high variation in the claims’ probability as measured in the pre-test, and the 
claims’ content. Each participant received four instantiations of each type of 
evidence. The order of the evidence types differed between the five versions of the 
material, but participants received the same names, cities, and universities in 
exactly the same order (see Appendix G). For anecdotal evidence, a maximum of 
two instantiations started with Since. There were four fixed combinations of a first 
name, last name, and city (e.g., Marcel Elling from Haarlemmermeer). For 
statistical evidence, the two different templates were each used twice. The sample 
sizes1 (138, 246, 315, and 429) were assigned to the claims in accordance with the 
assumed population size, and the percentages (71%, 74%, 77%, and 82%) were 
randomly assigned to the claims. There was no fixed relation between the numbers 
and the percentages. For expert evidence too, the two templates were each used 
twice. One of the four combinations of an expert name and a university was, for 
instance, Professor Giraud from the University of Bordeaux. 
The length of the operationalizations of the four types of evidence was 
compared. There was a main effect of culture on evidence length (F (1, 152) = 30.14, 
p < .001, η2 = .17): French evidence (28.81 words) was longer than Dutch evidence 
(24.94 words). Table 6.1 shows the mean length of the types of evidence. 
 
Table 6.1  Evidence length in number of words in function of language and type (SD 
    between parentheses; different superscripts refer to significant differences  
    within-cultures, alpha level of .001) 
 
type of evidence Dutch evidence French evidence 
statistical 28.85a (3.87) 33.35a (5.43) 
expert 28.70a (3.84)  35.50a (5.54) 
causal 22.65b (4.51)  24.90b (4.19) 
anecdotal 19.55c (3.38) 21.50b (4.49) 
total 24.94 (5.56) 28.81 (7.58) 
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There was also a main effect of evidence type (F (3, 152) = 63.63, p < .001, η2 = .56). 
As this main effect was nearly qualified by an interaction effect with culture (F (3, 
152) = 50.98, p = .06), analyses were run for each culture. These analyses showed 
for the French material that anecdotal and causal evidence were shorter than 
statistical and expert evidence, and for the Dutch material that anecdotal evidence 
was shorter than causal evidence, which was shorter than expert and statistical 
evidence. 
6.1.2  Participants 
The participants were students from universities with a large geographical 
variation in each country in order to better represent the Dutch and the French 
culture (cf. Smith, 2004). The Dutch cities were Amsterdam (n = 42; two groups), 
Delft (n = 23), Groningen (n = 46), Nijmegen (n = 108; three groups), and Tilburg (n 
= 86; two groups). The French cities were Angers (n = 30), Paris (n = 107; two 
groups), Roubaix (n = 34), Toulouse (n = 26), and Tours (n = 98; two groups). 
Questionnaires were excluded from the analyses if they had been filled in by non-
natives (about 40 in France, and 20 in the Netherlands) and/or had not been filled 
in seriously (e.g., all the 20 claims were rated as extremely improbable). Only 
students older than 16 and younger than 31 were taken into account. In this dataset 
(France: n = 333; Netherlands: n = 310) there were differences in the number of 
participants in each version. As the lowest number of participants in each version 
was 59 in France and 61 in the Netherlands, participants were randomly rejected in 
versions that contained more than 59 or 61 participants respectively. In total, 305 
Dutch students (61 in each version) and 295 French students (59 in each version) 
participated. Appendix G gives an overview of the number of participants for each 
version, and for each group in France and in the Netherlands2. 
The Dutch participants studied at the Faculty of Arts (89%; Business 
Communication Studies, Communication Sciences, Dutch language and culture), 
Social Sciences (4%), or a technical discipline (7%). The French participants studied 
Arts (63%; Applied Foreign Languages, English language and culture), or Social 
Sciences (36%; Sociology, Psychology). The percentage of female participants was 
higher in France (86.8%) than in the Netherlands (77.4%) (χ2 (1) = 8.98, p < .01), but 
there was no interaction effect between participants’ sex and the relative 
persuasiveness of the types of evidence (F < 1). On average, the Dutch participants 
were 20.98 (SD = 2.36) years old, and the French participants 20.75 (SD = 1.96). This 
difference was not significant: t(585.16) = 1.33, p = .19. 
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6.1.3  Design 
In each of the five versions, four claims were supported by statistical evidence, 
four by anecdotal evidence, four by causal evidence, four by expert evidence, and 
four were not supported by evidence (cf. Hoeken & Hustinx, 2003b). A balanced 
Latin square design was used to determine the order in which the types of 
evidence were used as support for the claims. Each claim was supported by 
another type of evidence in each of the versions. Claim 8, for instance, was 
supported by statistical evidence in version 2, by anecdotal evidence in version 3, 
by causal evidence in version 4, and by expert evidence in version 5, but was not 
supported by evidence in version 1.  
6.1.4  Instrumentation 
The booklet that participants received was titled ‘Opinions on social issues’. A 
short instruction explained how to fill in the questionnaire, which was said to have 
been constructed by Dutch and French universities. After the instruction, 
participants read 20 pairs of claims with a type of evidence. Each pair was 
followed by a repetition of the claim, and by a 5-point semantic differential (very 
improbable – very probable) on which participants were asked to judge the 
probability of each claim. After these 20 judgments, participants received a number 
of items of three context variables for which they had to indicate their agreement 
on a 5-point Likert scale. These variables were included in order to explain 
possible cultural effects. Participants were given seven items of the Need for 
Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), eight items of the Preference for 
Numerical Information (Viswanathan, 1993), and six items of the Preference for 
Expert Information scale. The three scales were found not culturally unreliable 
with Van de Vijver and Leung’s (1997) formula to test the equality of reliability 
coefficients in two groups (p’s > .05). 
For the PEI scale, the first four items proved to be reliable (cf. Study 2), both for 
the French participants (α = .77), and for the Dutch (α = .75). Based on the findings 
in Study 2, the French participants were not expected to score higher on this scale 
than the Dutch. However, I hypothesized that the score on PEI would correlate 
positively with the actual persuasiveness of expert evidence. For the three other 
types of evidence, I did not have any indications for cultural differences. 
Nevertheless, context variables were still selected, as they might provide insight 
into personal characteristics that affect the persuasiveness of those types of 
evidence. I hypothesized that the persuasiveness of causal evidence was related to 
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the score on NFC (Cacioppo, et al., 1984)3. People who score high (as opposed to 
low) on NFC could engage more in spontaneously thinking about the causal 
relations in the claim, and could therefore find causal evidence more persuasive. 
NFC was also included in the questionnaire as a check on the route to persuasion 
that Dutch and French participants take (central or peripheral). Given that the four 
types of evidence are not equally persuasive (see review in Chapter 3), it was 
hypothesized that people who scored high on NFC would perceive larger 
differences between the persuasiveness of evidence types than people who scored 
low on NFC. Finally, NFC may be related to anecdotal evidence. People who 
engage in thinking to a lesser degree may be less sensitive to the normative 
weakness of anecdotal evidence, and may – as a result – be more persuaded by 
anecdotal evidence than people who score high on NFC. The NFC scale was 
reliable: α = .74 for the French participants, and α = .67 for the Dutch.  
The persuasive power of statistical evidence may be related to the degree to 
which people appreciate numerical information. The Preference for Numerical 
Information (PNI) scale measures the “proclivity toward using numerical 
information and engaging in thinking involving numerical information” 
(Viswanathan, 1993, p. 741). This scale measures people’s attitude toward 
statistical information. It was hypothesized that the score on this scale would affect 
the persuasiveness of statistical evidence. I used the validated small 8-item version 
of PNI, which proved to be reliable (α = .86 for the French participants, and α = .85 
for the Dutch). The original English items were translated into French by a French 
psychologist, and into Dutch by a Dutch communication scholar. A French native 
and I compared the three versions on equivalence. After these context variables, 
there were four questions about the perceived expertise of the four experts that 
each participant read about (cf. Study 2), and questions about participants’ age, 
sex, nationality, and current education. 
6.1.5  Procedure 
The questionnaires were filled in at several Dutch and French universities in 
October – November 2003. The questionnaire was introduced and distributed at 
the beginning or at the end of tutorials or lectures4. After the questionnaires had 
been collected, the real research purpose was revealed, and participants were 
thanked for their cooperation. The students received no reward for their 
participation. The whole procedure took about 10 to 12 minutes in the smaller 
groups, and 13 to 15 minutes in the larger groups. There were no disturbances 
during the experiment. 
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6.1.6  Statistical tests 
The persuasiveness of evidence was computed as a difference score: the judgment 
of a claim with evidence minus the judgment of the same claim without evidence. 
Thus, claims without evidence served as a baseline. Each participant judged four 
instantiations of, for instance, anecdotal evidence. The four difference scores for 
anecdotal evidence were averaged into a score indicating the persuasiveness of 
anecdotal evidence for that participant. As the procedure for statistical, causal, and 
expert evidence was the same, each participant finally had a difference score for 
each type of evidence. The research question about cultural differences in the 
relative persuasiveness of evidence types was evaluated by means of a 2 (culture) x 
4 (type of evidence) analysis of variance, where culture was a between-subjects 
factor and type of evidence a within-subjects factor. Concerning the other research 
question, cultural differences in the persuasiveness of expert evidence were 
investigated in two ways. First, the persuasiveness of expert evidence in the two 
cultural groups was directly compared with an independent t-test. Second, the 
relative persuasiveness of expert evidence was investigated by comparing its 
persuasiveness with that of the other types of evidence. In addition to these 
analyses by participants, analyses by stimuli were also conducted in order to test 
whether the effects of culture and evidence type could be generalized over the 
different claims. 
A within-subjects design carries the risk of a carry over effect (see Elmes, 
Kantowitz, & Roediger, 1992): the participants’ judgments of claims in the second 
part of the booklet may be influenced by their judgments of claims in the first part. 
Therefore, a 2 (first judgment, last judgment) x 4 (type of evidence) analysis of 
variance with repeated measures was conducted. If participants had learned to 
perceive differences between the types of evidence, there should have been a 
significant interaction effect between the two factors. The interaction, however, 
was not significant: F (3, 594) = 1.03, p = .38. 
6.2  Results 
As in Study 2, I tested whether the Dutch and French participants differed in their 
use of scale extremities. Table 6.2 shows the Bachman and O’Malley (1984) indices 
for the judgments of the 20 claims5 with evidence, the three context variables (19 
items), and the expertise of the four experts. As the French participants always 
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scored more extremely than the Dutch, the scores on these variables were 
standardized (see, for the procedure, footnote 5 in Chapter 5). The analyses below 
will concern only the standardized data, unless indicated otherwise. 
 
Table 6.2  Extreme response indices for Dutch and French participants and t-test for 
cultural differences (SD between parentheses) 
 
variable  Dutch index French index t-test 
claims .22 (0.16)  .31 (0.16)  t(598) = 6.33, p < .001 
context variables .22 (0.16)  .32 (0.18)  t(598) = 7.22, p < .001 
expertise of experts .05 (0.16)  .12 (0.23)  t(521.11) = 4.10, p < .001 
 
I tested whether there were cultural differences in the perception of the expertise of 
the 20 experts used in the experimental material (with a corrected alpha level, see 
footnote 5 in this chapter). The perceived expertise of the 20 experts did not differ 
between the two cultural groups. The mean perceived expertise was 3.29 (SD = 
0.64) for the Dutch participants, and 3.22 (SD = 0.74) for the French (non-significant 
difference: t(598) = 1.36, p = .17; t-test with raw data). There was one expert for 
which the expertise was significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale (the 
fourth Dutch expert in version 1: M = 2.61, SD = 0.90). Below, the results will be 
presented that are relevant to the research questions (6.2.1), and that concern the 
context variables (6.2.2). 
6.2.1  Research questions 
Table 6.3 shows the persuasiveness of the types of evidence for the Dutch and the 
French participants. As these scores are based on standardized data, they do not 
reflect the absolute difference scores on a 5-point scale. However, a higher score 
still means higher persuasiveness, and a negative score means that using evidence 
is less persuasive than no evidence. 
First of all, there was a main effect of type of evidence on persuasiveness (F1 (3, 
596) = 35.05, p < .001, η2 = .15; F2 (3, 17) = 18.37, p < .001, η2 = .76). This means that 
the four types of evidence were not equally persuasive: in fact, statistical evidence 
was more persuasive than causal evidence, with expert evidence taking an 
intermediate position, and anecdotal evidence was the least persuasive (see Table 
6.3). Next, there was a main effect of culture with an analysis by participants (F1 (1, 
598) = 6.28, p < .05, η2 = .01) – suggesting more impact of evidence for the Dutch (M 
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= 0.57, SD = 1.07) than for the French participants (M = 0.35, SD = 1.09) – but only a 
tendency for this main effect with an analysis by stimuli (F2 (1, 19) = 3.38, p = .08).  
 
Table 6.3  Persuasiveness of evidence in function of culture and type (standardized data; 
     SD between parentheses; different superscripts refer to significant differences  
    within-cultures, alpha level of .01) 
 
type of evidence Dutch (n = 305) French (n = 295)  total (N = 600) 
statistical 1.04a (1.75) 0.48a,b (1.53)  0.77a (1.67) 
expert  0.66b (1.62) 0.60a (1.64) 0.63a,b (1.63) 
causal 0.64b (1.61)  0.31b (1.69) 0.48b (1.66) 
anecdotal -0.08c (1.68)  0.00c (1.54)  -0.04c (1.61) 
 
These main effects were qualified by an interaction effect between type of evidence 
and culture (F1 (3, 596) = 6.33, p < .001, η2 = .03; F2 (3, 17) = 4.56, p < .05, η2 = .45)6. 
This means that there are cultural differences in the relative actual persuasiveness 
of the four types of evidence (general RQ2). In particular, statistical evidence was 
more persuasive to the Dutch participants (M = 1.04) than to the French 
participants (M = 0.48) (t1 (598) = 4.18, p < .001; t2 (38) = 3.24, p < .01), and causal 
evidence too was more persuasive to the Dutch participants (M = 0.64) than to the 
French participants (M = 0.31) with an analysis by participants (t1 (598) = 2.48, p < 
.05), but not with an analysis by stimuli (t2 (38) = 1.54, p = .13).  
In an absolute way, expert evidence was not significantly more persuasive to 
the French participants (M = 0.60) than to the Dutch participants (M = 0.66) (t1  
(598) = 0.50, p = .62; t2  (38) = 0.34, p = .74) (specific RQ2). However, when the 
persuasiveness of expert evidence was compared to that of the other types of 
evidence, expert evidence appeared to be relatively more persuasive in France than 
in the Netherlands (see Figure 6.1). More specifically, there was an interaction 
effect between culture and statistical / expert evidence (F1 (1, 598) = 9.92, p < .01, η2 
= .02; F2 (1, 38) = 5.38, p < .05, η2 = .12). Concerning the Dutch participants, 
anecdotal evidence (M = -0.08) was the least persuasive, and statistical evidence (M 
= 1.04) was the most persuasive, with expert (M = 0.66) and causal evidence (M = 
0.64) taking an intermediate position. For the French participants too, anecdotal 
evidence was the least convincing type of evidence (M = 0.00). Expert evidence (M 
= 0.60) was more persuasive than causal evidence (M = 0.31), and statistical 
evidence (M = 0.48) took an intermediate position.  
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Figure 6.1  The actual persuasiveness of evidence types in the Dutch and the French 
culture (based on Table 6.3) 
 
The four types of evidence differed in their word length (see Section 6.1.1). This 
length operationalization may have contributed to the difference in persuasiveness 
of the types of evidence. Statistical evidence might, for instance, be persuasive 
because of its length, and not because of its content. In order to determine the 
effect of word length, I ran repeated measures ANCOVA’s with length as covariate 
(unstandardized data). For the Dutch material, evidence length did not affect the 
relative persuasiveness of evidence types (F < 1), and the main effect of type of 
evidence was still present (F (3, 75) = 4.70, p < .01, η2 = .16). For the French material, 
there was no effect for length as covariate (F < 1), but there was no longer a main 
effect of type of evidence (F (3, 75) = 1.76, p = .16). Therefore, evidence length 
seems to have played a role for the French participants, but – in the absence of an 
effect for length – it is not a strong alternative explanation for the difference in 
persuasiveness of the types of evidence. 
6.2.2  Context variables 
Context variables were selected in order to explain possible cultural differences in 
the persuasiveness of the types of evidence. As Table 6.4 shows, there were no 
cultural differences in the scores on the three context variables. As in Study 2, 
French and Dutch participants scored equally on the PEI scale. 
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Table 6.4  Scores on the context variables and t-test for cultural differences (SD between 
    parentheses; means with raw data, test with standardized data) 
 
variable  Dutch participants French participants t-test 
NFC 3.16 (0.61) 3.35 (0.72) t(597) = 0.87, p = .38 
PEI 2.41 (0.74) 2.40 (0.77) t(597) = 0.87, p = .38 
PNI  2.82 (0.77) 2.90 (0.90) t(597) = 0.22, p = .83 
 
The expectation concerning PEI was that the higher participants scored, the more 
they would be persuaded by expert evidence. PEI as covariate had a significant 
effect on the persuasiveness of expert evidence for the Dutch participants (F (1, 
300) = 20.00, p < .001, η2 = .06). There was a significant, positive correlation between 
the two variables: r (304) = .24, p < .001. For the French participants the PEI score as 
covariate had no effect on the persuasiveness of expert evidence (F (1, 291) = 1.83, p 
= .18). The degree to which French participants found expert evidence persuasive 
was independent of their personal preference for expert information. 
The scores on NFC, PNI, or PEI could not account for differences that were 
found, because Dutch and French participants did not differ in their scores on 
these scales. Still, the context variables may provide insight into the way personal 
characteristics affect the persuasiveness of the types of evidence. As hypothesized 
in Section 6.1.4, the score on NFC was related to the overall difference in 
persuasiveness of the types of evidence. On the basis of the median-split technique, 
two groups were created: high and low NFC. Participants who scored high on 
NFC perceived larger differences in the persuasiveness of statistical, causal, and 
expert evidence (F (2, 271) = 7.78, p < .01, η2 = .05) than participants who scored low 
on NFC (F (2, 324) = 1.34, p = .26). This only applied to these three types of 
evidence. With four types of evidence, participants who scored low on NFC also 
perceived differences, but only between anecdotal evidence (lower persuasiveness) 
and the three other types of evidence (higher persuasiveness). Furthermore, NFC 
was related to the persuasiveness of anecdotal evidence for the Dutch participants 
(F (1, 300) = 6.38, p < .05, η2 = .02), but not for the French participants (F < 1). For 
the Dutch participants, their NFC correlated positively with the persuasiveness of 
anecdotal evidence (r (304) = .10, p = .07), but this correlation was only marginally 
significant. Other hypotheses were not confirmed: NFC was not related to the 
persuasiveness of causal evidence (for both cultures: F < 1), and PNI was not 
related to the persuasiveness of statistical evidence (for both cultures: F < 1)7.  
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6.3  Conclusion 
Study 3 was set up to answer the general RQ2 about whether there are cultural 
differences in the relative actual persuasiveness of anecdotal, statistical, causal, and 
expert evidence. The results of this study confirm such cultural differences. The 
specific research question RQ2 was whether expert evidence is more persuasive in 
France than in the Netherlands. In an absolute way, normatively strong expert 
evidence was not more persuasive to the French participants, but it was in a 
relative way. This cultural difference was less pronounced than could be expected 
on the basis of what is known about the power distances in the Dutch and the 
French culture. Larger differences could be suggested with normatively weak 
expert evidence. The French communication scholar Breton (2003) argued that 
experts can influence people’s opinions about an issue that is far from their own 
field of expertise. This suggests that – under conditions of a large power distance – 
normatively weak expert evidence with an irrelevant field of expertise may be as 
persuasive as normatively strong expert evidence. People from a large power 
distance culture (e.g, the French) more easily accept differences in power distance 
(Hofstede, 1980, 2001), and may therefore be less affected by the relevance of the 
experts’ field of expertise, provided that these experts have a high status (e.g., 
because of titles or affiliation to a research center). People from small power 
distance cultures such as the Dutch culture could be said to take into account the 
relevance of the field of expertise, as predicted by normative rules from 
argumentation theory. Study 4 therefore investigated whether there are cultural 
differences in the persuasiveness of normatively strong and normatively weak 
expert evidence in France and the Netherlands. 
Study 4 
This study focused on the specific research question RQ2 about whether the actual 
persuasiveness of expert evidence is higher for the French than for the Dutch. In 
Study 3, I demonstrated that normatively strong expert evidence was only 
relatively more persuasive in France, and I suggested that larger cultural 
differences could be in play with normatively weak expert evidence instantiations. 
Based on Breton (2003), and Hofstede (1980, 2001), the following research 
questions were formulated: 
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RQ3 Is there a cultural difference in the relative actual persuasiveness of  
   normatively strong and normatively weak expert evidence in France and the  
   Netherlands? 
 
RQ4 Is normatively weak expert evidence more persuasive in France than in the  
Netherlands? 
 
I also included statistical evidence for three reasons. First, if French participants in 
this study turn out not to differentiate between normatively strong and 
normatively weak expert evidence, this could also be attributed to their 
insensitivity to evidence quality. This attribution would find support, if this 
insensitivity also occurs with statistical evidence. Second, statistical evidence was 
chosen because it was possible to create normatively strong and weak 
instantiations of it. In contrast, this was impossible for anecdotal and causal 
evidence (see Section 5.1.2). Third, the inclusion of statistical evidence allowed me 
to examine whether the interaction effect between culture and statistical / expert 
evidence in Study 3 could be replicated. Study 4 was set up to answer these 
research questions. 
6.4  Method 
6.4.1  Material 
Participants received 20 claims: 10 claims with fillers, and 10 claims with 
manipulated evidence that were the least probable claims in Study 3, and that did 
not differ significantly between the two cultures. In Studies 2 and 3, expert 
evidence was normatively strong, because the experts were credible and reliable 
(‘Prof. dr.’ in the Dutch material, and also the affiliation with the National Research 
Center in the French material), and because their field of expertise was relevant to 
the field of the claim. Normatively weak expert evidence was created by changing 
the relevant field of expertise into an irrelevant field of expertise. Note that it is 
likely that experts with an irrelevant field of expertise may also be considered less 
credible and reliable (cf. Section 3.1.1). 
Each field of expertise in Study 3 was used again for strong expert evidence, 
but also for weak expert evidence. For instance, the field of dietetics was linked to 
a claim about basil in pasta sauce leading to better sporting performance in the 
strong version, and was also linked to a claim about an improvement in boys’ 
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school performance as a result of putting them next to girls in class in the weak 
version. The distribution of the fields of expertise to the weak expert evidence 
instantiations followed two criteria: (a) there should be a strong differentiation 
between the relevant and the irrelevant field related to a claim (e.g., behavioral 
therapy versus eye diseases, and not versus social psychology), and (b) 
participants should not receive the same field of expertise twice8. The two 
templates for expert evidence were used, each for normatively strong and for 
normatively weak expert evidence. 
The statistical evidence instantiations in Studies 2 and 3 were normatively 
strong, because they had large sample sizes, and high percentages of cases in the 
sample. In this experiment, two sets of normatively strong and normatively weak 
statistical evidence were created: ‘78% of 314 persons’ and ‘74% of 381 persons’ for 
the strong instantiations, and ‘35% of 46 persons’ and ‘38% of 53 persons’ for the 
weak instantiations. The two templates for statistical evidence were used, each 
template for normatively strong and for normatively weak evidence. Finally, some 
claims were supported by causal or anecdotal evidence. These claims were taken 
from Study 3, and were used as fillers between the normatively strong and 
normatively weak statistical and expert evidence instantiations. The names, cities, 
and universities mentioned in the material are listed in Appendix H. 
6.4.2  Participants 
The Dutch participants in this study were students from universities in 
Amsterdam (n = 73; five groups), Delft (n = 21; two groups), Enschede (n = 28; 
three groups), Nijmegen (n = 77), and Tilburg (n = 101; three groups). The French 
participants studied in Besançon (n = 49), Paris (n = 56; two groups), Roubaix (n = 
58), Strasbourg (n = 65; six groups), and Tours (n = 72). Questionnaires from 
participants who were non-natives (54 in France, and 7 in the Netherlands), 
and/or who were younger than 17 or older than 30 were excluded from analyses. 
In the dataset that resulted from this selection (France: n = 313; Netherlands: n = 
315) there were differences in the number of participants in each version. As the 
lowest number of participants in each version was 60 in both countries, 
participants were randomly rejected in versions that contained more than 60 
participants. In the end, there were 300 French participants (60 in each version), 
and 300 Dutch participants (60 in each version). Appendix H gives an overview of 
the number of participants for each version, and for each group in France and in 
the Netherlands9. 
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Of the French participants, 81.3% was female, whereas this percentage was only 
70.0% for the Dutch participants. This difference was significant (χ2 (1) = 10.32, p < 
.01). Participants’ sex did not affect the relative persuasiveness of the types of 
evidence (F < 1), but did affect the relative persuasiveness of strong and weak 
evidence (F (1, 597) = 4.71, p < .05, η2 = .01). In fact, strong evidence was more 
persuasive to the male participants (M = 0.42, SD = 0.73) than to the female 
participants (M = 0.27, SD = 0.68) (t(597) = 2.25, p < .05). However, more 
importantly, for both the male participants (t(145) = 3.41, p < .01) and the female 
participants (t(452) = 2.55, p < .05) strong evidence was more persuasive than weak 
evidence. The age of the French participants ranged from 17 to 30, with a mean of 
20.19 (SD = 1.81). The Dutch participants were 20.64 years old on average (SD = 
1.91), with ages from 17 to 26. The Dutch participants were significantly older than 
the French participants (t(596.21) = 2.97, p < .01). This difference did not affect the 
persuasiveness of evidence, as age did not interact with evidence type (F (1, 598) = 
1.35, p = .25), or evidence quality (F < 1). The French participants studied at the 
Faculty of Arts (98.18%; Applied Foreign Languages, Communication, Languages), 
or Social Sciences (1.84%). The Dutch participants studied at the Faculty of Arts 
(92.33%; Business Communication Studies, Communication Sciences, Languages), 
Social Sciences (0.67%), or a technical discipline (7.00%). 
6.4.3  Design 
The design of Study 3 was used, but there were only 10 claims with manipulated 
evidence; the other 10 claims were fillers (5 with anecdotal, and 5 with causal 
evidence)10. A design with 20 manipulated claims could have led participants to 
discover the goal of Study 4, as they would encounter only statistical and expert 
evidence. All participants received the 20 claims in exactly the same order in each 
version, but the distribution of the five types of evidence over the 10 experimental 
claims and the five versions followed a balanced Latin square. 
6.4.4  Instrumentation 
Again, the booklet that participants received was titled ‘Opinions on social issues’ 
and started with an instruction. After the instruction, 20 pairs of claims with 
different types of evidence followed. For each of the claims, participants judged 
the probability on 5-point semantic differentials (very improbable – very probable). 
After these judgments, participants judged the degree to which they agreed with 
items of three context variables on a 5-point Likert scale: seven items of the NFC 
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scale (Cacioppo, et al., 1984), four items of the PEI scale (Studies 2 and 3), and 10 
items of the RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1988).  
The RWA scale was included, because the context variable PEI could not 
account for cultural differences in Studies 2 and 3. The Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988) is considered the most elaborate 
and widely accepted theory of authoritarianism (Kemmelmeier, et al., 2003). Right-
wing authoritarianism is composed of three related concepts (authoritarian 
submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism) of which authoritarian 
submission appears relevant for expert evidence. It is “submission to the 
authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in 
which one lives” (Altemeyer, 1981, p. 148). A number of empirical studies have 
shown that power distance is related to this scale. Feather (1998), and Rohan and 
Zanna (1996), for instance, showed that the Schwartz (1994) power value (related 
to power distance) was more important for people who score high on RWA than 
for people who score low on RWA. The selection of the 10 items used in the 
present study is explained in Appendix I. With respect to RWA, it was 
hypothesized that French participants would score higher than Dutch participants, 
and that the higher participants scored on RWA, the more they would be 
persuaded by strong expert evidence. The reliability of the 10 items of this scale 
proved to be adequate for the French participants (α = .71), but only marginally so 
for the Dutch participants (α = .60). 
The NFC scale was included in the questionnaire as a control with Study 3, 
where the score on this scale proved to affect participants’ ability to perceive 
differences in the relative persuasiveness of three evidence types. I hypothesized 
that people who scored high on NFC would perceive the difference between 
normatively strong and normatively weak evidence better than participants who 
scored low on NFC. The seven items of this scale were reliable (Dutch participants: 
α = .72; French participants: α = .78). The PEI scale too served as a control with 
Study 3, where it affected the persuasiveness of expert evidence for the Dutch, but 
not for the French participants. The PEI scale was reliable (Dutch participants: α = 
.75; French participants: α = .79). NFC and PEI were found not to be culturally 
unreliable (p’s > .05; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). 
After these items, four control questions followed about the expertise of the 
four experts that each participant read about (cf. Studies 2 and 3). One control 
question about the perceived quality of statistical evidence followed. On a 5-point 
semantic differential, participants were asked to indicate which of the two 
examples they would choose as proof for the generality of the occurrence of an 
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effect: “the effect occurs in 35% of 46 persons” or “the effect occurs in 78% of 314 
persons”. The questionnaire ended with questions about participants’ age, sex, 
nationality, and current education. 
6.4.5  Procedure 
The procedure was the same as for Study 3. Students of several universities in the 
Netherlands and France filled in the questionnaire in October – December 2004. 
The study was introduced as being about social issues. The students were not 
rewarded for their participation, which took about 13 to 18 minutes. After the 
questionnaires had been collected, the real research purpose was revealed, and 
participants were thanked for their cooperation. There were no disturbances 
during the experiment. 
6.4.6  Statistical tests 
The persuasiveness of statistical and expert evidence was computed as a difference 
score between the judgment of each claim with evidence and that of a claim 
without evidence. The research question about cultural differences in the 
persuasiveness of normatively strong and normatively weak expert evidence was 
evaluated through a 2 (culture) x 2 (quality) x 2 (type) analysis of variance, where 
culture was a between-subjects factor, and type of evidence and evidence quality 
within-subjects factors. The research question about cultural differences in the 
persuasiveness of normatively weak expert evidence was investigated in two ways 
(cf. Study 3). The persuasiveness of weak expert evidence in the two cultural 
groups was directly compared with an independent t-test, and indirectly by 
comparing it with the persuasiveness of strong expert evidence. Next to these 
analyses by participants, analyses by stimuli were also conducted. 
The occurrence of a carry over effect was tested with a 2 (first judgment, last 
judgment) x 2 (statistical, expert) analysis of variance with repeated measures, and 
a 2 (first judgment, last judgment) x 2 (strong, weak) analysis of variance with 
repeated measures. If participants had learned to perceive differences between the 
type and the quality of evidence, there should have been significant interaction 
effects. However, the interaction effect was not significant for time of judgment 
and type of evidence (F (1, 599) = 2.33, p = .13), or for time of judgment and quality 
of evidence (F (1, 599) = 1.63, p = .20). 
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6.5  Results 
As in Studies 2 and 3, I used the index of Bachman and O’Malley (1984) to test 
whether the Dutch and French participants differed in their use of the scale 
endpoints. Table 6.5 shows the indices for the judgments of the 10 claims11, the 
three context variables (21 items), and the expertise of the four experts. Because of 
cultural differences in response extremity on the claims and the context variables, 
the scores on these items were standardized (for procedure, see Study 2). The 
analyses below will concern only the standardized data, unless indicated 
otherwise. 
 
Table 6.5  Extreme response indices for Dutch and French participants and t-test for 
cultural differences (SD between parentheses) 
 
variable  Dutch index French index t-test 
claims .22 (0.19)  .31 (0.19)  t(598) = 5.98, p < .001 
context variables .20 (0.17)  .31 (0.17)  t(598) = 7.97, p < .001 
expertise of experts .19 (0.24)  .20 (0.27)  t(598) = 0.67, p = .50 
 
I tested whether the manipulations of strong and weak statistical and expert were 
successful. As cultures may differ in their sensitivity to evidence quality, these 
tests were run per culture. I first checked whether strong statistical evidence was 
indeed perceived as stronger than weak statistical evidence (t-tests with raw data). 
This was the case for both the French participants (M = 3.71, SD = 1.28; t(290) = 
9.52, p < .001), and the Dutch participants (M = 4.39, SD = 0.99; t(298) = 24.12, p < 
.001), as each group of participants scored above 3.00 on the manipulation check. 
However, the manipulation was more successful for the Dutch participants than 
for the French participants (t(547.15) = 7.12, p < .001).  
Next, I checked whether the normatively strong experts were considered as 
having more expertise than the normatively weak experts. The French participants 
perceived the strong experts (M = 3.02, SD = 0.86) as more expert than the weak 
experts (M = 2.61, SD = 0.92), F (1, 299) = 46.48, p < .001, η2 = .14. Similarly, the 
Dutch participants considered the strong experts (M = 3.30, SD = 0.83) had more 
expertise than the weak experts (M = 2.33, SD = 0.85), F (1, 299) = 255.81, p < .001, 
η2 = .46. The operationalization of weak and strong expert evidence was successful, 
but this main effect of quality was qualified by culture (F (1, 598) = 43.93, p < .001, 
η2 = .07). This interaction effect is shown in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2  The perceived expertise of strong and weak expert in function of culture 
 
As Figure 6.2 suggests, the difference in expertise between strong and weak 
experts was more pronounced for the Dutch participants (η2 = .46) than for the 
French participants (η2 = .14). The Dutch participants perceived the strong experts 
as more expert than the French participants (t(598) = 3.99, p < .001), and the weak 
experts as less expert than the French participants (t(598) = 3.94, p < .001). In sum, 
the manipulations of strong and weak statistical and expert evidence were 
successful, but to a larger extent for the Dutch participants than for the French 
participants. Whether these cultural differences affected the sensitivity to evidence 
quality will be shown below, where the results relevant to the research questions 
(6.5.1), and relevant to the context variables (6.5.2) are presented. 
6.5.1  Research questions 
The persuasiveness of the strong and the weak instantiations of statistical and 
expert evidence for the Dutch and the French participants is shown in Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6  Persuasiveness of evidence in function of culture, type and quality 
(standardized data; SD between parentheses; different superscripts refer to 
significant differences within-cultures, alpha level of .05) 
 
type of evidence Dutch (n = 300) French (n = 300)  total (N = 600) 
statistical evidence    
 strong 1.04a (1.77) 0.46a (1.72)  0.75a (1.77) 
 weak 0.42c (1.72) 0.35a (1.62) 0.39b,c (1.67) 
expert evidence    
 strong 0.73b (1.73) 0.25a (1.66) 0.49b (1.71) 
 weak 0.25c (1.74) 0.36a (1.59) 0.31c (1.67) 
2,2
2,4
2,6
2,8
3
3,2
3,4
Dutch French
strong
weak
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In order to answer the research questions, an analysis of variance with the factors 
culture (Dutch, French), quality (high, low), and evidence type (statistical, expert) 
was carried out. First, there was a main effect of type of evidence on 
persuasiveness with an analysis by participants (F1 (1, 598) = 8.22, p < .01, η2 = .01) 
– suggesting that statistical evidence (M = 0.57, SD = 1.30) was more persuasive 
than expert evidence (M = 0.40, SD = 1.32) – but there was only a tendency for such 
a main effect with an analysis by stimuli (F2 (1, 9) = 4.01, p = .08). There was also a 
main effect of quality (F1 (1, 598) = 18.53, p < .001, η2 = .03; F2 (1, 9) = 9.26, p < .05, η2 
= .51): high quality evidence (M = 0.62, SD = 1.39) was more persuasive than low 
quality evidence (M = 0.35, SD = 1.29). A main effect of culture – suggesting more 
impact of evidence for the Dutch (M = 0.61, SD = 1.09) than for the French 
participants (M = 0.36, SD = 1.06) – occurred with an analysis by participants (F1 (1, 
598) = 8.43, p < .01, η2 = .01), but not with an analysis by stimuli (F2 (1, 9) = 3.29, p = 
.10).  
There was no interaction effect between evidence type and evidence quality (F1 
(1, 598) = 2.16, p = .14; F2 (1, 9) = 1.48, p = .25). Another interaction effect, however, 
did occur, namely between culture and evidence quality (F1 (1, 598) = 17.91, p < 
.001, η2 = .03; F2 (1, 9) = 25.61, p < .01, η2 = .74). For the Dutch participants, there 
was a main effect of quality (F1 (1, 299) = 35.47, p < .001, η2 = .11; F2 (1, 9) = 16.47, p 
< .01, η2 = .65): strong evidence (M = 0.89, SD = 1.41) was more persuasive than 
weak evidence (M = 0.34, SD = 1.28). For the French participants, however, there 
was no main effect of evidence quality (F1 < 1; F2 < 1). Normatively strong evidence 
(M = 0.36, SD = 1.33) was as persuasive as normatively weak evidence (M = 0.35, 
SD = 1.30).  
With respect to the research question about the persuasiveness of normatively 
strong and normatively weak expert evidence in France and the Netherlands 
(RQ3), the interaction effect between culture and quality had to be investigated for 
expert evidence alone. Although there was no three-way interaction effect between 
the three factors (F1 < 1; F2 < 1) – implying that the interaction effect did not differ 
between statistical and expert evidence – this interaction effect was still analyzed 
for each type of evidence separately. Figure 6.3 visualizes the interaction effects 
between culture and quality for expert and statistical evidence. 
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          expert evidence                statistical evidence 
 
Figure 6.3  The persuasiveness of strong and weak evidence in function of type and 
culture (based on Table 6.6) 
 
First, the interaction effect between culture and quality on the persuasiveness of 
expert evidence was significant (RQ3): F1 (1, 598) = 11.43, p < .01, η2 = .02; F2 (1, 9) = 
14.05, p < .01, η2 = .61. For the French participants, there was no difference in the 
persuasiveness of strong and weak expert evidence (t1 (299) = 0.89, p = .37; t2 (9) = 
1.03, p = .33), whereas strong expert evidence was more persuasive than weak 
expert evidence for the Dutch participants (t1 (299) = 3.77, p < .001; t2 (9) = 2.37, p < 
.05). A similar interaction effect was found for statistical evidence: F1 (1, 598) = 7.62, 
p < .01, η2 = .01; F2 (1, 9) = 20.47, p < .01, η2 = .70. For the French participants, strong 
statistical evidence was as persuasive as weak statistical evidence (t1 (299) = 0.90, p 
= .37; t2 (9) = 1.65, p = .13), but for the Dutch participants strong statistical evidence 
was more persuasive than weak statistical evidence (t1 (299) = 4.65, p < .001; t2 (9) = 
4.63, p < .01).  
The last possible interaction effect was that between culture and evidence type. 
This interaction effect was not significant (F1 (1, 598) = 1.37, p = .24; F2 (1, 9) = 1.34, 
p = .28)12. In relation to this, the specific research question (RQ4) focused on the 
persuasiveness of normatively weak expert evidence in France and in the 
Netherlands. In an absolute way, weak expert evidence was equally persuasive in 
both cultures (t1 (598) = 0.77, p = .44; t2 (9) = 0.61, p = .56). In a relative way, as was 
shown above, weak expert evidence was more persuasive in France, as it was as 
persuasive as strong expert evidence. Finally, it was tested whether the interaction 
effect between culture and evidence type (strong statistical, strong expert) in Study 
3 was replicated. This interaction effect did not occur (F1 < 1; F2 < 1). 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
Dutch French
strong
weak
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
Dutch French
strong
weak
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6.5.2  Context variables 
Context variables were selected in order to explain possible cultural differences in 
the persuasiveness of evidence types. The French and Dutch participants did not 
differ with respect to PEI, NFC (cf. Studies 2 and 3), and RWA (see Table 6.7). 
 
Table 6.7  Scores on the context variables and t-test for cultural differences (SD between 
parentheses; means with raw data, test with standardized data) 
 
variable  Dutch participants French participants t-test 
NFC 3.13 (0.61) 3.25 (0.74) t(573.79) = 1.65, p = .10 
PEI 2.44 (0.67) 2.38 (0.77) t(585.51) = 1.65, p = .10 
RWA 2.72 (0.46) 2.73 (0.55) t(581.81) = 0.61, p = .54 
 
The persuasiveness of strong expert evidence was expected to be affected by RWA 
and, for the Dutch participants, by PEI. For the Dutch participants, both variables 
had a marginal effect on the persuasiveness of strong expert evidence (RWA: F (1, 
296) = 2.44, p = .06, one-tailed; PEI: F (1, 296) = 3.67, p < .05, one-tailed), but the 
correlations were not significant (RWA: r (300) = -.07, p = .25; PEI: r (300) = .09, p = 
.11). For the French participants, RWA and PEI did not affect the persuasiveness of 
strong expert evidence (both F’s < 1).  
A participant’s score on NFC was expected to affect the perception of the 
difference in evidence quality. As the Dutch and French participants reacted 
differently to evidence quality, the interaction effect between NFC and evidence 
quality was computed for each culture. For the French participants, there was no 
effect for NFC on the difference between low and high evidence quality (F < 1). For 
the Dutch participants, however, there was an interaction effect between NFC and 
evidence quality (F (1, 298) = 5.95, p < .05, η2 = .02). More precisely, NFC affected 
the quality of expert evidence. Contrary to what was hypothesized, normatively 
strong expert evidence was more persuasive than the weak counterpart for the 
participants with low NFC (F (1, 163) = 12.42, p < .01, η2 = .07), whereas there was 
only a tendency for this difference for the participants that scored high on NFC (F 
(1, 135) = 2.94, p = .09)13. 
Finally, I examined the relationships between RWA and PEI on the one hand, 
and the perceived expertise of the strong and weak experts for each culture on the 
other (raw data). For the French participants, the perception of the strong experts’ 
expertise correlated positively with the score on PEI (r (300) = .24, p < .001), and 
that of the weak experts correlated positively with the score on RWA (r (300) = .14, 
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p < .05). For the Dutch participants, PEI correlated positively with the perception of 
the expertise of strong (r (300) = .18, p < .01) and weak experts (r (300) = .18, p < 
.01), whereas RWA correlated positively with the perception of the expertise of 
weak experts (r (300) = .11, p < .05)14.  
6.6  Conclusion 
Based on Breton (2003), and Hofstede (1980, 2001), it was suggested that there 
could be cultural differences in the persuasiveness of normatively weak expert 
evidence. Study 4 showed that there was a cultural difference in the relative actual 
persuasiveness of normatively strong and weak expert evidence in France and the 
Netherlands (RQ3). Strong expert evidence was more persuasive than weak expert 
evidence for the Dutch participants, but both types of expert evidence were equally 
convincing for the French participants. In a relative way, then, weak expert 
evidence was more persuasive in France than in the Netherlands. In an absolute 
way, this was not the case (RQ4).  
The fact that the two types of expert evidence were equally persuasive to 
French participants can be explained in two directions. A first, more general, 
explanation comes from the ELM. The French participants were not sensitive to the 
quality of statistical and expert evidence, because they may have taken the 
peripheral route to persuasion by using heuristics: ‘There is numerical information 
or an expert source, so the claim must be probable’. There was also an indication, 
however, that the French participants were following the central route to 
persuasion. In fact, their scores on NFC, a marker for the central route, were 
moderate, and similar to those of the Dutch participants.  
A second, more specific, explanation deals with expert and statistical evidence 
separately. In fact, the reason why French participants were insensitive to the 
strength of expert evidence is not necessarily related to the reason why they were 
insensitive to the strength of statistical evidence. As the focus in this dissertation 
lies on expert evidence, and not on statistical evidence, I will only explore an 
explanation for expert evidence. Power distance suggests that people in large 
power distance cultures are insensitive to the experts’ field of expertise when these 
experts have a high status (e.g., professors). This explanation was tested by having 
participants judge expert sources with a lower status than professors. This was 
done in Study 5. 
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Study 5 
In Study 4, strong and weak expert evidence were equally persuasive to the French 
participants. Similarly, there was a relatively small difference in the perception of 
the expertise of strong and weak experts. This can be explained by the experts’ 
status. Because of their professorship, these experts may not need to be specialized 
in a certain field in order to influence people of claims within this field. This 
explanation holds, if field of expertise has a greater influence on perceived 
expertise when the experts have a lower status (i.e., when they are not professors): 
 
RQ5 In France, does the influence of the field of expertise on the perception of 
experts’ expertise depend on their status? 
 
If this field of expertise indeed matters more with low status experts, the finding in 
Study 4 can be explained by the status of the professors. For comparison reasons, 
these relationships will also be tested with Dutch participants. For them, field of 
expertise mattered greatly for the perceived expertise of professors in Study 4, and 
there is no reason to believe this will change with an expert with a lower status: 
 
RQ6 In the Netherlands, is the influence of the field of expertise on the perception 
of experts’ expertise independent on their status? 
 
Study 5 was conducted to answer these two research questions. 
6.7  Method 
6.7.1  Material 
Four types of expert evidence were created on the basis of status (professor – 
researcher), and field of expertise (high – low). Two of these four expert types were 
also used in Study 4: (1) a professor with a relevant field of expertise, and (2) a 
professor with an irrelevant field of expertise. These experts are supposed to have 
a relatively high status. Experts with lower status were created by leaving out 
references to Professor and to the CNRS: (3) a researcher with a relevant field of 
expertise, and (4) a researcher with an irrelevant field of expertise. 
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(1) According to Prof. dr. Timmermans from the University of Amsterdam, a 
specialist in dietetics, the consumption of basil in tomato pasta sauce improves 
sporting performance. 
 
(2) According to Prof. dr. Timmermans from the University of Amsterdam, a 
specialist in didactics, the consumption of basil in tomato pasta sauce improves 
sporting performance. 
 
(3) According to Timmermans from the University of Amsterdam, a specialist in 
dietetics, the consumption of basil in tomato pasta sauce improves sporting 
performance. 
 
(4) According to Timmermans from the University of Amsterdam, a specialist in 
didactics, the consumption of basil in tomato pasta sauce improves sporting 
performance. 
 
The two templates for expert evidence were used (see Table 5.1), and presented 
alternately. The combinations of names and universities made in Study 2 were 
used in this experiment, but with one change. The city of Paris was mentioned 
instead of Strasbourg, because the French participants came from this city (see 
Appendix J). 
The 8 claims in the material were selected from the 10 claims of Study 4 for 
which there was an effect for expert evidence quality for the Dutch participants, 
and not for the French participants. In this way, claims (22) and (3) from Study 4 
were not taken into account. The eight claims were presented in the same order as 
in Study 415. 
6.7.2  Participants 
Questionnaires from students who were non-natives (34 in France, and 5 in the 
Netherlands), and/or who were younger than 17 or older than 30 were excluded 
from analyses. The Dutch participants (n = 106) studied Business Communication 
Studies (44.3%; n = 47) or History (55.7%; n = 59) at the Radboud University 
Nijmegen. There was no main effect of study on the perception of the expertise of 
expert type (1) (t(104) = .09, p = .93), (2) (t(104) = .02, p = .99), (3) (t(104) = 1.18, p = 
.24), or (4) (t(104) = .64, p = .52). The French participants (n = 112) studied Applied 
Foreign Languages at the University Marc-Bloch in Strasbourg (two groups; n = 59, 
n = 53). The Dutch participants were 19.69 years old on average (SD = 1.60), with 
ages from 18 to 25. The age of the French participants ranged from 18 to 26, with a 
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mean of 19.67 (SD = 1.37). This difference in ages in the two cultures was not 
significant (t(207.09) = 0.00, p = .93). The percentage of male participants was 
higher in the Dutch group (41.5%) than in the French group (14.3%) (χ2 (1) = 20.23, 
p < .001), but participants’ sex hardly affected the perceived expertise of the 
experts16. 
6.7.3  Design 
All participants received the eight claims in exactly the same order, but in each of 
the four versions of the material the distribution of the four types of experts 
differed across claims. The types of experts were assigned to different claims in 
each version through a balanced Latin square.  
6.7.4  Instrumentation 
In the booklet called ‘Social issues’, it was explained that participants would 
receive a number of social issues highlighted by researchers. There were eight 
claims supported by different types of expert evidence. The participants indicated 
their perception of the experts’ expertise by indicating on a 5-point Likert scale the 
degree to which they found that each expert had enough expertise to make a 
judgment about a claim (similar to the control questions in Studies 2, 3, and 4). 
Subsequently, participants indicated on a 5-point Likert scale the degree to which 
they agreed with 10 items of the RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1988), seven items of the 
NFC scale (Cacioppo, et al., 1984), and four items of the PEI scale (Studies 2, 3, and 
4). These items were included in order to control with the other experiments, and 
to examine their effects on perceived expertise. After leaving out item (10), the 
RWA scale was reliable for the Dutch participants (α = .75), but not for the French 
(α = .58). For comparison with Study 4, this scale was still taken into account. The 
NFC scale was reliable for both cultural groups (Dutch: α = .81; French: α = .78), 
and the same was true for the PEI scale (Dutch: α = .79; French: α = .82). Moreover, 
these two scales were not culturally unreliable (p’s > .05; Van de Vijver & Leung, 
1997).  
A new question about expert evidence was added. Participants had to indicate 
on three 5-point semantic differentials the degree to which they found the use of an 
expert to persuade other people: unwise – sensible, definitively a success – no guarantee 
for success, and to be advised against – recommendable. The scale was found not to be 
reliable (Dutch: α = .30; French: α = -.03). Participants may have given responses in 
the same direction on the questionnaire, but they appear to have overlooked the 
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endpoints of the second item, which were reversely coded. As the scale reliability 
of the two other items was too low (Dutch: α = .52; French: α = .34), these items will 
be analyzed separately. The questionnaire ended with questions about 
participants’ age, sex, nationality, and current education. 
6.7.5  Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in the other studies. Questionnaires were filled in 
at universities in Nijmegen and Strasbourg in the months March and April 2005. 
The study was introduced as being about social issues. The students were not 
rewarded for their participation, which took about 8 to 10 minutes. After the 
questionnaires had been collected, the real research purpose was revealed, and 
participants were thanked for their cooperation. There were no disturbances 
during the experiment. 
6.7.6  Statistical tests 
First, a 2 (culture) x 2 (status) x 2 (field of expertise) analysis of variance was run, in 
which culture was a between-subjects factor, and status and field of expertise 
within-subjects factors. Next, similar analyses of variance were run for each 
cultural group in order to test the research questions. Analyses by stimuli were 
also conducted. The occurrence of a carry over effect was tested with a 2 (first 
judgment, last judgment) x 2 (professor, researcher) analysis of variance with 
repeated measures, and a 2 (first judgment, last judgment) x 2 (relevant, irrelevant 
field of expertise) analysis of variance with repeated measures. If participants had 
learned to perceive differences between the types of experts, there should have 
been significant interaction effects. The interaction effect was not significant for 
time of judgment and status (F (1, 217) = 1.50, p = .22), but it was for time of 
judgment and field of expertise (F (1, 217) = 5.15, p < .05, η2 = .02). More precisely, 
it was only significant for the Dutch participants (F (1, 105) = 15.83, p < .001, η2 = 
.13): the difference in field of expertise of the first pair of experts was larger than 
for the second pair. As the strong and weak fields of expertise were still 
significantly different for the second pair of experts, this interaction effect has no 
consequences. 
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6.8  Results 
Using the index of Bachman and O’Malley (1984), I tested whether the Dutch and 
French participants differed in their use of the scale endpoints (cf. Studies 2 – 4). 
Table 6.8 shows the indices for the judgments for the eight experts, and the four 
context variables (22 items, as one RWA item and one new question were not taken 
into account).  
 
Table 6.8  Extreme response indices for Dutch and French participants and t-test for 
cultural differences (SD between parentheses) 
 
variable  Dutch index French index t-test 
expertise of experts .31 (0.22)  .32 (0.22)  t(216) = 0.31, p = .76 
context variables .22 (0.18)  .32 (0.18)  t(216) = 4.00, p < .001 
 
Because of cultural differences in response extremity on the context variables, the 
scores on these items were standardized (for procedure, see Study 2). These 
standardized data were used for the analyses. I first tested whether there was a 
cultural difference in the interaction effect under investigation, namely between 
status and field of expertise. Although the three-way interaction effect was not 
significant (F1 < 1; F2 < 1), I did run analyses of variance for each culture in order to 
answer the research questions. The Dutch and French perceptions of the expertise 
of the four types of experts are shown in Table 6.9. 
 
Table 6.9  The perception of expertise in function of culture and type of expert (SD 
    between parentheses; different superscripts refer to significant differences  
     within-cultures, alpha level of .05) 
 
type of expert Dutch (n = 106) French (n = 112) 
professor   
 relevant field of expertise 3.77a (0.79) 3.01a (0.96) 
 irrelevant field of expertise 2.28b (0.84) 2.75b,c (0.95) 
researcher   
 relevant field of expertise 3.84a (0.80) 2.93a,c (0.94) 
 irrelevant field of expertise 2.12b (0.77) 2.54b (0.91) 
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For the French participants, there was a main effect of field of expertise on 
perceived expertise (F1 (1, 111) = 12.54, p < .01, η2 = .10; F2 (1, 7) = 5.68, p < .05, η2 = 
.45): experts with a relevant field of expertise (M = 2.97, SD = 0.73) were considered 
as having more expertise than experts with an irrelevant field of expertise (M = 
2.65, SD = 0.71), but the effect size was moderate. Next, there was a tendency for a 
main effect of status with an analysis by participants (F1 (1, 111) = 3.15, p = .08) – 
suggesting that high status experts (M = 2.88, SD = 0.72) were perceived as more 
expert than low status experts (M = 2.74, SD = 0.64) – but not with an analysis by 
stimuli (F2 (1, 7) = 1.92, p = .21). Finally, there was no interaction effect between 
status and field of expertise (F1 < 1; F2 < 1). This means that the relationship 
between field of expertise and perceived expertise was not moderated by the status 
of the expert (RQ5). 
For the Dutch participants, there was a very strong main effect of field of 
expertise on perceived expertise (F1 (1, 105) = 357.70, p < .001, η2 = .77; F2 (1, 7) = 
33.31, p < .01, η2 = .83): experts with a relevant field of expertise (M = 3.81, SD = 
0.68) were considered as having much more expertise than experts with an 
irrelevant field of expertise (M = 2.20, SD = 0.57). Next, there was no main effect of 
status (F1 < 1; F2 < 1), nor an interaction effect between status and field of expertise 
(F1 (1, 105) = 2.96, p = .09; F2 < 1). Just as for the French participants, the 
relationship between field of expertise and perceived expertise was not affected by 
the expert’s status (RQ6). 
Finally, there were strong cultural differences in the perceptions of the 
expertise of the four experts. There was a large interaction effect between culture 
and field of expertise on the expertise perception (F1 (1, 216) = 105.344, p < .001, η2 
= .33; F2 (1, 14) = 17.14, p < .01, η2 = .55). In fact, the experts with a relevant field of 
expertise were perceived as more expert by the Dutch participants than by the 
French participants (professor: t1 (216) = 6.38, p < .001; t2 (7) = 5.07, p < .01; 
researcher: t1 (216) = 7.70, p < .001; t2 (7) = 6.09, p < .001). Next, the experts with an 
irrelevant field of expertise were perceived as less expert by the Dutch participants 
than by the French participants (professor: t1 (216) = 3.87, p < .001; t2 (7) = 2.03, p = 
.08; researcher: t1 (216) = 3.71, p < .001; t2 (7) = 2.13, p = .07). Simply stated, the 
effects of field of expertise on the expertise perception were much more 
pronounced for the Dutch than for the French participants. This is visualized in 
Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4  The perceived expertise of experts with a relevant and an irrelevant field of 
expertise in function of expert type and culture (based on Table 6.9) 
 
A number of context variables were included in the questionnaire in order to 
explain possible cultural differences, and to control with the other experiments. 
The French and Dutch participants did not differ in their scores on NFC (cf. 
Studies 2, 3, and 4), and RWA (cf. Study 4), but did differ in PEI, and on the two 
new questions about the use of experts. The Dutch participants scored higher on 
PEI, and the French participants scored higher on the two questions about the use 
of experts (see Table 6.10). 
 
Table 6.10  Scores on the context variables and t-test for cultural differences (SD between 
parentheses; means with raw data, test with standardized data) 
 
variable  Dutch French t-test 
NFC 3.13 (0.75) 3.28 (0.75) t(216) = 0.09, p = .93 
PEI 2.66 (0.76) 2.40 (0.87) t(216) = 2.93, p < .01 
RWA 2.68 (0.59) 2.90 (0.52) t(198.96) = 1.59, p = .11 
the use of experts is:    
 a sensible thing to do 3.77 (0.80) 4.15 (0.80) t(214) = 3.50, p < .01 
 recommendable 3.45 (0.81) 3.65 (0.98) t(214) = 1.65, p = .05* 
* one-tailed test 
 
I therefore examined the effects of these two context variables on the perceived 
expertise of the four experts in each culture. For the French participants there were 
only two significant effects. First, the answer to the question about how sensible it 
is to use experts had an effect on the perception of the expertise of the researcher 
with an irrelevant field of expertise (F (1, 104) = 5.41, p < .05, η2 = .05). These 
variables correlated positively, but weakly: r (110) = .24, p < .05. Second, the 
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answer to the question about whether the use of experts is recommendable 
affected the perception of the expertise of the researcher with a relevant field of 
expertise (F (1, 104) = 4.65, p < .05, η2 = .05). These variables too were correlated 
positively, but weakly: r (110) = .24, p < .05. For the Dutch participants, this same 
question about how recommendable it is to use experts affected the perception of 
the expertise of the researcher with an irrelevant field of expertise (F (1, 100) = 5.74, 
p < .01, η2 = .09). There was a moderate negative correlation between the two 
variables: r (106) = -.31, p < .01. 
6.9  Conclusion 
The fact that French participants judged strong and weak expert evidence as 
equally persuasive in Study 4 was attributed to the relatively small difference in 
the perceived expertise of professors with a relevant and an irrelevant field of 
expertise. Study 5 tested whether this small difference could be explained by the 
professors’ status by having participants indicate the perceived expertise of 
professors (relatively high status) and researchers (relatively low status) with a 
relevant or an irrelevant field of expertise. The results showed that the influence of 
field of expertise on the perception of the expert’s expertise did not depend on 
status in France (RQ5). The same small difference in perception of strong and weak 
professors also applied to researchers. This means that (a) French participants 
again did not greatly differentiate between relevant and irrelevant fields of 
expertise, and that (b) this small difference can not be explained by an expert’s 
high status. Finally, for the Dutch participants the large difference in perception of 
the expertise of strong and weak professors in Study 4 was replicated, both for 
professors and researchers (RQ6). 
6.10  Conclusion and discussion of Studies 3, 4, and 5 
The studies presented in this chapter demonstrated that there are cultural 
differences in the relative actual persuasiveness of evidence types (general RQ2). 
The relative actual persuasiveness of anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert 
evidence was different in France and in the Netherlands (Study 3). Normatively 
strong causal and statistical evidence were more persuasive to the Dutch 
participants than to the French participants (Study 3). The specific RQ2 focused on 
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the persuasiveness of expert evidence. Strong expert evidence was not more 
persuasive in France in an absolute way, but it was in a relative way (Study 3): it 
was among the most persuasive types of evidence in France, but it took an 
intermediate position in the relative persuasiveness of the types of evidence in the 
Netherlands. Next, it was suggested that normatively weak expert evidence – 
consisting of experts with an irrelevant field of expertise – could be more 
persuasive in France than in the Netherlands. Similar to the finding in Study 3, 
normatively weak expert evidence was not more persuasive in France in an 
absolute way, but in a relative way: strong and weak expert evidence were equally 
convincing for the French participants, but strong expert evidence was more 
persuasive than weak expert evidence for the Dutch participants. The equal 
persuasiveness of strong and weak expert evidence for the French participants was 
attributed to the small difference in the perception of the expertise of strong and 
weak experts. Study 5 further demonstrated that this small difference in perception 
can not be explained by the high status of the professors of strong expert evidence, 
because this small difference also applied to researchers with a lower status. 
Below, I will discuss the three studies separately. 
Study 3 
Of the three studies in this chapter, Study 3 can be compared most easily with 
previous studies. Comparing the conclusion of the review in Chapter 3 (studies 
with mostly American participants) with the results of Study 3 would be 
inappropriate after having shown that culture affects the relative persuasiveness of 
evidence types. It is therefore more suitable to compare the results for the Dutch 
participants in Study 3 with a similar experiment with Dutch participants, namely 
Hoeken and Hustinx (2003b). In Hoeken and Hustinx, statistical, causal, and expert 
evidence were more persuasive than anecdotal evidence. In Study 3, statistical 
evidence was also more persuasive than expert and causal evidence, whereas there 
was only a tendency for such an effect in Hoeken and Hustinx with an analysis by 
participants. This difference could be attributed to the material. Contrary to 
Hoeken and Hustinx, the material in Study 3 consisted of moderately probable 
claims supported by (mostly) normatively strong evidence. Because of these 
improvements in the material, it is likely that statistical evidence is indeed more 
persuasive than causal and expert evidence for Dutch participants. Also, it should 
be noted that anecdotal evidence was not persuasive in both studies, especially in 
Study 3, where it had a very simple operationalization. Anecdotal evidence was as 
persuasive as when no evidence was provided. An explanation lies in the 
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moderately probable claims. In Section 3.2, anecdotal evidence was said to be 
persuasive, because of the similar cases that it may evoke. With moderately 
probable claims, participants are likely not to have such similar cases, so that 
anecdotal evidence can not benefit from this. The low persuasiveness of anecdotal 
evidence is interesting, since anecdotal evidence has regularly been found to be 
persuasive when it was operationalized in a more elaborate, vivid way (see 
Chapter 3). 
In Study 3, context variables were included in order to explain possible 
cultural differences in the actual persuasiveness of evidence types. The two 
cultural groups did not differ in their PEI, but the role of this personality trait was 
not the same in both cultures. For the Dutch participants, the score on PEI 
correlated positively with the persuasiveness of expert evidence, but this 
correlation was absent for the French participants (cf. Study 4). Expert evidence 
was persuasive to them, but regardless of their own preference for expert 
information. As with PEI, the Dutch and French participants did not differ in their 
scores on NFC and PNI. Moreover, NFC was not related to the persuasiveness of 
causal evidence, and PNI was not related to the persuasiveness of statistical or 
anecdotal evidence. The absence of an effect of PNI on the persuasiveness of 
statistical evidence has parallels with Kazoleas (1993), where the participants’ level 
of experience in statistics and methodology did not affect the persuasiveness of 
statistical evidence, and with Parrott, Silk, Dorgan, Condit, and Harris (2005), 
where the level of numeracy skills did not affect the perceived persuasiveness of 
statistical evidence. The score on NFC, however, affected the overall difference in 
persuasiveness of the types of evidence: the difference was larger for participants 
with a relatively high NFC. This corresponds with the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986), which postulates that NFC is related to the degree to which people are 
sensitive to differences in argument quality. 
Finally, there are two alternative explanations for the actual persuasiveness of 
statistical evidence. First, the (long) statistical evidence was more persuasive than 
the (short) anecdotal evidence. Other evidence studies that controlled for evidence 
length (Allen, et al., 2000; Hoeken & Hustinx, 2003b), however, also showed that 
statistical evidence was more persuasive than anecdotal evidence. If evidence 
length affected the relative persuasiveness of evidence types, this effect appears to 
have been small. Second, it could be suggested that statistical evidence was more 
persuasive to the Dutch than to the French participants, because the samples sizes 
were relatively larger for the Dutch populations than for the French populations. I 
could have multiplied the French sample sizes by three, since France has three 
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times more inhabitants than the Netherlands. This, however, would have resulted 
in large sample sizes (e.g., 900 people) that are unrealistic for claims about new 
information, such as ‘The consumption of basil in tomato pasta sauce improves 
sporting performance’. The use of the same sample sizes has not affected the 
persuasiveness of statistical evidence for the French participants, as these were 
found to be insensitive to sample sizes used in statistical evidence (Study 4). 
Study 4 
This study showed that culture can have an impact on the importance of 
normative criteria for the persuasiveness of strong evidence. After all, the degree to 
which expert and statistical evidence met the criteria of a relevant field of expertise 
and a large sample size respectively did not influence the persuasiveness of these 
evidence types for the French participants. These findings are interesting, since 
other experimental studies on experts have shown that sources with a relevant 
field of expertise were more persuasive than sources with an irrelevant field of 
expertise (e.g., Luchok & McCroskey, 1978; Maddux & Rogers, 1980). The French 
insensitivity to evidence quality can be attributed to the small differences 
perceived in the instantiations of strong and weak (expert and statistical) evidence. 
The insensitivity of the quality of expert evidence was of particular interest. RWA, 
the context variable introduced in this study, did not account for this result, since it 
was not reliable (cf. Study 5), and since the Dutch and French participants scored 
similarly on it. Another explanation – the high status of the professors used in 
normatively strong expert evidence – was tested in Study 5. 
Finally, an interaction effect in Study 3 – strong statistical evidence was more 
persuasive than strong expert evidence for the Dutch participants, but the two 
types of evidence were equally persuasive to the French participants – was not 
replicated in Study 4. This may be explained by the design of Study 4: participants 
received both strong and weak instantiations of evidence. Whereas the Dutch 
participants appeared to polarize between strong and weak evidence, the French 
participants had difficulties in differentiating between strong and weak 
instantiations. This polarization effect may also explain why strong expert 
evidence tended to be more persuasive to the Dutch participants than to the French 
participants (a result contradictory to Study 3). 
Study 5 
As mentioned above, the equal persuasiveness of strong and weak expert evidence 
for French participants in Study 4 was attritubed to the small difference in the 
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perceived expertise of experts with a relevant and an irrelevant field of expertise. 
The field of expertise of an expert apparently is not important for French 
participants (cf. Breton, 2003). Power distance suggests that this effect can be 
explained by the high status of the experts, who were professors. However, Study 
5 showed that the same small difference between the perceived expertise of strong 
and weak experts also applied to researchers without a professor’s title, who have 
a lower status. Explanations for this result will be given in Chapter 7, where the 
relationships between power distance and the cultural differences found in the 
present dissertation will be discussed. 
Notes 
1.  I did not use sample sizes that were all larger than 300, because for claims that 
participants are unfamiliar with, such as basil consumption leading to better sporting 
performance, a study conducted with a large group of participants may be perceived as 
unrealistic. 
2.  As different groups were used in each culture, I tested whether there was an interaction 
effect between group and evidence type on the persuasiveness. For France, there was 
no interaction effect (F < 1), but for the Netherlands, the interaction effect was 
significant (F (24, 888) = 1.85, p < .01, η2 = .05). Therefore, the relative persuasiveness of 
evidence types was analyzed for each Dutch group. In four of five groups with a 
sufficient number of participants, the order from the least persuasive type of evidence 
to the most persuasive type of evidence was the same: statistical evidence was more 
persuasive than expert and causal evidence, which both were more persuasive than 
anecdotal evidence. Therefore, all the groups were taken into account in the final 
analysis. 
3.  Another predictor of the persuasiveness of causal evidence is the degree to which 
people engage in ‘causal thinking’ (Anderson, 1983; see Section 3.2). Anderson used a 
number of measures for causal thinking that are appropriate for a single text, but 
inconvenient for 20 different claims. 
4.  I did not personally distribute the questionnaires in 3 of the 16 groups: Angers, 
Nijmegen (first group), and Toulouse. 
5.  I tested whether there were cultural differences for each of the claims without evidence. 
As four claims without evidence were presented in each version, the alpha level was 
corrected: p = .05 / 4 = .0125. (see footnote 2 in Chapter 5). The independent t-tests were 
computed with the standardized data, but the means below are from the raw data. The 
scores on the claims without evidence ranged from 1.84 to 3.84 for the Dutch 
participants, and from 1.76 to 3.75 for the French participants. There were two 
significant differences: claim (2) was more probable for the Dutch (M = 3.44, SD = 0.98) 
than for the French participants (M = 2.88, SD = 0.99), and claim (12) was more probable 
for the French (M = 3.75, SD = 1.08) than for the Dutch (M = 3.07, SD = 1.28). 
6.  The same effects were found with the raw data: (a) a main effect of type of evidence: F1 
(3, 596) = 34.18, p < .001, η2 = .15; F2 (3, 17) = 19.15, p < .001, η2 = .77, (b) a tendency for a 
main effect of culture: F1 (1, 598) = 3.48, p = .06; F2 (1, 19) = 1.84, p = .19, and (c) an 
interaction effect between type of evidence and culture: F1 (3, 596) = 5.13, p < .01, η2 = 
.03; F2 (3, 17) = 3.62, p < .05, η2 = .39. 
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7.  On the other hand, the context variables did have unhypothesized effects on the 
persuasiveness of certain types of evidence. For the French participants, the effect of 
PEI on statistical evidence was significant (F (1, 291) = 4.31, p < .05, η2 = .02). PEI was 
correlated positively, but weakly with the persuasiveness of statistical evidence: r (295) 
= .11, p = .05. For the Dutch participants, there was an effect of NFC on statistical 
evidence (F (1, 300) = 9.27, p < .01, η2 = .03) – they were weakly correlated in a positive 
way (r (304) = .15, p < .01) – and on expert evidence (F (1, 300) = 4.05, p < .05, η2 = .01), 
but this correlation was not significant (r (304) = .09, p = .14). In addition, there were 
effects of PEI on anecdotal evidence (F (1, 300) = 17.01, p < .001, η2 = .05) – resulting in a 
positive correlation (r (304) = .22, p < .001) – and on statistical evidence (F (1, 300) = 9.08, 
p < .01, η2 = .03), leading to a weak, positive correlation: r (304) = .16, p < .01. 
8.  For claim (47), the original field of expertise ‘clinical psychology’ was changed into 
‘psychiatry’, as ‘clinical psychology’ resembles too much other fields of psychology 
used in the material. As two pairs of claims, (22) – (25) and (37) – (19), were related to 
the same field, (19) was replaced by claim (24), and (25) by claim (10). 
9.  Dutch and French participants came from groups from different universities. I tested 
whether there was an interaction effect between group and evidence type or quality on 
the persuasiveness. For France, there was no interaction effect between group and 
evidence type, nor between group and evidence quality (both F’s < 1). For the 
Netherlands, there was no interaction effect between group and evidence type (F < 1), 
nor between group and evidence quality (F (12, 287) = 1.24, p = .26). This means that, 
within each culture, the different groups of participants did not differ in their judgment 
of the relative persuasiveness of evidence types. 
10.  The positions of the fillers in the 20 claims were positions 1, 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, and 
20. Participants sometimes received consecutive evidence of the same type but with 
another quality, but there was always a filler between two such instantiations. The 
persuasiveness of these fillers was not computed, because they were linked to the same 
claims in each version, and because these claims were more probable than those with 
statistical and expert evidence, so that the persuasive effect of the fillers would be 
lower. 
11.  I again tested whether the scores on these claims without evidence were comparable 
between the two cultures. The scores on these claims ranged from 1.88 to 3.07 for the 
French participants, and from 1.83 to 2.98 for the Dutch participants (raw data). As two 
claims without evidence were presented in each version, the alpha level was corrected: 
p = .05 / 2 = .025 (see footnote 5 above). Independent t-tests computed with the 
standardized data showed that claim (11) was more probable for the French 
participants (M = 2.50, SD = 1.20) than for the Dutch participants (M = 2.02, SD = 0.98) 
(means in raw data). 
12.  The same effects were found with the raw data: (a) a main effect of type of evidence 
with an analysis by participants (F1 (1, 598) = 7.91, p < .01, η2 = .01), but a tendency for 
this effect with an analysis by stimuli (F2 (1, 9) = 3.98, p = .08), (b) a main effect of 
quality: F1 (1, 598) = 16.64, p < .001, η2 = .03; F2 (1, 9) = 8.71, p < .05, η2 = .49, (c) a main 
effect of culture with an analysis by participants (F1 (1, 598) = 5.37, p < .05, η2 = .01), but 
not with an analysis by stimuli (F2 (1, 9) = 2.19, p = .17), (d) no interaction effect between 
culture and evidence type: F1 (1, 598) = 1.04, p = .31; F2 (1, 9) = 1.09, p = .32, (e) no 
interaction effect between evidence type and quality: F1 (1, 598) = 2.23, p = .14; F2 (1, 9) = 
1.57, p = .24, (f) an interaction effect between culture and evidence quality: F1 (1, 598) = 
16.02, p < .001, η2 = .03; F2 (1, 9) = 26.13, p < .01, η2 = .74, and (g) no interaction effect 
between culture, evidence type, and evidence quality: F1 < 1; F2 < 1. 
134 chapter 6 
 
 
13.  With the median-split technique Dutch participants with high NFC were distinguished 
from those with low NFC. NFC did not affect the quality of statistical evidence, as 
normatively strong statistical evidence was more persuasive than the normatively weak 
variant for the each of the two groups (low NFC: F (1, 163) = 13.52, p < .001, η2 = .08; 
high NFC: F (1, 135) = 8.13, p < .01, η2 = .06). 
14.  The context variables did have unhypothesized effects on the persuasiveness of certain 
types of evidence. For the French participants, there was an effect of NFC on the 
persuasiveness of strong expert evidence (F (1, 296) = 5.36, p < .05, η2 = .02), and on 
weak expert evidence (F (1, 296) = 6.12, p < .05, η2 = .02). The correlations between NFC 
and strong expert evidence, and NFC and weak expert evidence were positive, but 
weak (strong: r (300) = .13, p < .05; weak: r (300) = .12, p < .05). For the Dutch 
participants, there was an effect of NFC on the persuasiveness of weak expert evidence 
(F (1, 296) = 6.44, p < .05, η2 = .02) – the variables were weakly, positively correlated (r 
(300) = .15, p < .01) – and an effect of PEI on weak statistical evidence (F (1, 296) = 7.00, p 
< .01, η2 = .02), with a similar weak, positive correlation: r (300) = .17, p < .01.  
15.  There was one exception, however. In each version, participants received six unique 
fields, and one field twice. In order to ensure that these two fields never succeeded each 
other, the first and the seventh claim were exchanged. 
16.  The Dutch participants’ sex did not affect the perceived expertise of expert types (1) 
(t(102.49) = 1.48, p = .14), (2) (t(104) = .06, p = .95), (3) (t(104) = 0.21, p = .84), or (4) (t(104) 
= .56, p = .58). Next, the French participants’ sex did not influence the perceived 
expertise of expert types (2) (t(110) = .28, p = .78), (3) (t(110) = 1.76, p = .08), or (4) (t(110) 
= 1.12, p = .27), but it did affect that of expert type (1) (t(110) = 2.25, p < .05). Male 
participants considered that this expert type had more expertise (M = 3.50, SD = 0.77) 
than the female participants (M = 2.93, SD = 0.97). As the percentage of French male 
participants was low (14.3%), the consequences of this effect were not considered as 
important. 
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Conclusion and discussion 
In this chapter, I will recapitulate and discuss the findings of the studies presented 
in this dissertation. I will first answer the general and the specific research 
questions (7.1). In Section 7.2, I will discuss how the differences can be explained 
by culture, and what kinds of limitations pertain to the studies. On the basis of this 
discussion I will make suggestions for further research (7.3). 
7.1  Conclusions 
Although the need for research on the effect of culture on the persuasiveness of 
evidence has been underscored repeatedly (Allen & Preiss, 1997; Bradac, Sandell, 
& Wenner, 1979; Greene & Brinn, 2003; Reynolds & Reynolds, 2002), this research 
was never conducted. In this dissertation, therefore, I investigated whether culture 
affects the relative persuasiveness of anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert 
evidence. This question was addressed for two cultures: the Dutch and the French 
culture. In this investigation, I specifically focused on expert evidence. The 
answers to the question as to whether expert evidence is more persuasive in France 
will be given in Section 7.1.2. The first section is concerned with cultural 
differences in the relative persuasiveness of the four types of evidence.  
7.1.1  General research questions 
I first investigated how persuasive people from different cultures expect the four 
types of evidence to be: 
 
General RQ1 Are there cultural differences in the relative expected persuasiveness 
of anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert evidence? 
 
Studies 1 and 2 showed that there indeed were cultural differences in expected 
persuasiveness. In Study 1, expected persuasiveness was measured on the basis of 
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Dutch and French text writers’ use of the four types of evidence in persuasive 
public information brochures. There were cultural differences in the relative use of 
these evidence types. In particular, expert evidence was more frequently employed 
in the French corpus than in the Dutch corpus, and there was a tendency for a 
similar effect for anecdotal evidence. In Study 2, Dutch and French participants 
ranked the four types of evidence in relation to their expected persuasiveness as 
support for a number of claims. There was no cultural difference in the pattern of 
rankings of the four types of evidence. However, there were two more subtle 
results that indicated cultural differences. First, statistical evidence was ranked 
higher by the Dutch participants than by the French participants, and anecdotal 
evidence was ranked higher by the French participants than by the Dutch 
participants. Second, the mean number of times that anecdotal and expert evidence 
were put in first position was higher for the French than for the Dutch participants, 
whereas statistical evidence was put in first position more frequently by the French 
than by the Dutch participants.  
If people from different cultures have other expectations about the 
persuasiveness of different types of evidence, the question arises whether there are 
also cultural differences in the relative actual persuasiveness of these evidence 
types: 
 
General RQ2 Are there cultural differences in the relative actual persuasiveness of 
anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert evidence? 
 
In Study 3, actual persuasiveness was measured on the basis of the probability 
assessment of a number of claims supported by different evidence types. Where 
possible, these evidence instantiations were normatively strong. The relative 
persuasiveness of the four evidence types was different in the Dutch and the 
French culture. In particular, statistical and causal evidence were more persuasive 
to the Dutch than to the French participants. A comparison of the expected and 
actual persuasiveness of evidence types in Studies 2 and 3 shows that the 
expectations that the Dutch and French participants had about the persuasiveness 
of the evidence types were quite accurate. The ranking of the expected 
persuasiveness of evidence types in Study 2 corresponded fully to the relative 
persuasiveness of evidence types for the Dutch participants, and to a high degree 
for the French participants in Study 31.  
Taken together, the results from these studies demonstrate that cultures may 
differ in the relative expected and actual persuasiveness of the four types of 
evidence. It should be noted that the differences were not particularly large, 
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especially with regard to expected persuasiveness. In Section 7.2.1, I will give a 
tentative explanation for these cultural differences. Parallel to the two general 
research questions, two specific research questions about expert evidence were 
formulated. The answers to these questions will be discussed in the next section. 
7.1.2  Specific research questions 
In Chapter 1, it was suggested that the persuasiveness of expert evidence could be 
related to the extent that receivers of expert evidence accept that the expert 
possesses more knowledge about the topic in question than they do. Therefore, 
expert evidence could be more persuasive in large power distance cultures than in 
small power distance cultures, and thus, more persuasive in the French culture 
than in the Dutch culture (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Koopman, et al., 1999). Similar to 
the distinction between expected and actual persuasiveness in the general research 
questions, the first specific research question was: 
 
Specific RQ1 Is the expected persuasiveness of expert evidence higher for the 
French than for the Dutch? 
 
Study 1 showed that expert evidence was hardly used in the Dutch corpus, and 
more frequently – but still only moderately – in the French corpus. The more 
frequent use of expert evidence is an indicator that the expected persuasiveness of 
expert evidence is higher in the French culture. Study 2 demonstrated that Dutch 
and French students differed in the expected persuasiveness they assigned expert 
evidence, but only in a subtle way. There was no cultural difference in the mean 
ranking of expert evidence, but the French participants more frequently expected 
expert evidence to be the most persuasive type of evidence than the Dutch 
participants. In addition to expected persuasiveness, other studies were conducted 
to test this specific research question about actual persuasiveness: 
 
Specific RQ2 Is the actual persuasiveness of expert evidence higher for the French 
than for the Dutch? 
 
In Study 3, normatively strong expert evidence was not more persuasive to the 
French than to the Dutch participants in an absolute way, but it was in a relative 
way. In fact, it was among the most persuasive types of evidence for the French 
participants, whereas it only took an intermediate position in the relative 
persuasiveness of the types of evidence for the Dutch participants. The actual 
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persuasiveness of normatively strong and normatively weak expert evidence was 
investigated in Study 4. Normatively weak expert evidence, consisting of 
professors with an irrelevant field of expertise, was not more persuasive in the 
French culture than in the Dutch culture in an absolute way. However, it was more 
persuasive to the French participants in a relative way: both types of expert 
evidence were equally convincing for the French participants, whereas strong 
expert evidence was more persuasive than weak expert evidence for the Dutch 
participants. In sum, the differences concerning expert evidence can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1.  French people expect expert evidence to be somewhat more persuasive than Dutch 
people (Studies 1 and 2). 
 
2.  Expert evidence is more persuasive in the French culture than in the Dutch culture 
in a relative way (Studies 3 and 4). 
 
3.  Normatively strong expert evidence is more persuasive than normatively weak 
expert evidence for the Dutch, but the two types of evidence are equally persuasive 
for the French (Study 4). 
 
In conclusion, the four studies demonstrate at a general level that there are cultural 
differences in the relative expected and actual persuasiveness of evidence types in 
the Dutch and the French culture. At a specific level, they show that the relative 
expected and actual persuasiveness of expert evidence is different in the Dutch 
than in the French culture. In the next section, these studies will be discussed 
further. 
7.2  Discussion 
The discussion addresses the following two questions: how can the cultural 
differences be explained (7.2.1), what are the limitations of the studies (7.2.2)? 
7.2.1  Effects of culture 
Besides the differences concerning expert evidence, two other results were found. 
First, the actual persuasiveness of evidence, regardless of its type, was higher for 
the Dutch than for the French participants. Second, the expected and actual 
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persuasiveness of statistical evidence, and the actual persuasiveness of causal 
evidence were higher in the Dutch than in the French culture. These results could 
not be attributed to context variables measured at the level of individual 
participants. A tentative explanation for the pattern of results regarding the 
persuasiveness of the four types of evidence lies in the research traditions in the 
Dutch and the French culture. Each type of evidence can be related to a form of 
research. In fact, Hoeken and Hustinx (2003b) pointed out that there is an analogy 
between basic forms of scientific research on the one hand (the experiment, the 
survey, and the case study), and evidence types on the other. The experiment is 
conducted to determine possible causal relations between factors, and thus leads to 
causal evidence. The survey method is used to question a great number of subjects, 
and therefore results in statistical evidence. The last method, the case study, is 
qualitative in a sense that it aims to describe as detailed as possible a case or 
phenomenon (anecdotal evidence). Although there is no research method that 
leads to expert evidence, source citation in articles and books can be considered as 
a form of expert evidence.  
A parallel between the research traditions in the Dutch and the French culture, 
and the relative persuasiveness of the evidence types is particularly appropriate, 
given that the participants in the experiments were students, who are exposed to 
research traditions intensively. Very few studies have been conducted on research 
traditions in various cultures. One of these is the essay that Galtung (1981) wrote 
about intellectual styles. He distinguished the saxonic (e.g., US, UK), teutonic (e.g., 
German), gallic (e.g., France), and nipponic (e.g., Japan) style. Although Galtung 
speculates that the Netherlands is influenced by the first three styles, it appears to 
me that the saxonic style is dominant. This intellectual style is characterized by 
weak theory formation, and by a strong focus on data collection in order to 
investigate smaller parts of a theory that in the end may lead to a more 
comprehensive theory. In this tradition, experiments and surveys are essential. It 
comes as no surprise, then, that causal and statistical evidence were among the 
most persuasive types of evidence for the Dutch participants in the present studies. 
Galtung argues that the gallic style, typical for France, is characterized by very 
strong theory formation, for which data are not necessary as a back up. French 
scholars develop and refine theories that are never tested empirically. At their best, 
data serve as illustration (cf. anecdotal evidence). Perhaps correspondingly, the 
actual persuasiveness of causal and statistical evidence was lower in the French 
culture than in the Dutch culture in the present studies. In the French intellectual 
style, the relationships between the scholar’s theory and those of others are 
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important. References to other scholars (cf. expert evidence) may be frequently 
used either to emphasize the relevance of own ideas or to disconfirm competing 
theories and ideas. In conclusion, even if the links between the types of evidence 
and the styles distinguished in Galtung can not be documented, this parallel 
provides a possible account for the relative persuasiveness of the types of evidence 
in the Dutch and the French culture. 
As far as expert evidence is concerned, it was suggested in Chapter 1 that this 
could be more persuasive to French than to Dutch people because of a difference in 
power distance between the two cultures (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Koopman, et al., 
1999). Below, I will discuss five possible explanations – other than Galtung’s (1981) 
intellectual styles – for the cultural differences in the persuasiveness of expert 
evidence. The overall pattern of results on expert evidence may be explained by 
differences in power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Some specific results 
may be explained by the importance of cultural versus personal norms, by 
differences in educational systems in the two cultures, and by the route to 
persuasion (central or peripheral). 
Power distance 
As I argued in Chapter 4, in order to determine the effect of power distance, this 
value dimension should be measured at the level of the participants in the 
experiments. Personal values related to power distance were not measured, but a 
context variable was constructed, the Preference for Expert Information scale (PEI). 
It was expected that the French participants would score higher on this scale than 
the Dutch participants. No cultural differences in PEI were found in Studies 2, 3, 
and 4, but the Dutch participants scored higher on the PEI scale than the French 
participants in Study 5. Also, it was expected that the score on this scale would 
affect the actual persuasiveness of expert evidence. The relationship between the 
two variables was assessed in Studies 3 and 4. For the Dutch participants, there 
was a significant, positive correlation between their PEI and the actual 
persuasiveness of expert evidence. For the French participants, this correlation was 
not significant. In Study 2, however, PEI correlated positively with the expected 
persuasiveness of expert evidence for the French participants, but not for the 
Dutch participants. Another scale, the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale, 
was administered in Studies 4 and 5. There were no cultural differences in the 
scores on this scale in either study. In Study 4, RWA had a marginal effect on the 
persuasiveness of strong expert evidence for the Dutch participants, but not for the 
French participants. 
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Taken together, there were more cultural similarities than differences in the scores 
on the scales related to power distance. Cultural differences found in the 
persuasiveness of expert evidence were smaller than the differences in power 
distance, as reported in Hofstede (1980, 2001), suggest. Also, the status of the 
expert did not affect the perception of the expertise of strong and weak experts for 
the French participants (Studies 4 and 5) – a finding in apparent contradiction with 
power distance. All these findings may lead one to believe that power distance 
does not provide a solid, plausible explanation for the cultural differences in the 
persuasiveness of expert evidence. 
Uncertainty avoidance 
The Dutch and the French culture also differ in their scores on Hofstede’s (2001) 
dimension of uncertainty avoidance, which is “The extent to which the members of 
a culture feel threatened by uncertain and unknown situations” (p. 161). 
Uncertainty avoidance is higher in the French culture than the Dutch culture. 
Differences observed in the relative persuasiveness of expert evidence may 
therefore be explained by uncertainty avoidance. In fact, people from high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures are said to rely more on experts than people from 
low uncertainty avoidance cultures, because experts can be used to reduce 
uncertainty (Hofstede, 1980, 2001). As people from high uncertainty avoidance 
cultures rely more on experts, they may therefore be more persuaded by expert 
evidence than people from low uncertainty avoidance cultures. French participants 
could therefore be expected to have a higher preference for expert information 
(PEI) than the Dutch participants, but this was not the case. Similar to the value 
dimension of power distance, no empirical support for an effect of uncertainty 
avoidance was found in the present study. There are three other possible 
explanations for more specific results. These explanations are discussed below. 
A personal or a cultural norm 
As mentioned above, the actual persuasiveness of normatively strong expert 
evidence was related to the Dutch participants’ preference for expert information, 
but not to that of the French participants (Studies 3 and 4). This suggests that the 
persuasiveness of expert evidence is a personality related norm for the Dutch 
participants, and a cultural norm for the French participants. A study by 
Kagitçibasi (1970), where the determinants of respect for authority of participants 
from the US (small power distance) and Turkey (large power distance) were 
compared, supports this suggestion. The Turkish participants had a great respect 
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for authorities regardless of their score on ‘core authoritarianism’, a measure that is 
related to power distance. The American participants, on the other hand, only had 
a great respect for authorities if these participants scored high on core 
authoritarianism. Kagitçibasi came up with a social norm explanation. 
Authoritarian attitudes are a matter of personal preference for people in small 
power distance cultures, whereas they are a social norm for people in large power 
distance cultures. In terms of Studies 3 and 4, the persuasiveness of expert 
evidence might be a personal matter for the Dutch participants, and a cultural 
matter for the French participants. In the French culture, expert evidence may be 
persuasive because it is a cultural norm. 
Educational system 
The fact that strong and weak expert evidence were equally persuasive to the 
French participants in Study 4 was attributed to the small difference in the 
perceived expertise of professors with a relevant and an irrelevant field of 
expertise. This small difference could not be explained by the experts’ status 
(Study 5). A plausible explanation lies in the educational systems in France and the 
Netherlands. The Dutch findings mirrorred normative considerations: a relevant 
field of expertise is important for the persuasiveness of expert evidence. The 
French researcher De Bony (2003) notes that Dutch children on elementary schools 
are already incited to adopt critical attitudes towards the texts that they are 
learning to read. In this light, it is not surprising to find that the Dutch participants 
were not convinced by experts with an irrelevant field of expertise. Such experts 
simply are not considered competent. In the French educational system, on the 
other hand, children are not educated to develop such critical attitudes. French 
pupils are not supposed to learn themselves, they can only learn because of 
teachers, who are considered omniscient (e.g., Gruère & Morel, 1991; Planel, 1997). 
Since the 15th century, French philosophers such as Rabelais have insisted on the 
need for omniscient and erudite instructors. Today, French teachers at high school 
still are such instructors who are expected to spread a culture générale (Blom, 1995). 
In such a system of erudite teachers and dependent pupils, it is understandable 
that the French students in Studies 4 and 5 accorded the professors and researchers 
quite a high level of expertise on a domain that is not their field of expertise. 
Professors and researchers are not easily attacked on the irrelevance of their fields 
of expertise in relation to a given topic.  
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Peripheral or central route to persuasion 
Finally, the lack of an effect of evidence quality on the persuasiveness of expert 
evidence for the French participants in Study 4 could also be explained through the 
peripheral route that these participants may have taken. People that use this route 
are said not to take into account the quality of arguments (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
In fact, strong and weak expert evidence were equally persuasive for the French 
participants (and the same was true for strong and weak statistical evidence). As 
suggested in Chapter 6, the French participants could have used the heuristic 
‘There is an expert source, so the claim must be probable’. In contrast, however, the 
moderate scores on NFC suggest that these participants may have taken the central 
route. Also, the French participants in Study 3 did differentiate between the 
persuasiveness of different types of evidence. It could therefore be concluded that 
there is no strong support for the use of either the central or the peripheral route. 
Conclusion 
The goal of this section was to discuss how the cultural differences in the relative 
expected and actual persuasiveness of expert evidence in the Dutch and French 
culture could be explained. As the scales constructed to measure power distance 
did not differ between the two cultures, it is impossible to empirically attribute 
these differences to power distance. However, it should be noted that if context 
variables had not been taken into account in the present study, power distance 
would have been a plausible explanation. This stresses the importance of 
measuring context variables or values at the level of participants in studies on 
cultural effects. Without context variables, power distance would have been more 
plausible, because all explanations (except the route to persuasion) are related to 
this value dimension. As Turkey and the US in the Kagitçibasi (1970) study are 
said to differ in power distance in a similar way as France and the Netherlands, 
this study suggests that power distance may be related to the finding that the 
persuasiveness of expert evidence was related to PEI for Dutch participants, but 
not for the French participants. Next, educational systems are a natural part of 
culture as an overall system (Hofstede, 1980, 2001). In his discussion of the 
influence of culture on teacher – student interactions, Hofstede (1986) argued that 
teachers are not contradicted or criticized in large power distance cultures, but that 
students are allowed to contradict and criticize teachers in small power distance 
cultures. Finally, Hofstede (2001) showed that there is a very strong, positive 
correlation between power distance and uncertainty avoidance in the European 
region. 
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In sum, there are a number of possible explanations for the subtle cultural 
differences found in the present study. Whereas most of the explanations 
(indirectly) appear to point to power distance as an underlying dimension to 
which the results may be attributed, empirical evidence suggests that power 
distance is not an explanation. The concept of power distance itself may account 
for the difficulties in measuring cultural differences in power distance at an 
individual level. People in large power distance cultures deal with inequality of 
power in an ambiguous way. Hofstede (2001, p. 96), for instance, remarked that “in 
high-PDI [power distance] countries where [...] [inequality] is, in practice, expected 
and desired by the less powerful, it remains problematic at the same time”. In the 
French culture, there is an ambiguous attitude towards authorities, which is 
recognized by the French themselves, and by outsiders studying the French 
culture. The French anthropologist d’Iribarne (1989, p. 77) notes that “The often 
strongly emotional character of hierarchical relationships in France is intriguing. 
There is an extreme diversity of feelings towards superiors: They may be either 
adored or despised with equal intensity” (translation from Hofstede, 2001). 
Demangeat and Molz (2003) – in their comparison of the French and German 
culture – reach the same conclusion: the French attitude towards authorities varies 
from great appreciation to total denial. In conclusion, future research is needed to 
solve these complexities of unraveling the impact of power distance and 
alternative explanations of the differences in persuasiveness of (expert) evidence 
found in the present study. 
7.2.2  Limitations 
The experimental studies reported in this dissertation have several limitations that 
restrict the generalizability of their results. These limitations are related to the 
material, to the selection of the participants, and to the context in which the 
experiments were conducted. 
Concerning the material, the claims were moderately probable in order to rule 
out the negative influence of extreme (im)probability on the effect of evidence. As 
a consequence, the results are limited to these kinds of claims. In reality, however, 
persuaders also aim to convince people of claims that are perceived as highly 
probable (e.g., smoking leads to a higher risk of getting lung cancer). Next, the 
choice for claims and evidence without a context also has a drawback with respect 
to generalizability. The claims with evidence were presented in two short 
sentences. An advantage of this operationalization is that differences in 
persuasiveness can be better attributed to evidence, and that differences in 
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evidence quality can be perceived more easily by the participants. A disadvantage 
of this operationalization is that claims and supporting evidence are usually part of 
a longer text in real life argumentation. People may react differently to evidence 
when it is presented in a richer context than when it is presented in isolation with a 
claim. 
A second series of limitations is related to the selection of the participants. The 
conclusions now only hold for students. It could be argued that the persuasiveness 
of expert evidence in particular was affected by the fact that the participants were 
students who are regularly exposed to the experts used in the experiments: 
professors and researchers. Moreover, they were mostly students of Arts, who are 
more likely to have had a course on argumentation than other kinds of students. 
The persuasiveness of expert evidence may indeed be different when other 
participants are involved. However, it should be noted that the type of participants 
used in the present studies has not influenced the cultural comparison of the 
persuasiveness of expert evidence. In fact, the internal validity was high because 
the Dutch and French participants were highly similar in education, age, and sex. 
Finally, the context in which the experiments were conducted may also have 
consequences for the degree to which the results of the studies can be generalized. 
Within-subjects designs were chosen in the experiments. Each Dutch or French 
participant was compared with him- or herself, as he or she was exposed to all the 
experimental conditions, such as anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert evidence 
in Studies 2 and 3, and to strong and weak evidence in Study 4. This direct 
comparison is an advantage of the within-subjects design over the between-
subjects design, in which participants only receive one condition. A disadvantage 
of the within-subjects design is a carry over effect: as participants are given 
different conditions, the response to condition X may affect the reaction to 
condition Y. More concretely, the participants’ judgments of evidence types in the 
first part of the questionnaire may influence their judgments in the second part. A 
carry over effect only occurred for the Dutch participants in Study 5, but it was 
rather small. Still, participants may have become more aware of the goal of the 
experiment than when a between-subject design had been used, because they were 
exposed to the different experimental conditions. Another limitation related to the 
experimental context is the presentation format used in the experiments. In the 
paper-and-pencil experiments, participants have more time to think than in real 
life situations when persuasive messages are directed at them. In written (as 
opposed to oral) questionnaires, participants may more easily give a neutral 
opinion (i.e., the midpoint of 5-point semantic differential). The limitations on the 
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generalizability of the results open the door to suggestions for further research. 
These suggestions will be presented in the next section. 
7.3  Suggestions for further research 
In this section, I will outline a few directions for further research that naturally 
follow the discussion of the effects of culture (7.2.1), and the limitations of the 
experiments (7.2.2). The major problem encountered in determining the effect of 
culture was that the context variables could not account for the cultural differences 
in the persuasiveness of evidence types, and of expert evidence in particular. Other 
context variables should be selected and/or constructed in order to measure the 
effect of culture. In this process, focus groups could be used in order to raise the 
understanding of what determines the persuasiveness of evidence types. In a focus 
group, discussion among group members is stimulated through structured 
interviewing techniques (Morgan, 1988). Focus groups were, for instance, used in 
Reinard (2003). In this study, participants were asked to explain why they had 
marked some evidence instantiations as expectedly high or low on persuasion. 
This research method may provide valuable information about why people find 
expert evidence persuasive or not. In a focus group, members can be stimulated to 
discuss the role of expert evidence in their own culture. Such a discussion may 
further investigate the Kagitçibasi (1970) explanation by sorting out whether high 
persuasiveness of expert evidence is a personal or a cultural matter. The context in 
which participants can freely discuss matters with each other is also more similar 
to real life than the laboratory setting of the paper-and-pencil experiments. In sum, 
the use of focus groups may be effective in resolving problems discussed in 7.2.1, 
and in canceling out limitations of the experimental studies. 
A second suggestion for further research would also help solve problems 
mentioned earlier. In Study 1, expert evidence was the least popular evidence type. 
One of the explanations for this finding was that text writers, and the French in 
particular, may think that they do not need further support from other experts, as 
they are experts themselves. This explanation could be tested by asking students to 
write an essay about a topic that they are not knowledgeable about. In support of 
their claims, they would then have to use evidence types that would be provided 
beforehand in order to ensure a fair comparison of the evidence types. This design 
looks like Study 2, where students were asked to rank evidence types in terms of 
their expected persuasiveness. The proposed study, however, is interesting to 
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conduct, as the task (writing an essay) is more concrete than the task in Study 2. In 
this way, the persuasiveness of evidence types can be studied in a context that is 
more similar to real life persuasion. 
The route to persuasion (central or peripheral) was suggested as a possible 
explanation for results of Study 4. Without strong support for the use of either 
route, a third suggestion for further research is to set up an experiment in which 
participants can be expected to take ELM’s central route to persuasion. A review of 
Heckler and Childers (1992) demonstrated that people take this route when they 
are faced with incongruent information. Therefore, Dutch and French participants 
could be given incongruent information in support of a claim: positive (negative) 
statistical evidence from a Consumer’s Guide, and negative (positive) expert 
evidence. In different versions, statistical and expert evidence are both normatively 
strong (weak), or one of them is normatively strong and the other normatively 
weak. 
Limitations mentioned in 7.2.2 can easily be taken into account in further 
research. Instead of simple texts with claims and evidence, more realistic texts, 
such as essays, advertisements, or fundraising texts could be employed in an 
experimental setting. In a similar vein, experiments with between-subjects design 
could be conducted in order to avoid possible problems related to the carry over 
effect. Special attention could be paid to the selection of participants. Of course, it 
is recommended that people other than (Arts) students participate in such 
experiments. Also, it is important to select other cultures than the Dutch and the 
French. In this dissertation, the Dutch and the French cultures were selected to 
represent a large and a small power distance culture respectively. As these cultures 
also differed in uncertainty avoidance, a comparison of cultures that only differ in 
power distance is recommended. However, a close look at Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) 
scores of European countries shows that it is quite hard to find European countries 
that differ in power distance, but not on the three other value dimensions. Italy 
and Germany are relatively similar with respect to the three other dimensions, but 
their scores on power distance are not very different (54 and 35 respectively). 
Another way of selecting cultures is suggested by Van de Vijver and Leung (1997), 
who argue that the more cultures are included in a study, the more reliable the 
conclusions are about the effect of culture. In order to further investigate the effect 
of power distance on the relative expected and actual persuasiveness of expert 
evidence, then, studies could be conducted in several European cultures that are 
said to have a large (e.g., Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Spain) or a small power 
distance (e.g., Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, and Switzerland), 
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regardless of their scores on the other dimensions. An advantage of this procedure 
is that it would also allow testing across cultures of the Kagitçibasi (1970) 
suggestion of a personal versus a cultural norm for the persuasiveness of expert 
evidence. 
7.4  Epilogue 
The goal of this dissertation was to investigate whether there are cultural 
differences in the relative expected and actual persuasiveness of anecdotal, 
statistical, causal, and expert evidence. A number of studies that examined 
reasoning processes of cultures influenced by ancient Greece (e.g., Europe, United 
States), and of cultures affected by ancient the Chinese culture (e.g., China, Japan) 
have demonstrated that culture may influence the ways in which people process 
and use information to make decisions (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & 
Norenzayan, 2001). In this dissertation, two cultures were selected that are highly 
similar: the Dutch and the French culture. These cultures have the same Greek 
roots of reasoning and argumentation. Finding cultural differences, however small, 
in the relative persuasiveness of evidence types between two such similar cultures 
provides strong support for the impact of culture. Not only was the relative 
persuasiveness of evidence types different for the Dutch and French participants, 
one of the studies also demonstrated that the two cultures differed in the 
importance of norms for the persuasiveness of strong evidence. Whether 
normatively strong evidence is indeed more persuasive than normatively weak 
evidence appears culture-dependent. Together with the results of the other studies 
in this dissertation, this finding may stimulate further research on the impact of 
culture on the relative persuasiveness of evidence types and, more generally, on 
argument quality. 
Notes 
1.  The French participants in Study 2 expected statistical evidence to be the most 
persuasive type of evidence, but to the other French participants in Study 3 expert 
evidence was as persuasive as statistical evidence in practice. Anecdotal and causal 
evidence were the least persuasive types of evidence in both studies. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1.  Normative criteria for the types of evidence 
 
type of evidence                 normative criteria 
statistical/anecdotal 
(general claim) 
- the cases in the evidence should be representative of 
the class of cases in the claim 
- the number of cases in the evidence should be 
sufficiently large in order to allow valid 
generalizations about the class of cases in the claim 
  
statistical 
(specific claim) 
- the cases in the evidence should be representative of 
the class of cases to which the case that is presented in 
the claim belongs 
- the number of cases in the evidence should be 
sufficiently large in order to allow valid 
generalizations about the class of cases to which the 
case in the claim belongs 
- the cases in the evidence should be highly similar to 
the case presented in the claim 
  
anecdotal 
(specific claim) 
- there should be a large number of relevant similarities 
between the case in the evidence and the case in the 
claim 
- there should be no relevant dissimilarities between 
the case in the evidence and the case in the claim 
  
causal - the cause and the effect should covary 
- the cause should come into play before the effect 
occurs 
- there should not be other variables that trouble the 
causal relationship, nor in a positive way (the 
relationship only holds if another variable is present), 
nor in a negative way (the relationship does not hold 
if another variable is present) 
  
expert - the expert should be credible 
- the expert should be reliable 
- the expert should have a high expertise in the field 
that the claim he underscores is relevant for 
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Appendix B 
 
Anecdotal and statistical evidence in cognitive psychological experiments 
 
In Chapter 3, I referred to experiments in cognitive psychology whose results differed from 
studies presented in the review. In these psychological experiments, the normative criteria 
of a large sample size and high representativeness did not affect people’s judgments, and 
anecdotal evidence had more impact than statistical evidence. This last difference could be 
attributed to the type of claim: whereas most of the evidence studies used general claims 
(see Table 3.1), the majority of the cognitive psychological studies concerned a specific 
claim. However, there appears to be a more compelling explanation for the difference in 
results. The objective of this appendix is to show that the persuasive impact of anecdotal 
evidence, the relatively small impact of statistical evidence, and the lack of effect of 
differences in sample size and representativeness result from the specific research designs. 
As reviews on evidence have selected these studies (e.g., Baesler & Burgoon, 1994; Reinard, 
1988), and the underlying theoretical background of these studies (Tversky and Kahneman’s 
heuristics) has been adopted as an explanation for the persuasiveness of anecdotal evidence, 
these studies deserve special attention here. I will first introduce the theoretical background, 
the design, and the results of cognitive psychological experiments on anecdotal and 
statistical evidence. Next, the presentation of a series of more recent cognitive psychological 
studies will demonstrate that statistical evidence has more impact under circumstances that 
differ from those in the original research designs, and that – as a consequence – the norms of 
sample size and representativeness do matter. 
 
Theoretical background, design, and results of the cognitive psychological experiments 
In experiments on the persuasiveness of evidence types, people are confronted with claims 
and evidence that they process in order to make a judgment. Cognitive psychologists are 
interested in this process of information gathering, making sense of it, and using it to reach 
a certain goal. When normative models on information processing were empirically tested, 
people’s behavior was often characterized by errors and biases in comparison with the 
normative rules. People sometimes rely on strategies that are normatively weaker but easier 
to use. These strategies are knowledge structures, such as schemata and beliefs, and 
heuristics (e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Heuristics lead to a rapid, easy form of reasoning. In 
itself, as Nisbett and Ross stress, the use of heuristics is a valid way to arrive at a judgment, 
but it often results in errors and biases. One of the most important contributions to the study 
of heuristics in human judgments comes from Tversy and Kahneman’s heuristics and biases 
program (see handbooks of Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & 
Tversky, 1982). In a number of studies, Tversky and Kahneman have advanced heuristics 
that explain people’s biases and errors in judgments, such as the representativeness 
heuristic, the availability heuristic, and anchoring and adjustment. The representativeness 
heuristic is relevant here.  
 A classic experiment on this heuristic is Kahneman and Tversky (1973). This study was 
presented in Section 3.1.1. Participants based their judgments on the attributes in the 
descriptions (anecdotal evidence), and ignored the explicitly stated statistics (statistical 
evidence). These findings were explained with the representativeness heuristic. People use 
this heuristic to make inferences about the probability that a person belongs to a group or 
that an event belongs to a sequence of events. Instead of integrating statistical information 
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with the individuating information, people ignore the statistical information, which results 
in a series of errors. The errors that result from the use of this heuristic can be related to 
three findings that I referred to in Chapter 3: 
 
1. Anecdotal evidence has more impact than statistical evidence 
As was shown in the Kahneman and Tversky (1973) experiment, people neglect 
statistical information when they have to make a probability judgment, and base 
their decision on individuating information.  
 
2. The norm of a large sample size is not important 
People do not mind generalizing from one single case. This insensitivity to sample 
size has been referred to as the belief in the law of small numbers (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1971).  
 
3. The norm of high representativeness is not important 
People generalize from single cases regardless of whether the sample is typical of 
the population or not (e.g., Hamill, Wilson, & Nisbett, 1980; Nisbett & Borgida, 
1975; Strange & Leung, 1999).  
 
The original work of Tversky and Kahneman (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1971), replications 
in psychological studies (e.g., Nisbett & Borgida, 1975), and mass communication studies 
(e.g., Brosius & Bathelt, 1994) have consistently shown these errors. Below, I will discuss 
studies that prove that these three findings are the result of the research design in which 
anecdotal and statistical evidence were presented in competition. 
 
Artefacts of the research design 
In the studies on the representativeness heuristic, participants typically did not use 
statistical information to form a judgment. Some researchers claimed that their behavior is 
quite normal (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p. 12): 
 
“Consider Kahneman and Tversky’s well-known engineer/lawyer problem. When 
asked whether a given description is likely to belong to an engineer or lawyer, one 
cannot fail to compute the similarity between the description and each professional 
stereotype. Both the immediacy and relevance of this assessment of similarity, then, 
make it highly likely that one’s very definition of what the task is about will be 
hijacked. A question about likelihood is construed as a question about ‘fit’. And there is 
nothing artifactual about the switch” 
 
Bar-Hillel (1980, p. 217) explained that, when base-rate information and individuating 
information are presented in competition, “people may be ordering information by its 
perceived degree of relevance to the problem they are judging”. High relevance information 
renders other information irrelevant. Anecdotal evidence is often more specific than 
statistical evidence in relation to the judgmental task. As participants especially relied on 
this anecdotal evidence, the base rates were not relevant anymore. As a result, anecdotal 
evidence had more impact than statistical evidence (1), and the norms of large sample size 
(2) and high representativeness (3) were not important. Numerous studies have commented 
on the biased comparison of individuating and base-rate information in Tversky and 
Kahneman’s experiments (e.g., Ginossar & Trope, 1980; Zukier & Pepitone, 1984). These 
studies claim that base-rate neglect is an artefact of the research design, and show that 
statistical evidence is persuasive if it is more relevant than in the Tversky and Kahneman 
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studies. Indirectly, these studies also suggest that the norms of sample size and 
representativeness are important. Base-rate information is more relevant, for instance, when 
it is more vidid, and when it is presented after anecdotal evidence. This will be shown 
below. 
 Vividness and salience – When base-rates are made more vivid and salient, they are 
more frequently used by participants to form a judgment (e.g., Ginossar & Trope, 1980; 
Zukier & Pepitone, 1984). In Ginossar and Trope, for instance, the individual case was made 
less useful for the task, less consistent or less related to the outcome categories than in the 
original Kahneman and Tversky (1973) study. Under these conditions, base-rate information 
had judgmental impact. In three experiments, Zukier and Pepitone showed that the context 
of the decision in the experiment, and the role of the participants both affect the importance 
of base-rate information on judgments. Participants who were instructed to solve the 
judgmental problems as scientists, for instance, assigned greater weight to base rates than 
participants who were instructed to solve the problems as clinical psychologists.  
Order effect – The order effect explanation holds that, as anecdotal evidence was 
always the second piece of information in the Tversky and Kahneman studies, it was more 
relevant, and therefore more influential than statistical evidence. This claim was advanced 
and supported in a series of seven experiments by Krosnick, Li and Lehman (1990). When 
statistical evidence was given after anecdotal evidence, it had greater influence on the 
participants’ assessment than when it was given before anecdotal evidence. This order or 
recency effect can be explained with reference to conversational conventions. People expect 
that, when a text writer decides to give extra information, this information must be highly 
relevant, and even more relevant than the first piece of evidence (see, for a discussion about 
conversational conventions and the Tversky and Kahneman studies, Hilton & Slugoski, 
2001). The information given in the second place therefore has more impact. 
 
Conclusion 
The objective of this appendix was to argue that findings of cognitive psychological 
experiments about sample size, representativeness, and the persuasive impact of anecdotal 
and statistical evidence have been mediated by their research design. When statistical 
information is made more relevant, it has a greater influence on people’s judgments than 
Tversky and Kahneman originally suggested. As a consequence, it is likely that the norms of 
large sample size and high representativeness are more important than the original studies 
suggested. 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C1.  Selected Dutch brochures (Study 1) 
 
brochure title (sender) pages 2nd coder* 
   
interest for other people   
Amsterdam heeft wat met Managua (Stichting Stedenband 
Amsterdam-Managua) 
6 h 
De ervaring van je leven (Holland World Youth) 4 s 
Geef een kind als Joli een betere toekomst! (Foster Parents Plan) 8 s 
Geef om dit kind (Stichting Liliane Fonds) 8 h 
Heerlijk smullen! (Solidaridad) 4 h 
Het kindje links is de moeder (Terre des Hommes) 6 h 
Ik zoek een huis waar ik voor donker binnen moet zijn (Federatie 
Pleegzorg) 
4 h 
In Nederland bent u vrij om lid te worden van Amnesty 
International (Amnesty International Nederland) 
8 h 
Max Havelaar meer dan lekker (Stichting Max Havelaar) 4 h 
Nederlanders naar Srebrenica (Werkgroep Nederland-Srebrenica) 6 h 
Teken van geweld (Vrouwen Informatie Punt Nicaragua) 4 h 
Wel eens een vluchteling de weg gewezen? (Stichting Voor 
Vluchtelingen & Nieuwkomers) 
2 s 
Zuivere koffie (-) 4 h 
   
societal interest   
‘Sport’vissen is niet zo sportief ... (Dierenbescherming Afdeling 
Den Haag) 
6 h 
   
receiver interest   
De o is weer in de maand: tijd voor de griepprik! (College voor 
zorgverzekeringen) 
8 h 
Geef kanker minder kans eet volop groente en fruit (Nederlandse 
Kankerbestrijding) 
8 h 
Hou de spanning erin (-) 4 s 
Mist, halveer je snelheid, verdubbel je afstand (Ministerie van 
Verkeer en Waterstaat) 
4 h 
Pas bij nul houden we op met tellen (Provinciaal Orgaan 
Verkeersveiligheid Brabant) 
8 h 
Rookoverlast? U kunt er wat aan doen (Stichting Volksgezondheid 
en Roken) 
12 s 
Tabak (Jellinek Preventie en Consultancy) 12 s 
Wat doet drank met u? (Nationaal Instituut voor 
Gezondheidsbevordering en Ziektepreventie) 
12 h 
   
* h = Hans Hoeken, s = Marianne Starren 
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Table C2.  Selected French brochures (Study 1) 
 
brochure title (sender) pages 2nd coder* 
   
interest for other people   
Amnesty International (Amnesty International) 6 s 
Avec vous le défi de la solidarité (Terre des Hommes France) 6 s 
Ensemble, brisons l'indifférence (Action des Chrétiens pour 
l’Abolition de la Torture) 
6 g 
Grâce à vous, Frères des Hommes les aide à construire leur vie 
(Frères des Hommes) 
10 s 
Grandir ensemble (Mouvement pour les Villages d’Enfants) 10 g 
La faim c’est quotidien (Action contre la Faim) 10 g 
Legs et donations en faveur du CCFD (Comité Catholique contre la 
Faim et pour le Développement) 
6 g 
Legs et donations: il y a autre chose à vivre que la misère 
(Fondation Abbé Pierre pour le Logement des Défavorisés) 
12 g 
Mouvement pour les villages d'enfants (Mouvement pour les 
villages d'enfants) 
6 s 
Œuvrer ensemble (Orphelinat Mutualiste de la Police Nationale) 6 s 
On ne peut par dire qu’on ne peut rien faire (Action contre la Faim) 8 s 
Parrainez un enfant dans le monde (Centre français de protection 
de l’enfance) 
4 g 
Une vraie vie de famille en héritage (SOS Villages d’Enfants) 6 s 
   
societal interest   
Baleines et dauphins en liberté avec SOS Grand Bleu (SOS Grand 
Bleu) 
8 g 
   
receiver interest   
Écoute cancer (Ligue Nationale contre le Cancer) 6 s 
Et vous, avec l’alcool, vous en êtes où? (Comité Français 
d’Éducation pour la Santé) 
8 s 
Femmes et tabac (Comité Français d’Éducation pour la Santé) 6 s 
Le dopage: quelques informations pour votre sécurité (Préfecture 
de Police) 
6 g 
Le tabagisme passif (Comité Français d’Éducation pour la Santé) 16 g 
Protection rapprochée (Comité Français d’Éducation pour la Santé) 6 g 
Quand je serai grande, j’inventerai un vaccin contre la vitesse 
(Sécurité Routière) 
8 s 
Si chacun fait un peu, c’est la vie qui gagne (Sécurité Routière) 6 g 
   
* g = Marjan Groeneveld, s = Marianne Starren 
   
172  
 
 
Appendix D 
 
Table D1.  The origin of the 50 claims, and their presence in Studies 2, 3, 4, and 5 
 
claim origin* 2 3 4 5 
1. A course that is oriented to the labour market leads to better 
opportunities on that market for art history students. 
A x x   
2. Riding a bike over bad, bumpy roads promotes stronger bones.       
3. Listening to classical music helps students to absorb a lot of 
knowledge in a short period of time. 
A, C x x x  
4. A walk during lunch leads to higher work productivity in the 
afternoon. 
     
5. Twins that grow up apart from each other more often take an 
identical course in life than twins that grow up in the same family. 
B     
6. The introduction of a provisional driver’s licence is said to prevent 
reckless driving by drivers that have just passed their driving test. 
B     
7. Watching soaps reduces depression. C     
8. Drinking at least two liters of water a day reduces cellulite in 
women. 
A, C     
9. If children help with the cooking, they’ll have a greater appetite.      
10. A regular change of workplace within a company raises 
productivity at work. 
  x x x 
11. A national campaign in favor of breast-feeding is said to reduce 
the risk of smoking to children. 
C     
12. The regular consumption of pizzas reduces the risk of cancer.      
13. Library membership gives elderly people the feeling that they are 
less lonely. 
     
14. Playing computer games has a positive impact on people’s sense 
of direction. 
  x   
15. The introduction of a new Politics course is said to increase the 
interest of high school students in the field of politics. 
A, C     
16. Being employed as an intermediary by an employment agency 
helps you to find a job for later. 
  x   
17. Solving puzzles is a way for elderly people to prevent memory 
problems. 
     
18. Multicultural personnel promotes more innovative solutions in 
companies.  
     
19. A course of fruit juice helps people to attain their desired weight 
and maintain that weight. 
C  x   
20. The use of Internet reduces the feeling of social isolation that 
elderly people may have. 
C     
21. Playing slow music in supermarkets raises their turnover. B  x   
22. Boys’ performance at school can be improved by putting boys 
next to girls in class.  
 x x x  
23. Too tight a tie leads to reduced sight.   x x x 
24. Playing party games helps young criminals to become more 
socialized. 
 x x x x 
25. The consumption of cold beverages during exams leads to lower 
achievements in students. 
B  x   
* A = Hoeken & Hustinx, 2003a, B = Hoeken & Hustinx, 2003b, C = Hornikx & Hoeken, 2003 
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claim origin* 2 3 4 5 
26. The introduction of an education protocol against bullying 
prevents children from falling victim to such behavior.  
C  x   
27. The use of relaxation rooms in the office reduces absenteeism. A     
28. Compulsory work placement abroad leads to better performance 
in an international context. 
C     
29. Places of entertainment that are equipped with cameras give 
visitors a greater feeling of security. 
A     
30. Watching cartoons that were popular in their youth helps 
publicity agents to regain their creativity. 
 x x   
31. Eating paprika leads to better sporting performance.      
32. The use of a lightweight mouse and regular relaxation reduce the 
risk of RSI for people who often work with computers for hours a 
day. 
C     
33. Salesmen feel more involved in their company, when they use 
new media, such as a laptop with an Internet connection at home. 
 x x   
34. People who live in a city that attracts a lot of visitors have a 
strongly developed identity. 
     
35. Art in offices is good for the atmosphere at work.       
36. Descaling drinking water leads to more fractures in elderly 
people. 
B     
37. The consumption of basil in tomato pasta sauce improves 
sporting performance.  
  x x x 
38. Writing poems helps people to become more considerate 
towards others. 
     
39. Compulsory driving lessons for people over 70 years old reduces 
their uncertainty in traffic. 
A  x   
40. Reading regional newspapers increases the fear of becoming a 
crime victim. 
     
41. Waiters that repeat the orders of customers verbatim, receive a 
higher tip. 
  x x x 
42. Fear of driving cars can be taken away by riding along with a 
truck driver for a day. 
 x x x x 
43. Babies that are read to by their parents develop fewer language 
problems at school. 
B     
44. Keeping pets leads to better mental health in the elderly. B     
45. The increase in mobile phone use by car drivers leads to more 
road accidents. 
B     
46. Keeping photos of family and friends on the desk raises 
productivity at work. 
 x x x x 
47. Fear of flying decreases as a consequence of a balloon flight.   x x x 
48. Exercising for one hour twice a week is a solution to depression. A     
49. Swimming once a week helps to prevent RSI.      
50. Confronting young criminals with the victims of their behavior is 
an effective way to prevent them from reoffending. 
A     
* A = Hoeken & Hustinx, 2003a, B = Hoeken & Hustinx, 2003b, C = Hornikx & Hoeken, 2003 
 
 
174  
 
 
Table D2.  Fifty Dutch and French claims 
 
1.  Een cursus arbeidsmarktoriëntatie leidt tot betere kansen op de arbeidsmarkt voor 
studenten kunstgeschiedenis. / Les étudiants en histoire de l’art ont de meilleures 
chances sur le marché du travail après avoir suivi un cours d’orientation sur le marché 
du travail. 
2.  Door veel te fietsen over hobbelige, slechte wegen krijg je sterkere botten. / Faire du 
vélo sur de mauvaises routes cahoteuses renforce les os. 
3.  Het luisteren naar klassieke muziek helpt scholieren om in korte tijd veel kennis op te 
nemen. / En écoutant la musique classique lorsqu’ils étudient, les lycéens assimilent 
beaucoup de connaissances en peu de temps. 
4.  Een wandeling tijdens de lunch zorgt voor een hoge arbeidsproductiviteit in de 
middag. / Une promenade pendant la pause de midi stimule la productivité du travail 
dans l’après-midi. 
5.  Tweelingen die apart van elkaar opgroeien hebben vaker een identieke levensloop dan 
tweelingen die in hetzelfde gezin opgroeien. / Les jumeaux qui grandissent séparément 
ont plus souvent une vie identique que ceux qui évoluent dans la même famille. 
6.  De invoering van een voorlopig rijbewijs kan roekeloos rijgedrag van automobilisten 
die net hun rijbewijs hebben tegengaan. / L’introduction d’un permis de conduire 
provisoire peut prévenir l’imprudence au volant des automobilistes qui viennent 
d’obtenir leur permis. 
7.  Het kijken naar soaps leidt tot minder depressiviteit. / Regarder les feuilletons réduit 
les dépressions nerveuses. 
8.  Het drinken van minstens twee liter water per dag kan cellulitis bij vrouwen doen 
verminderen. / La consommation d’au moins deux litres d’eau par jour permet de 
réduire la cellulite des femmes. 
9.  Als kinderen zelf helpen bij het koken, krijgen ze meer eetlust. / La participation des 
enfants à la cuisine stimule leur appétit. 
10.  Het regelmatig veranderen van werkplek binnen hetzelfde bedrijf leidt tot een 
verhoging van de arbeidsproductiviteit. / Le changement régulier du lieu de travail au 
sein de la même entreprise entraîne une augmentation de la productivité du travail. 
11.  Een landelijke campagne vóór borstvoeding verkleint de kans op roken bij kinderen die 
geen borstvoeding hebben gehad. / Une campagne nationale en faveur de l’allaitement 
maternel réduit le risque pour les enfants non allaités par leur mère de développer un 
penchant au tabagisme. 
12.  Het regelmatig eten van pizza’s verkleint de kans op het krijgen van kanker. / La 
consommation régulière de pizzas réduit le risque du cancer. 
13.  Een lidmaatschap bij de bibliotheek geeft bejaarden het gevoel dat ze minder eenzaam 
zijn. / Une souscription à la bibliothèque aide les personnes âgées à se sentir moins 
seules. 
14.  Het spelen van computerspellen heeft een positieve invloed op het oriëntatievermogen. 
/ Les jeux électroniques exercent une influence positive sur le sens de l’orientation. 
15.  Het instellen van een verplicht vak Politiek op school kan de interesse van middelbare 
scholieren in politiek verhogen. / L’introduction au programme d’un cours obligatoire 
de sciences po stimule l’intérêt des lycéens à la vie politique. 
16.  Werken als intercedent helpt om later zelf een baan te vinden. / En travaillant comme 
intérimaire on trouvera plus facilement un emploi dans l’avenir. 
17.  Puzzelen is voor ouderen een manier om vergeetachtigheid tegen te gaan. / Les mots 
croisés aident les personnes âgées à prévenir les défauts de mémoire. 
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18.  Een multicultureel personeelsbestand op het werk zorgt voor meer innovatieve 
oplossingen. / En employant des salariés d’origine ethnique variée on favorise la 
créativité de la prise de decisions. 
19.  Door het volgen van een sapkuur komen en blijven veel mensen op het gewenste 
gewicht. / Les régimes à base de jus de fruits conduisent durablement au poids désiré. 
20.  Het gebruik van het internet kan het gevoel van sociale isolatie van ouderen 
verminderen. / L’utilisation d’Internet est un des moyens pour réduire l’isolement 
social dont souffrent les personnes âgées. 
21.  Het draaien van langzame muziek in supermarkten verhoogt de omzet. / La musique à 
cadence tempérée permet d’augmenter le chiffre d’affaires des supermarchés. 
22.  Schoolprestaties van jongens kunnen verbeterd worden door jongens naast meisjes in 
de schoolbanken te zetten. / Les performances scolaires des garçons s’améliorent 
quand ils sont placés à côté des filles en classe. 
23.  Een te strakke stropdas leidt tot een verminderd gezichtsvermogen. / Une cravate trop 
serrée mène à une vue réduite. 
24.  Het spelen van gezelschapsspelletjes leidt ertoe dat jonge criminelen socialer worden. / 
En jouant à des jeux de société, les délinquants juvéniles deviennent plus sociables. 
25.  Koude dranken drinken tijdens een tentamen leidt tot slechtere prestaties bij studenten. 
/ La consommation de boissons froides pendant les épreuves réduit les performances 
des étudiants. 
26.  Het invoeren van een onderwijsprotocol tegen pesten kan voorkomen dat kinderen de 
dupe worden van pesten. / L’introduction d’un protocole de l’établissement contre les 
tracasseries est un moyen pour éviter les tracasseries subies par les élèves. 
27.  Het gebruik van een ontspanningsruimte op het werk brengt het ziekteverzuim 
omlaag. / L’utilisation d’un espace de détente au travail réduit le taux d’absentéisme 
des salariés. 
28.  Een verplichte buitenlandse stage leidt ertoe dat mensen beter functioneren in een 
internationale bedrijfscontext. / Dans l’environnement économique international, un 
stage obligatoire à l’étranger mène à un meilleur fonctionnement. 
29.  Uitgaansgelegenheden die voorzien zijn van camera’s geven de bezoekers een veiliger 
gevoel. / La vidéosurveillance dans les bars, théâtres ou restaurants renforce le 
sentiment de sécurité des clients. 
30.  Het kijken naar tekenfilms uit hun eigen jeugd helpt reclamemakers om weer creatief te 
zijn. / En regardant les dessins animés de leur jeunesse, les publicitaires retrouveront 
plus facilement leur créativité. 
31.  Het eten van paprika zorgt voor het neerzetten van betere sportprestaties. / La 
consommation de poivrons stimule les performances sportives. 
32.  Het gebruik van een lichtgewicht muis en regelmatig ontspannen vermindert de kans 
op RSI bij mensen die vaak urenlang achter de computer zitten. / L’utilisation d’une 
souris ultralégère et le respect de moments de détente réguliers réduisent le risque de 
LATR pour ceux qui passent souvent de longues heures devant l’écran. 
33.  Vertegenwoordigers voelen zich meer betrokken bij hun bedrijf door het gebruik van 
nieuwe media, zoals een laptop met internetverbinding thuis. / Grâce aux nouveaux 
médias, comme l’ordinateur portable avec une connexion Internet à la maison, les 
commerciaux se sentent plus impliqués dans leur entreprise. 
34.  Mensen die in een stad wonen die door veel toeristen wordt bezocht, hebben een sterk 
ontwikkeld identiteitsgevoel. / Les habitants d’une ville courue par les touristes 
développent une forte identité. 
35.  Kunst in bedrijfsruimtes is goed voor de sfeer op het werk. / Les oeuvres d’art exposées 
dans les entreprises stimulent l’ambiance au site de travail. 
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36.  Ontkalking van het drinkwater leidt tot meer botbreuken bij bejaarden. / Le détartrage 
de l’eau augmente le nombre de fractures parmi les personnes âgées. 
37.  Het eten van basilicum in de pastasaus verhoogt de sportprestaties. / Le basilic ajouté 
aux sauces pour accompagner les pâtes améliore les performances sportives. 
38.  Het schrijven van gedichten zorgt ervoor dat mensen attenter in de omgang worden. / 
Ecrire des poèmes mène à un comportement plus attentif envers l’autre. 
39.  Verplichte rijlessen voor mensen boven de 70 jaar kunnen hun onzekerheid in het 
verkeer wegnemen. / En imposant des leçons de conduite aux personnes de plus de 70 
ans, on peut supprimer leur incertitude au volant. 
40.  Het lezen van regionale dagbladen verhoogt de vrees om slachtoffer te worden van een 
misdrijf. / La lecture de journaux régionaux fait augmenter la peur d’être victime d’une 
agression. 
41.  Obers die bestellingen van hun klanten letterlijk herhalen, krijgen een hogere fooi. / Les 
garçons de café qui répètent littéralement les commandes de leurs clients, touchent des 
pourboires plus élevés. 
42.  Angst om auto te rijden kan worden opgelost door een dag mee te rijden met een 
vrachtwagenchauffeur. / Un des moyens pour supprimer la peur au volant, c’est de 
passer une journée aux côtés d’un routier qui conduit son camion. 
43.  Baby’s die worden voorgelezen door hun ouders hebben later minder taalproblemen op 
school. / Si les parents font régulièrement la lecture à leurs bébés, ils auront moins de 
problèmes linguistiques plus tard à l'école. 
44.  Het houden van huisdieren leidt tot een betere geestelijke gezondheid van bejaarden. / 
Prendre un animal domestique améliore la santé mentale des personnes âgées. 
45.  Het toenemend gebruik van mobiele telefoons achter het stuur leidt tot meer 
verkeersongelukken. / L’utilisation croissante du téléphone portable au volant fait 
augmenter le nombre d’accidents de la route. 
46.  Foto’s van familie en vrienden op het bureau verhogen de productiviteit op het werk. / 
En posant sur le bureau des photos de famille et d’amis, on augmente la productivité 
du travail. 
47.  Als gevolg van een vlucht met een luchtballon neemt de angst om te vliegen af. / La 
phobie de l’avion diminue après un vol en montgolfière. 
48.  Twee maal per week een uurtje sporten kan een oplossing zijn voor depressiviteit. / 
Faire du sport deux fois par semaine est un moyen pour résoudre les crises de 
dépressions nerveuses. 
49.  Een keer per week zwemmen helpt om RSI te voorkomen. / Faire de la natation une 
fois par semaine est un moyen pour prévenir les LATR. 
50.  Een confrontatie met de slachtoffers van hun gedrag is een effectief middel om 
herhaling bij jonge criminelen te voorkomen. / La confrontation des jeunes avec leurs 
victimes est un moyen efficace dans la lutte contre la récidive en matière de 
délinquance juvénile. 
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Table D3.  Probability ratings of 20 claims by Dutch (n = 30) and French (n = 28) 
     participants ordered from relatively improbable (a low score) to relatively  
    probable (a high score) (Dutch and French ratings are not significantly  
    different; the last claim does not precisely meet the first criterion mentioned in  
    Section 5.1.1: the mean probability rating is above 3.50) 
 
claim number* Dutch French mean 
42 2.10 2.25 2.18 
23  2.23 2.18 2.21 
25 2.37 2.21 2.29 
3 2.53 2.18 2.36 
19 2.43 2.36 2.40 
41 2.87 2.50 2.69 
37 2.70 2.71 2.71 
47 2.83 2.78 2.81 
46 2.77 2.96 2.87 
26 3.07 2.79 2.93 
1 3.10 2.89 3.00 
22 3.13 3.00 3.07 
24 3.20 3.21 3.21 
14 3.30 3.21 3.26 
16 3.53 3.04 3.29 
21 3.07 3.61 3.34 
30 3.50 3.32 3.41 
33 3.30 3.57 3.44 
10 3.23 3.64 3.44 
39 3.50 3.57 3.54 
mean 2.92 2.91 2.92 
* see Table D1 for the claims 
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Appendix E 
 
Table E1.  Dutch and French templates of the types of evidence (Studies 2, 3, 4, and 5) 
 
evidence Dutch French 
anecdotal Sinds [voornaam + achternaam] uit 
[plaats] de oorzaak heeft 
meegemaakt, is het gevolg 
opgetreden. 
Depuis que la cause s’est manifestée 
chez [prénom + nom] de [place], la 
conséquence s’est produite. 
   
statistical Uit een Nederlands onderzoek 
onder N personen is gebleken dat de 
consequentie bij X % van hen is 
opgetreden als gevolg van de 
oorzaak. 
Une étude française, se basant sur 
un échantillon de N personnes, a 
montré que la conséquence s’est 
produite à la suite de la cause pour 
X % d’entre eux. 
   
 De resultaten van een Nederlands 
onderzoek onder N personen lieten 
zien dat de consequentie bij X % van 
hen is opgetreden als gevolg van de 
oorzaak. 
Les résultats d’une étude française, 
se rapportant à N personnes, ont 
montré que la conséquence s’est 
produite à la suite de la cause pour 
X % d’entre eux. 
   
expert Volgens prof. dr. [naam] van de 
universiteit in [plaats], specialist / 
deskundige op het gebied van X, is 
[het standpunt[. 
D’après [nom], professeur à 
l’université de [place] et directeur de 
recherche au CNRS au laboratoire 
de X, [la thèse]. 
   
 Prof. dr. [naam], specialist / 
deskundige op het gebied van X aan 
de universiteit van [plaats], is [het 
standpunt[. 
[nom], professeur à l’université de 
[place] et directeur de recherche au 
CNRS, est spécialiste en X. Il 
souligne que [la thèse]. 
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Appendix F 
 
Table F1.  Equivalence of specific information used in Dutch and French material (Study 
2) (Figures in brackets correspond to the position in the databases given in 
Section 5.1.3) 
 
information Netherlands  France 
anecdotal names Bakker Moreau (10) 
 Van de Ven Fournier (21) 
 Heuvelmans  Lambert (24) 
 Mulder Robin (47) 
 Glastra Morin (48) 
 Elling Duval (54) 
 Claessens Picard (88) 
 Hesse  Roger (90) 
expert names  Timmermans Bonnet (32) 
 Westerveld Chevalier (41) 
 Meijer Clément (44) 
 Wildschut Masson (57) 
 De Groot  Marchand (65) 
 De Gauw Brunet (79) 
 Van Zanten Giraud (89) 
 Van Voorschoten Aubert (98) 
male first names  Jeroen (1) Sébastien (1) 
 Martijn (2) Nicolas (2) 
 Peter (3)  Julien (3) 
 Patrick (4) David (4) 
 Dennis (5) Cédric (5) 
 Mark (6)  Christophe (6) 
 Sander (7) Frédéric (7) 
 Marcel (9) Stéphane (9) 
extra names claim (22) Wouter (10) Olivier (10) 
 Chantal (6)  Sandrine (6) 
cities Den Haag (3) Lyon (3) 
 Eindhoven (5)  Nice (5) 
 Tilburg (6) Nantes (6) 
 Breda (9)  Le Mans (19) 
 Apeldoorn (11) Le Havre (11) 
 Enschede (12) Reims (12) 
 ’s-Hertogenbosch (16) Toulon (15) 
 Haarlemmermeer (18) Brest (18) 
 Dordrecht (20) Dijon (20) 
universities Utrecht (1) Strasbourg (2) 
 Groningen (3) Lille (3) 
 Rotterdam (4)  Lyon (4) 
 VU Amsterdam (5) Bordeaux (5) 
 Leiden (6) Grenoble (6) 
 Maastricht (9)  Toulouse (8) 
 Twente (12) Rennes (12) 
 Wageningen (13) Angers (13) 
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Appendix G 
 
Table G1.  Equivalence of specific information used in Dutch and French material (Study 
3) (Figures in brackets correspond to the position in the databases given in 
Section 5.1.3) 
 
information Netherlands France 
anecdotal names Van de Ven  Fournier (21) 
 Heuvelmans  Lambert (24) 
 Glastra  Morin (48) 
 Elling Duval (54) 
expert names Timmermans Bonnet (32) 
 Westerveld Chevalier (41) 
 De Groot Marchand (65) 
 Van Zanten Giraud (89) 
male first names Peter (3) Julien (3) 
 Patrick (4) David (4) 
 Mark (6)  Christophe (6) 
 Marcel (9) Stéphane (9) 
extra names claim (22)  Chantal (6) Sandrine (6) 
 Wouter (10)  Olivier (10) 
cities Apeldoorn (11) Le Havre (11) 
 Enschede (12) Reims (12) 
 Haarlemmermeer (18)  Brest (18) 
 Dordrecht (20) Dijon (20) 
universities Utrecht (1) Strasbourg (2) 
 Rotterdam (4) Lyon (4) 
 VU Amsterdam (5) Bordeaux (5) 
 Leiden (6) Grenoble (6) 
         
  181 
 
 
Table G2.  Number of participants in each version in function of country, city, and group 
    (Study 3) 
 
country   city    total version     
          1  2  3  4  5  
Netherlands  Amsterdam  13  2  3  3  3  2 
        29  6  6  5  5  7 
    Delft   23  3  5  5  6  4 
    Groningen  46  11  10  8  7  10 
    Nijmegen  39  8  0  5  8  18 
        51  13  11  12  10  5 
        18  0  14  2  2  0 
    Tilburg   16  3  3  4  3  3 
        70  15  9  17  17  12  
    total   305  61  61  61  61  61 
 
France   Angers   30  6  0  6  11  7 
    Paris   75  27  21  9  1  17 
        32  0  9  13  8  2  
    Roubaix   34  5  0  11  16  2 
     Toulouse  26  5  7  2  7  5 
    Tours   34  5  7  6  8  8 
        64  11  15  12  8  18 
    total   295  59  59  59  59  59 
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Appendix H 
 
Table H1.  Equivalence of specific information used in Dutch and French material (Study 
4) (Figures in brackets correspond to the position in the databases given in 
Section 5.1.3) 
 
information Netherlands France 
anecdotal names Bakker Moreau (10) 
 Van de Ven Fournier (21) 
 Heuvelmans  Lambert (24) 
 Glastra  Morin (48) 
 Elling Duval (54) 
expert names Timmermans Bonnet (32) 
 Westerveld Chevalier (41) 
 De Groot Marchand (65) 
 Van Zanten  Giraud (89) 
male first names Jeroen (1) Sébastien (1) 
 Peter (3)  Julien (3) 
 Patrick (4) David (4) 
 Mark (6)  Christophe (6) 
 Marcel (9) Stéphane (9) 
cities Eindhoven (5) Nice (5) 
 Breda (9) Le Mans (19) 
 Apeldoorn (11) Le Havre (11) 
 Den Bosch (16) Toulon (15) 
 Haarlemmermeer (18)  Brest (18) 
universities Groningen (3) Lille (3) 
 Rotterdam (4) Lyon (4) 
 VU Amsterdam (5) Bordeaux (5) 
 Leiden (6) Grenoble (6) 
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Table H2.  Number of participants in each version in function of country, city, and group 
    (Study 4) 
 
country   city    total version     
          1  2  3  4  5  
Netherlands  Amsterdam  26  3  9  4  5  5 
        18  4  4  3  4  3 
        12  0  0  0  3  9 
        17  3  3  5  3  3 
    Delft   14  4  4  2  2  2 
        7  3  2  0  1  1 
    Enschede  7  2  2  1  2  7 
        14  4  5  0  5  0 
        7  0  0  7  0  0 
    Tilburg   37  7  8  10  5  7 
        52  10  11  12  10  9  
        12  2  1  1  2  6 
    Nijmegen  77  18  11  15  18  15 
    total   300  60  60  60  60  60 
 
France   Besançon  49  11  13  7  10  8 
    Paris   33  9  6  6  7  5 
        23  6  3  6  4  4 
    Roubaix   58  10  13  13  10  12 
    Strasbourg  11  2  3  1  2  3 
        5  1  1  1  1  1 
        11  3  2  3  2  1 
        12  4  1  3  3  1 
        16  0  4  2  4  6  
        10  1  2  2  2  3 
     Tours   72  13  12  16  15  16 
    total   300  60  60  60  60  60 
 
 
 
 
  
184  
 
 
Appendix I 
 
Selected items of the RWA scale (Studies 4 and 5) 
RWA items close to the concept of power distance were selected. As Altemeyer (1981, 1988) 
does not indicate to which of the three concepts each item refers (see Section, 6.4.4), I 
selected 14 potential items of Altemeyer (1988, pp. 22-23): items 22, 12, 3, 5, 17, 23, 16, 26, 2, 
29, 7, 1, 9, and 30. At the same time, nine pairs of Dutch students (Radboud University 
Nijmegen) were asked to rank Altemeyer’s (1988) RWA items from most appropriate to 
measure power distance to least appropriate to measure power distance. Subsequently, the 
10 lists were compared, and finally 10 items were selected. These items were available in 
Dutch (Meloen, 1991), but were adapted into contemporary Dutch. The adapted items were 
translated into French by the translation agency France Intermédiaire (Nijmegen), of which 
a second person back translated the French items into Dutch. The 10 items were (numbers 
corresponding to Altemeyer, 1988, pp. 22-23): 
 
2.  It is wonderful that young people today have greater freedom to protest against 
things they don’t like and ‘do their own thing’. 
 
3.  It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government 
and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying 
to create doubt in people’s minds. 
 
5.  It would be best for everyone if the proper authorities censored magazines and 
movies to keep thrashy material away from the youth. 
 
7.  The sooner we get rid of the traditional family structure, where the father is the 
head of the family and the children are taught to obey authority automatically, the 
better. The old-fashioned way has a lot wrong with it. 
 
12.  Obedience and respect are the most important virtues children should learn. 
 
17.  In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when 
dealing with agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things up. 
 
22.  If a child starts becoming unconventional and disrespectful of authority, it is his 
parents’ duty to get him back to the normal way. 
 
23.  In the final analysis the established authorities, like parents and our national 
leaders, generally turn out to be right about things, and all the protesters don’t 
know what they’re talking about. 
 
26.  The real keys to the ‘good life’ are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight 
and narrow. 
 
29.  Students in high school and university must be encouraged to challenge their 
parents’ ways, confront established authorities, and in general criticize the customs 
and traditions of our society. 
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Appendix J 
 
Table J1.  Equivalence of specific information used in Dutch and French material (Study 
5) (Figures in brackets correspond to the position in the databases given in 
Section 5.1.3) 
 
information Netherlands France 
expert names  Timmermans Bonnet (32) 
 Westerveld Chevalier (41) 
 Meijer Clément (44) 
 De Groot Marchand (65) 
 De Gauw Brunet (79) 
 Van Zanten Giraud (89) 
 Van Voorschoten  Aubert (98) 
universities Utrecht (1) Paris (1) 
 Groningen (3) Lille (3) 
 Rotterdam (4) Lyon (4) 
 VU Amsterdam (5) Bordeaux (5) 
 Leiden (6) Grenoble (6) 
 Maastricht (9) Toulouse (8) 
 Twente (12) Rennes (12) 
 Wageningen (13)  Angers (13) 
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Summary in Dutch 
Overtuigende teksten hebben vaak als doel mensen over te halen iets te doen of 
iets te laten. Als er in die teksten argumenten worden aangedragen en mensen 
deze argumenten kritisch beoordelen, dan is de kwaliteit van de aangedragen 
argumenten van belang: sterke argumenten zijn overtuigender dan zwakke 
argumenten. Helaas is er nog weinig bekend in welk opzicht sterke argumenten 
zich onderscheiden van zwakke. In dit proefschrift wordt argumentkwaliteit 
bestudeerd door de overtuigingskracht van evidentie te onderzoeken. Evidentie 
wordt als ondersteuning voor standpunten gebruikt in argumentatie. Er zijn 
verschillende evidentietypen: statistische, anekdotische, causale en 
expertevidentie. Door de relatieve overtuigingskracht van deze typen te 
bestuderen, wordt het inzicht in argumentkwaliteit vergroot. Hoewel 
verschillende onderzoekers hebben onderstreept dat de overtuigingskracht van 
evidentietypen zou kunnen afhangen van cultuur, is hiernaar nog nooit onderzoek 
verricht. Recent psychologisch onderzoek heeft laten zien dat mensen die variëren 
in culturele achtergrond kunnen verschillen in de manieren waarop ze redeneren. 
Omdat evidentie een rol kan spelen in deze redeneerprocessen, is het mogelijk dat 
ook de relatieve overtuigingskracht van de vier evidentietypen door cultuur wordt 
beïnvloed. De algemene onderzoeksvraag luidt daarom: 
 
Onderzoeksvraag 1 Zijn er culturele verschillen in de relatieve overtuigingskracht 
van statistische, anekdotische, causale en expertevidentie? 
 
Meer specifiek zou de overtuigingskracht van expertevidentie gerelateerd kunnen 
zijn aan machtsafstand, de mate waarin er in een cultuur geaccepteerd wordt dat 
macht (bijvoorbeeld geld, invloed en kennis) ongelijk verdeeld is in de 
samenleving. In culturen met een grote machtsafstand zoals de Franse wordt een 
ongelijke machtsverdeling verwacht en geaccepteerd. In dergelijke culturen zou 
expertevidentie overtuigender kunnen zijn dan in culturen met een kleine 
machtsafstand zoals de Nederlandse. Immers, mensen accepteren dan dat er 
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anderen zijn die meer weten over bepaalde onderwerpen dan zijzelf. De specifieke 
onderzoeksvraag luidt daarom: 
 
Onderzoeksvraag 2 Is de overtuigingskracht van expertevidentie groter in Frankrijk 
dan in Nederland? 
 
Om deze vragen te beantwoorden zijn vijf studies uitgevoerd. In de eerste twee 
studies is de verwachte overtuigingskracht onderzocht: hoe overtuigend 
verwachten mensen dat de vier evidentietypen zijn voor anderen in hun cultuur? 
In de derde en vierde studie is de daadwerkelijke overtuigingskracht onderzocht. 
Deze studies doen uitspraken over hoe overtuigend de vier evidentietypen in 
werkelijkheid zijn. De vijfde en laatste studie is opgezet om een verklaring voor 
een resultaat in de vierde studie te toetsen. 
Normatieve criteria en overtuigingskracht 
Als er in overtuigende teksten gebruik wordt gemaakt van argumenten, dan 
gebeurt dit meestal door in te gaan op de voordelen van het aanbevolen gedrag 
(een snelle internetverbinding door een ADSL-aansluiting), of op de nadelen van 
het afgeraden gedrag (misselijkheid door dagelijkse sherryconsumptie). Deze 
vorm van argumentatie wordt pragmatische argumentatie of argumentatie op 
basis van voor- en nadelen genoemd. De redenering in pragmatische argumentatie 
is als volgt: als de gevolgen van gedrag (on)wenselijk zijn, dan is het gedrag het 
ook. Een voorbeeld: ‘misselijkheid is onwenselijk, dus het dagelijkse drinken van 
sherry is onwenselijk’. Pragmatische argumentatie wordt vaak gebruikt, maar leidt 
het er ook toe dat de lezer wordt overtuigd? Alleen als mensen gemotiveerd en 
capabel zijn om de argumenten in een tekst kritisch te beoordelen, is de kwaliteit 
van de argumenten belangrijk. Sterke argumenten zijn dan overtuigender dan 
zwakke argumenten. In de eerste twee hoofdstukken laat ik zien dat een sterk 
pragmatisch argument in overtuigende teksten een argument is dat het (a) heel 
waarschijnlijk maakt dat een gevolg gaat optreden en dat het (b) heel aannemelijk 
maakt dat dit gevolg wenselijk of juist onwenselijk is. Een lezer die argumenten 
kritisch beoordeelt, zal niet zomaar aannemen dat het oorzakelijke verband zal 
optreden. Evidentie kan dan worden ingezet om het waarschijnlijker te maken dat 
bijvoorbeeld het dagelijks drinken van sherry tot misselijkheid leidt. 
Er zijn grofweg vier evidentietypen: (1) statistische evidentie met een 
getalsmatige samenvatting van een aantal gevallen, (2) anekdotische evidentie 
waarbij een specifiek geval wordt gepresenteerd, (3) causale evidentie met een 
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verklaring en (4) expertevidentie, ten slotte, waarbij een deskundige wordt 
aangehaald. Hieronder staan deze evidentietypen voor het standpunt over 
misselijkheid als gevolg van sherry: 
 
(1) Uit een steekproef van 267 mensen bleek 78% van hen last van misselijkheid te 
hebben na het dagelijks drinken van sherry 
 
(2) Sinds Johan Kaarsemaker uit Assen dagelijks sherry drinkt, heeft hij 
regelmatig last van misselijkheid 
 
(3)  Alcohol komt in het bloed terecht en tast zo de maag en het evenwichtsorgaan 
in de hersenen aan 
 
(4)  Volgens alcoholdeskundige prof. dr. F. Klassen van de Universiteit Utrecht 
leidt het dagelijks drinken van sherry tot misselijkheid 
 
In de argumentatietheorie zijn normen geformuleerd voor sterke en zwakke 
argumentatie. Voor mensen die argumenten kritisch beoordelen zouden die 
normen van belang moeten zijn: normatief sterke argumenten zijn dan 
overtuigender dan normatief zwakke argumenten. In hoofdstuk 2 worden deze 
normatieve criteria toegepast op de vier evidentietypen. Expertevidentie, 
bijvoorbeeld, is normatief sterk als de expert die wordt aangehaald geloofwaardig 
is, betrouwbaar is en een hoge mate van expertise heeft op het gebied waarover het 
standpunt gaat dat hij onderstreept. Als mensen een tekst kritisch verwerken, dan 
zou normatief sterke evidentie overtuigender moeten zijn dan normatief zwakke 
evidentie. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een overzicht gegeven van empirische studies 
waarin onderzocht is of de normen voor overtuigende evidentie er in de praktijk 
ook echt toe doen. Hoewel het aantal onderzoeken niet groot is, suggereert dit 
overzicht dat dit inderdaad het geval is. In het laatste gedeelte van hoofdstuk 3 
volgt een tweede overzicht, namelijk van de relatieve daadwerkelijke 
overtuigingskracht van verschillende evidentietypen. De voorzichtige conclusie 
van dit overzicht is dat statistische, causale en expertevidentie overtuigender zijn 
dan anekdotische evidentie. 
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Studies 1 en 2: verwachte overtuigingskracht 
In de enkele onderzoeken naar de verwachte overtuigingskracht van 
evidentietypen is de verwachte overtuigingskracht op twee manieren gemeten: 
indirect aan de hand van het gebruik van evidentie door taalgebruikers en direct 
aan de hand van experimenten. Bij de indirecte onderzoeken is de aanname dat het 
gebruik van evidentietypen door schrijvers of proefpersonen een indicator is voor 
de mate waarin ze verwachten dat de evidentietypen overtuigend zijn. De twee 
manieren van meten zijn beide in dit proefschrift toegepast: de corpusanalytische 
benadering in Studie 1 en de experimentele benadering in Studie 2. 
Studie 1 is opgezet met het doel te onderzoeken of er (a) culturele verschillen 
zijn in het relatieve gebruik van de vier evidentietypen in overtuigende 
communicatie in Nederland en Frankrijk en of (b) expertevidentie daarbij vaker 
wordt gebruikt in Frankrijk. Onafhankelijke beoordelaars analyseerden het 
vóórkomen van evidentie als ondersteuning voor standpunten in pragmatische 
argumentatie in 22 Nederlandse en 22 Franse overtuigende voorlichtings-
brochures. De resultaten lieten in de eerste plaats zien dat er inderdaad culturele 
verschillen waren in het gebruik van de vier evidentietypen in het Nederlandse en 
het Franse corpus. In de tweede plaats bleek expertevidentie relatief vaker te 
worden gebruikt door de Franse tekstschrijvers dan door hun Nederlandse 
collega’s. Expertevidentie werd nauwelijks gebruikt in Nederlandse overtuigende 
folders en in beperkte mate in de Franse folders. Omdat tekstschrijvers 
professionals zijn van wie verwacht mag worden dat ze ideeën hebben over wat 
wel en wat niet overtuigend werkt, is het aannemelijk om te veronderstellen dat de 
culturele verschillen in het gebruik van evidentietypen een indicatie zijn voor de 
verwachte overtuigingskracht van deze evidentietypen. Een beperking van dit 
corpusonderzoek is dat het twijfelachtig is of de tekstschrijvers bij elke beslissing 
om evidentie te gebruiken de beschikking hadden over alle vier de evidentietypen. 
Om deze tekortkoming weg te nemen is er in Studie 2 voor gezorgd dat de 
proefpersonen vrij konden kiezen uit de vier evidentietypen. 
Studie 2 is een experiment uit de serie van vier experimenten waarvoor 
hetzelfde basismateriaal is ontwikkeld: een aantal standpunten met bijbehorende 
evidentietypen. In een vooronderzoek zijn twintig standpunten geselecteerd die 
even waarschijnlijk waren gevonden door Franse en Nederlandse studenten. Een 
voorbeeld van een standpunt is ‘Het eten van basilicum in de pastasaus verhoogt 
de sportprestaties’. Voor elk standpunt zijn vier evidentietypen ontwikkeld. De 
evidentie voldeed aan de normatieve criteria uit hoofdstuk 2. Voor anekdotische 
evidentie was dit onmogelijk, omdat dit evidentietype normatief zwak is. Immers, 
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om te generaliseren naar het standpunt zou het gebaseerd moeten zijn op een groot 
aantal gevallen, maar het gaat juist uit van één geval. Voor causale evidentie 
bleken de normen ook moeilijk om te operationaliseren. Door het vertalen en 
terugvertalen van de Nederlandse en Franse standpunten en evidentie was het 
materiaal in beide talen in hoge mate vergelijkbaar.  
De vragenlijsten waren in elk experiment schriftelijk en werden in hoor- of 
werkcolleges door studenten ingevuld. In die vragenlijsten is ook een schaal 
opgenomen om eventuele culturele verschillen te kunnen verklaren. Mocht 
expertevidentie overtuigender blijken in Frankrijk dan in Nederland, dan zou dat 
aan machtsafstand kunnen liggen, maar ook aan heel andere factoren. Daarom kan 
er gecontroleerd worden of de Franse proefpersonen inderdaad hoger scoren op 
waarden die zijn gerelateerd aan machtsafstand dan de Nederlandse 
proefpersonen. Omdat het meten van waarden op proefpersoonniveau problemen 
met zich meebrengt, zo wordt betoogd in hoofdstuk 5, is de Voorkeur voor 
Expertinformatie (VVE) schaal ontwikkeld. Van deze schaal wordt verwacht dat 
hij samenhangt met de overtuigingskracht van expertevidentie. Daarnaast wordt 
van de Franse proefpersonen verwacht dat ze een grotere voorkeur voor 
expertinformatie hebben dan de Nederlandse proefpersonen. 
In Studie 2 kregen Franse en Nederlandse studenten acht standpunten met 
telkens de vier evidentietypen. Voor elke standpunt moest een rangschikking 
gemaakt worden van het evidentietype waarvan ze verwachtten dat het het meest 
overtuigend is tot het type waarvan ze verwachtten dat het het minst overtuigend 
is. Proefpersonen vulden ook de VVE-schaal in. De resultaten van dit experiment 
lieten zien dat er culturele verschillen waren in relatieve verwachte 
overtuigingskracht van de vier evidentietypen. Nederlandse proefpersonen 
verwachtten dat statistische evidentie overtuigender was dan de Franse 
proefpersonen en het omgekeerde gold voor anekdotische evidentie. De 
gemiddelde rangschikking voor expertevidentie was hetzelfde in beide culturen, 
maar expertevidentie stond wel vaker bovenaan de rangschikking bij de Franse 
proefpersonen dan bij de Nederlandse proefpersonen. Dit culturele verschil kon 
niet worden toegeschreven aan de VVE-schaal, omdat de scores op deze schaal in 
beide culturen niet verschilden. Studies 1 en 2 tonen aan dat culturen kunnen 
verschillen in de verwachtingen die ze hebben van de overtuigingskracht van 
evidentietypen. Of de evidentietypen ook daadwerkelijk verschillen in 
overtuigingskracht in Nederland en Frankrijk, is onderzocht in de drie andere 
onderzoeken. 
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Studies 3, 4 en 5: daadwerkelijke overtuigingskracht 
In hoofdstuk 6 worden drie onderzoeken gepresenteerd die zijn uitgevoerd om na 
te gaan of er (a) culturele verschillen zijn in de relatieve daadwerkelijke 
overtuigingskracht van de vier evidentietypen en of (b) expertevidentie 
overtuigender is in Frankrijk dan in Nederland. Overtuigingskracht is in deze 
studies als volgt gemeten. De proefpersonen kregen een serie standpunten 
voorgelegd met telkens een ander evidentietype of geen evidentie. De verdeling 
van de evidentietypen over de standpunten was verschillend in de versies van de 
vragenlijst. Zodoende is een standpunt in elke versie door een ander evidentietype 
ondersteund. De overtuigingskracht van evidentie is het verschil tussen de 
waarschijnlijkheid van een standpunt mét evidentie en dat van een standpunt 
zónder evidentie. 
 In Studie 3 is de overtuigingskracht van de vier evidentietypen onderzocht 
door Nederlandse en Franse proefpersonen de waarschijnlijkheid van twintig 
standpunten met evidentie te laten beoordelen. De evidentie was, indien mogelijk, 
normatief sterk. De studenten vulden ook de VVE-schaal in. De resultaten van 
Studie 3 lieten zien dat er culturele verschillen waren in de relatieve 
overtuigingskracht van de vier evidentietypen. Expertevidentie was in absolute zin 
niet overtuigender voor de Franse proefpersonen dan voor de Nederlandse, maar 
wel in relatieve zin. Terwijl expertevidentie voor de Nederlandse proefpersonen 
samen met causale evidentie een middenpositie innam, was expertevidentie voor 
de Franse proefpersonen overtuigender dan causale en anekdotische evidentie. De 
VVE-schaal kon de relatief hogere overtuigingskracht van expertevidentie niet 
verklaren, aangezien er geen verschil was in de score op deze schaal voor de 
Franse en Nederlandse proefpersonen. De score op de VVE-schaal bleek daarnaast 
positief samen te hangen met de overtuigingskracht van expertevidentie voor de 
Nederlandse proefpersonen, maar niet voor de Franse. 
 In Studie 3 was normatief sterke expertevidentie in absolute zin niet 
overtuigender in Frankrijk dan in Nederland. Op basis van wat bekend is over 
machtsafstand kan verwacht worden dat er ook culturele verschillen zijn als 
expertevidentie normatief zwak is. In culturen met een grote machtsafstand 
zouden geloofwaardige en betrouwbare experts met een expertisegebied dat 
irrelevant is voor het standpunt nog steeds overtuigend kunnen zijn. De norm 
voor een relevant expertisegebied zou er niet toe doen, omdat de expert, 
bijvoorbeeld een hoogleraar, een hoge status heeft. In culturen met een kleine 
machtsafstand zou normatief zwakke expertevidentie wel minder overtuigend zijn 
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dan normatief sterke expertevidentie. Studie 4 is opgezet om deze verwachting te 
onderzoeken.  
Dit experiment bevatte dezelfde standpunten als in Studie 3, alleen nu met 
normatief sterke of zwakke statistische en expertevidentie. De zwakke varianten 
hadden een irrelevant expertisegebied (expertevidentie) of een kleinere steekproef 
en lagere percentages (statistische evidentie). Naast de VVE-schaal werd ook de 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) opgenomen. Van deze schaal – die 
onderdanigheid, agressie en conventionaliteit meet – is bekend dat hij samenhangt 
met de culturele dimensie machtsafstand. Er bleken echter geen verschillen te zijn 
in de scores op de VVE- en RWA-schaal voor de Franse en Nederlandse 
proefpersonen. Om te controleren of de ingeschatte expertise van normatief sterke 
experts hoger was dan van normatief zwakke experts moesten proefpersonen voor 
elke expert de ingeschatte expertise met betrekking tot het standpunt aangeven. Er 
was ook een controlevraag voor de manipulatie van normatief sterke en zwakke 
statistische evidentie. Beide manipulaties bleken succesvol, maar in veel hogere 
mate voor de Nederlandse dan voor de Franse proefpersonen. 
Uit de resultaten bleek dat er een cultureel verschil was in de 
overtuigingskracht van normatief sterke en normatief zwakke evidentie. 
Nederlandse proefpersonen vonden sterke evidentie overtuigender dan zwakke, 
terwijl evidentiekwaliteit er voor de Franse proefpersonen niet toe deed. Voor hen 
was normatief zwakke expertevidentie dus even overtuigend als normatief sterke 
expertevidentie. Dit culturele verschil kan worden toegeschreven aan het kleine 
verschil dat de Franse proefpersonen zagen in de expertise van normatief sterke en 
normatief zwakke experts. Op basis van machtsafstand kan gesuggereerd worden 
dat het expertisegebied onbelangrijk is voor Fransen, als de expert een hoge status 
heeft, zoals de professoren in het experimentele materiaal. Zo beredeneerd zou het 
belang van het expertisegebied moeten toenemen wanneer de experts minder hoog 
in aanzien staan. Studie 5 onderzocht of dit het geval is. 
 In Studie 5 gaven Nederlandse en Franse proefpersonen voor vier soorten 
experts de ingeschatte expertise met betrekking tot het standpunt aan: hoogleraren 
met een relevant of een irrelevant expertisegebied (zoals in Studie 4) en 
onderzoekers met een relevant of een irrelevant expertisegebied. De resultaten in 
Studie 4 werden in dit experiment gerepliceerd voor de hoogleraren en de 
onderzoekers. Ook bij experts met een lagere status (onderzoekers) had het 
expertisegebied geen effect op de ingeschatte expertise voor de Franse 
proefpersonen. Het resultaat in Studie 4 kan dus niet worden verklaard door de 
hoge status van de experts.  
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Conclusie en discussie 
De studies waarover in dit proefschrift wordt gerapporteerd, laten zien dat er 
culturele verschillen zijn in de relatieve verwachte en daadwerkelijke 
overtuigingskracht van statistische, anekdotische, causale en expertevidentie. 
Daarnaast blijkt expertevidentie overtuigender te zijn in Frankrijk dan in 
Nederland, maar zijn de verschillen genuanceerd. De verwachte 
overtuigingskracht van expertevidentie is slechts in geringe mate hoger in 
Frankrijk dan in Nederland (Studies 1 en 2). Normatief sterke (Studie 3) en 
normatief zwakke (Studie 4) expertevidentie is in absolute zin niet overtuigender 
in Frankrijk dan in Nederland, maar wel in relatieve zin.  
Bij het optreden van deze culturele verschillen met betrekking tot 
expertevidentie is het belangrijk om vast te stellen in hoeverre de verschillen 
kunnen worden toegeschreven aan machtsafstand. Een probleem dat werd 
gesignaleerd in alle experimenten, is dat de schalen op individueel 
proefpersoonniveau (VVE, RWA) de culturele verschillen niet konden verklaren. 
De gevonden resultaten kunnen dan ook niet empirisch worden toegeschreven aan 
verschillen in machtsafstand. In hoofdstuk 7 passeren enkele andere verklaringen 
de revue, waaronder onzekerheidsvermijding, het onderwijssysteem en de mate 
van kritisch verwerken. Veel van deze verklaringen zijn gerelateerd aan 
machtsafstand. Concluderend lijkt machtsafstand aan de ene kant een 
aannemelijke verklaring, maar aan de andere kant kan de invloed ervan in deze 
studies niet worden aangetoond. 
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt een aantal beperkingen van de studies besproken die 
betrekking hebben op het materiaal (standpunten met evidentie zonder de context 
van een overtuigende tekst) en de proefpersonen (alleen studenten). Deze 
beperkingen en de problemen die zijn opgetreden bij het meten van het effect van 
cultuur leiden tot een serie suggesties voor verder onderzoek, zoals het gebruik 
maken van focusgroepen, meer uitgebreide teksten met evidentie, andere 
proefpersonen en andere culturen. Dit soort onderzoek kan meer inzicht 
verschaffen in het optreden en in het verklaren van de invloed van cultuur op de 
relatieve overtuigingskracht van evidentietypen. 
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